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

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INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY-MAKING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By ROGER HILSMAN, Jr.

WHEN he set out to form a secret intelligence agency for President Roosevelt in 1941, "Wild Bill" Donovan made little effort to curb his own characteristic receptivity to the new, the different, and even the unorthodox. Completely in character, he took up with quick enthusiasm the novel idea that scholars—those dreamy inhabitants of ivory towers—would be ideal for the job. He believed that by searching through the Library of Congress and through the files of the many government agencies these men could uncover much of the information for which secret agents risked their lives. In a sense, he dedicated the Research and Analysis Branch of the wartime Office of Strategic Services to the task of making the romantic secret agent obsolete. Since then, more and more people have come to believe that research—and the social sciences—have at last found a home within the formal structure of government.[1] This belief alone is a good reason to examine the new intelligence, but there is still another: since the war, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Intelligence Research in the State Department, and even the intelligence units in the three service departments have elbowed their way into the business of foreign affairs and there they intend to stay.

A look at these new organizations is thus in order. The first task here will be to identify the doctrines which govern their role in foreign affairs and to deduce something of why these particular doctrines, of all the possible ones, came to reign. The second task will be to set up a working model of the intelligence function and, lastly, we shall attempt to evaluate American doctrine in the light of that model.

[1] See Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton, N.J., 1949; and George S. Pettee, *The Future of American Secret Intelligence*, Washington, D.C., 1946.

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American Doctrines of Intelligence

Most people believe that the primary function of intelligence is to give warning of the hostile plans, military or political, of other nations. They also assume that this kind of information will come from espionage. However, government officials and the better-informed laymen do not entirely agree—they have some faith in those intelligence units devoted to research and analysis. Apparently, this faith is a secondary result of the Congressional investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Since the United States supposedly had so much information that might have revealed the Japanese plans, it was difficult at first for the onlooker to see how American officials could have failed to realize that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. As the investigation proceeded, however, one explanation came to be widely accepted. In essence, the argument is that all the information necessary to recognize that the Japanese were planning an attack was available in Washington. But the information had come across the desks of top officials in disordered fragments, and these hard-pressed and overworked people, responsible for so many things besides divining the intentions of the Japanese, never had the time to correlate the odds and ends of information and thus see their obvious significance. If there had been a research and analysis unit studying, correlating, and assembling these odds and ends, the argument concludes, Pearl Harbor would never have been surprised.[2]

In addition to giving warning, intelligence must also supply the information on which policy can be based. General Donovan, for example, says that the justification for intelligence is to be found in the nature of any decision for action: before you can make a decision, you must get information. "Then," he writes, "you've got to evaluate and interpret that information. When you do this, then you have a decision that you feel confident is an informed decision. Government is no different. Government policy, too, must be based upon a tested knowledge of the facts.

[2] See Pettee, *op.cit.*, p. 7; Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel for the Joint Investigating Committee on Pearl Harbor, "Why Were We Caught Napping at Pearl Harbor?" *Saturday Evening Post*, May 24, 1947; Kent, *op.cit.*, p. 160; and William J. Donovan, "A Central Intelligence Agency: Foreign Policy Must Be Based on Facts," *Vital Speeches*, May 1, 1946.

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What facts? The capabilities, the intentions, and the policies of other nations. . . . [Intelligence is] just the careful gathering and analysis and interpretation of many bits of evidence."[3]

But this information, it is believed, must not go out from intelligence in haphazard driblets. For example, General Vandenberg, one of the first heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, sees intelligence work as a process of building up, piece by piece, a "picture" of what is happening in the world.[4] The intelligence units of the service departments will in this way furnish the military, naval, and air "pictures," and the State Department unit the political and sociological "picture." The Central Intelligence Agency, like a central assembly line, will then put these and its own original work together, and present an "over-all picture in a balanced, national intelligence estimate, including all pertinent data."[5]

Admiral Hillenkoetter, for three years director of CIA, is even more explicit on this point. Today's intelligence operator, he writes, is more likely than not "a researcher, engaged in hard, painstaking work, poring over foreign newspapers and magazines, reference works and similar materials, endlessly putting fact upon fact, until the whole outline appears and the details begin to fill in."[6] His job is "to winnow the extraneous data from the vital facts and to set these facts in proper perspective, thereby providing the factual basis for high-level policy decisions affecting our national security."[7] The role of intelligence thus becomes, according to the Admiral, one of working a "gigantic jigsaw puzzle" which finally emerges as a "picture" containing all the relevant facts arranged in their proper relationship to each other.

This picture-puzzle analogy, which recurs endlessly, also serves to explain other aspects of the intelligence process. It provides,

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 446.

[4] Testimony of General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, *Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eightieth Congress, First Session on S. 758*, Part 3 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office), p. 491.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 499.

[6] Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, "Using the World's Information Sources," *Army Information Digest*, III, No. 11 (November 1948).

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

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for example, one of the most important tests for new information. The credibility of new information, intelligence people say, is partly established by the ease with which the information finds its place in the emerging "picture." And this "picture" also shows what new information is needed. In his testimony before Congress, for instance, General Vandenberg argues that as the "mosaic" is built up by the work of the different departmental intelligence units, a number of "gaps" will become visible. He pleads that a "centralized intelligence agency, intent on completing the national intelligence picture, must have the power to send out collection directives and request further material to fill these gaps."[8] Apparently he believes that what information is relevant and necessary is determined only by the facts themselves. The implication of this—in fact, of the whole picture-puzzle analogy—is that the process of analysis is a question merely of assembling facts in much the same common-sense way that one puts together a broken vase: by looking at the pieces and seeing how they fit.

People concerned with intelligence also insist that although policy is "based" on the "picture" supplied by intelligence, an intelligence organization should never suggest or recommend policy. General Donovan, for example, wants an intelligence agency that is central mainly because "intelligence must be independent of the people it serves so that the material it obtains will not be slanted or distorted by the views of the people directing operations."[9] Thus the danger is bias, and the cure is an intelligence organization which is independent and which never suggests, or even thinks of, policy.[10]

[8] Testimony of General Vandenberg, *Hearings on S. 758*, p. 498.

[9] Donovan, *op.cit.*, p. 446.

[10] It is, in fact, difficult to overemphasize the insistence on this idea. For example, Allen W. Dulles, now serving as a special advisor to the Director of CIA, says: "But for the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. . . . All we can do is to see that we have created the best possible mechanism to get the unvarnished facts before the policy makers, and to get it there in time." (Allen W. Dulles, Memo Re-

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The role of intelligence, then, is to give warning of future events and to furnish the information, analyzed and arranged in a pattern, on which policy should be based. And there is great emphasis on the importance of independence for intelligence and on the dangers of bias and slanted information if intelligence becomes involved in policy.

One would assume that the people who adopted this division of labor had considered how it would increase or lessen their personal power. The policy and operating official may have supported it as a solution that protected his own domain, and the intelligence officer as a compromise that cut out at least one area in which he might have primacy. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these are cynical men who think only of their narrow personal interest; the impression received by an outsider is that they are conscientious and sometimes almost naively sincere. It appears reasonable to suppose, in fact, that the high degree of similarity in the reasoning of both the policy officials and the intelligence men is due not to compatible power interests alone, but to a combination of factors. As a tentative hypothesis, it is submitted that one of these is a set of shared assumptions and attitudes which influences the thinking of these officials on the specific problem of a role for intelligence.[11] Much evidence tending to support this hypothesis can be found in material of the kind cited above—books, magazine articles, newspaper stories, Congressional hearings, and government documents. This ma-

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specting Section 202 [CIA] of the Bill to Provide for a National Defense Establishment, dated April 25, 1947, as published in *Hearings on S. 758*, p. 525.)

[11] The concept that individuals of the same cultural group share a way of looking at things by means of which they interpret events and in terms of which they choose courses of action is, of course, well established in the field of cultural anthropology. See, for example, Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, Penguin Books, 1949, and *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Boston, 1946; Abram Kardiner, Ralph Linton, Cora Du Bois, and James West, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, New York, 1945; Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man*, New York, 1949; Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, New York, 1945. The literature on peculiarly American attitudes includes: Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, New York, 1942; Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People: A Study in National Character*, New York, 1948; Ralph Barton Perry, *Characteristically American*, New York, 1949; and Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1950. Professor Almond systematizes observations made about the American character since the time of De Tocqueville in 1834 and uses these and a number of his own observations in analyzing American opinion on foreign affairs.

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terial, however, may lag behind current thinking. Hence sixty-five government officials, a selected sample of both producers and consumers of intelligence, were actually interviewed.

THE ATTITUDES OF THE OPERATING OFFICIALS

Let us begin with the consumers of intelligence, the policy and operating officials. Their reaction to the various kinds of intelligence product was, if anything, calm. Some felt that the periodic intelligence summary and comment—the daily, weekly, or monthly "newspaper" reporting and commenting upon "significant" events—was useful as a check to see if they were getting full information through their own channels or as an aid in keeping up with events in countries outside their own area of responsibility. The encyclopedic country survey[12] was not so widely known among the operators as the "daily," but one official was most pleased with the survey made on a country in his area. He said that it had brought together widely scattered information, and gave one a background with which to handle day-to-day problems. The so-called long-range research project, on the other hand, had few defenders. The feeling seemed to be that such projects turned out to be academic tomes which had little in common with real problems.

In general, the operators seemed most pleased with the kind of report that intelligence people call "backstopping." By this term the intelligence man means either a chronological history of events leading up to a problem, or a mechanical search for facts tending to support a policy decision that has already been made. The word implies that one is protecting the operator by supplying him with facts to defend his position. Thus one official cited the case of an old quarrel which had recently come before the United Nations. As the policy people were not intimately familiar with the case, intelligence was asked for an historical study, and turned up some useful background information. The official being interviewed said this paper had helped him get a clear picture of what he was judging. He added that this was an

[12] This is a continuously revised report containing "background" information on each country in the world. See Pearl Harbor *Hearings* (U.S. Govt. Printing Office), p. 783.

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ideal example of the function of intelligence. Since policy people did not have time for such things, and since they were generalists —experts in political relations rather than in a particular area— they needed background, history, and a description of the general situation to help them in making policy. The function of intelligence was to fill this need by preparing factual statements without prejudice.

Another official remembered that some time ago they had discovered that title to the Coronados Islands, a very small group off the coast of California, was in doubt. His office needed something to support a recommendation, which they wanted very much to make for political reasons, that the United States should renounce any claims. By going over old deeds, maps, diaries, and so on, the intelligence units were able to show that American officials had always assumed that these islands were not possessions of the United States. The policy people were thus able to recommend the official renunciation of American rights with the historical background as support.

Opinion among the operators on the warning function, although it differs only slightly, falls roughly into two groups. A typical official of one group said he thought the purpose of intelligence was to pick up odd facts. Suppose, he said, that every blue spruce in a certain country was being cut down. What did you use blue spruce for? The antenna of the intelligence man should catch this fact, but seeing the meaning of it was not the province of intelligence. For one thing, the intelligence man did not have the practical experience the policy man did. He hadn't been around and consequently didn't know as much about the area, and the people, and the high officials of the country. Intelligence should pore over the figures and find the freak statistic. This kind of warning would be very useful; it would give the policy people a valuable breathing spell.

However, other policy officials did not agree. Intelligence should be encouraged, one official said, to sound a warning when it felt, after going over the information, that something unpleasant was going to happen or that some new problem was coming up. He added that nevertheless he still felt the major function of

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intelligence was to see that the policy people had all the facts—those that supported the policy, and especially those that didn't. After all, policy people were human, too. Like everyone else, they tended to overlook facts that were inconvenient. You had a better chance of getting the whole picture if intelligence was separate so it could get *all* the facts.

It is already clear that the operators support the information-furnishing role. However, let us take as a further example the testimony of one of the most influential of the officials interviewed. He said the theory behind the present division of labor was that only an independent intelligence organization could be objective. The intelligence man had no aim in life except to report facts as he saw them. In practice everyone probably had ideas on policy. But he felt that the theory—that there would be more objectivity if the person collecting facts was divorced from policy—was pretty sound. If intelligence people attuned their minds to policy questions, they couldn't be objective.

He said that on the policy side, experience was most important. Any good student or scholar had been trained in analysis, but there was a great difference between analyzing the Versailles Treaty and evaluating things today as they were actually happening. In analyzing diplomatic facts that called for action, there was no training except experience. George Kennan, the head of the Policy Planning Staff, was better than the research people at seeing implications. What was the difference? It was the difference between a lifetime habit of dealing with realities and a lifetime habit of dealing with libraries. The official said that he would rather have a country doctor perform a lobotomy on him than one of those brilliant medical students who had done nothing but study. More professionals were needed and less experts and students. This was what the Foreign Service did: it produced professionals; it gave experience and proper training. Take a man who knew everything in history, and another who was a professional, a man who had operated; the operator was much better. So when all the facts were laid out on the table, the official went on, the operator came up with sensitivity. The operator had an antenna, the official said, illustrating his words by putting the

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backs of his hands on his forehead and wriggling his fingers—the operator had an antenna which quivered when the right fact came up. This ability came from experience. To have it, you had to get wet—to get in and swim around a bit. The interviewer then interrupted to ask why, if the operator was the only one who could tell which facts were pertinent, it was necessary to have a man collect facts who was not concerned with policy. The official said that the point was that the policy man was also vulnerable to bias, even though he was usually better at interpretation than the research people. Therefore you still needed someone to line up the facts so the operator would have them *all* staring him in the face. Then the operator could say, "This is a fact, but we don't have to pay any attention to it. This one, however, is the key." But, the official continued, the operator shouldn't have to line up the facts because he might overlook or not want to face an important one.

When the interviewer had already said good-bye, gathered up his notes, and started out the door, the official called him back to say that there was one more thing which would illustrate the point. He said he had once written a memo that intelligence should not be defined as *evaluated information,* but simply as *information.* The point was that if you used the former definition you could not be completely objective because you were already two steps up from your base—the unvarnished facts.

Here is the same reasoning that we found in the testimony of the other officials quoted, but at greater length and with more clarity. These officials, first, put an extreme emphasis on the importance of having *all* the facts. They also fear that the person who is attempting to solve a problem, who is thinking of policy, will become the unreasoning advocate of some pet solution. And they distrust the research man—they see the researcher as a long-haired academic, poring over musty books in dusty libraries far from the realities of practical life. On the other hand, they think that "practical" experience is the true—in fact, the only—path to knowledge and judgment. They seem to believe that out of practical experience there develops, in some automatic though mysterious way, a sort of sixth sense. They are convinced that

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only the man with practical experience—armed as he is with this almost magical capacity for accurate hunch, with this *feel* for things—can sweep away the tangle of doubts and complexity and seize the one effective course of action.

Most of the operators interviewed, then, supported a role for intelligence which was merely one or another modification of the two functions of giving warning and furnishing information. Significantly, furthermore, the reasoning behind their position was based on identical premises. Even if two officials differed widely—as widely, that is, as the narrow range of opinion would permit—even then, they seemed to share the same set of basic assumptions and attitudes.[13] In other words, two men usually did not reach varying conclusions (always within the general framework) because they began with different premises, but because they applied a slightly different weighting in the latter stages of their reasoning.[14]

Thus the evidence available seems to support our contention that the operators share a set of assumptions and attitudes which channels their thinking about the role of intelligence. Although generalizations about the nature of these assumptions and attitudes can be little more than tentative, we are perhaps justified in offering a few.

Activism. In general, we can say that the operators tend to be conscientious and serious about their work. Contrary to popular opinion, there are few time-servers in at least this part of the governmental bureaucracy. Indeed, most of these men are extremely ambitious; they tend to drive themselves hard, to work late and arrive early. Besides being highly motivated, they are

[13] The common set of basic assumptions explains, of course, the narrowness of the range of opinion.

[14] Another official, for example, said that since intelligence people had not had the right kind of experience, it would be a mistake if intelligence started to make policy. But the official thought that intelligence should make a few policy suggestions even though some people might say it was completely out of bounds. When playing around with the data, an intelligence man might sense something. An experienced policeman walking down the street might not see a thing, but he would *sense* a riot in the offing. The official said that he, himself, often had these feelings. Maybe while he was reading a telegram from some embassy overseas he would get a hunch. Of course, it was just a hunch, but it was a very, very useful thing to have. The major role of intelligence should be to get the facts, but if the intelligence man got an inference from the facts, it should be all right for him to pass it along.

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also oriented toward action, toward getting something done. The continuing, long-range problems of our time, problems of values and of survival, do not have as much urgency for them as the immediate problems which come in daily with the cables. The fact that these immediate problems are subsidiary, mere facets of the larger problems, does not seem to make these men act differently. Time and time again they have ostensibly solved these subsidiary problems and buried them in the out-box only to find them reborn and appearing again in the in-box. But the feeling remains that one must be "timely" and act at once on every paper. The operators seem to feel a pressure to get things done that is no less enormous because it is self-generated. Accordingly, they have no patience with a lengthy analysis of involved alternatives; they tend to develop solutions to their problems by doing, by taking action.

Simplism. There is also a certain distrust of complex solutions. The operators speak of "selling" a policy, and they prefer it to be neatly packaged, with dramatic, persuasive argument and telling legal logic.[15] On the whole, they reject the complex reasoning, numerous qualifications, and generally experimental and searching attitude of a more or less scientific approach. Although there is evidence that he respects the involved thought of the engineer or physical scientist, the operator apparently feels that social problems are best met by practical "common sense."[16] He seems to feel that social problems, and their solutions, are essentially straightforward. Thus many of the higher officials expect to be briefed or "filled in" on a subject quickly and simply. They do not like long papers both because they feel they cannot spare the time to read them, and because they tend to feel that most problems are not so subtle or complex as to require extended treatment—the one-page, one-side-only brief must suffice.

Organizational Tinkering. Many operators also seem to have

[15] See also Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World*, New York, 1949, pp. 152-54.

[16] See also Almond, *op.cit.*, p. 51. There is probably some relation between distrust of complex and subtle reasoning on social problems on the one hand, and the tendency to look down on the research man and university professor-expert on the other. The relation between this latter form of anti-intellectualism and the attitude toward experience, however, is probably much closer. See the section on experience below.

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a peculiar and remarkably resilient faith in reorganization as a means for improving foreign policy and the conduct of foreign affairs. Whatever opportunity reorganizations give to the power-seeker, there is little doubt that officials who urge a change are sincere. Each has a pet scheme for reorganization which he implies—and sometimes fairly shouts—will result in a marked improvement. And this faith in organizational tinkering has not faltered in the face of a lack of improvement attributable to any of the upheavals of the past.

All these assumptions, traits, and attitudes probably shape the thinking of policy people in some degree. The kind of activism and simplism discussed above creates a state of mind which tends to reject any organization devoted to the lengthy process of analytical research, and even to question the need for the more or less subtle analysis of the complex which such an organization tries to make. And a faith in organizational tinkering—by providing an outlet for feelings of doubt when events careen past leaving policies in their wake—seems to make a basic self-searching unnecessary.

Attitudes Toward Facts. Other assumptions and attitudes, however, seem to have a more direct influence. Of these the most important is the complex of assumptions about the role of facts. The implied assumption in the many expressed attitudes toward facts is that truth is obvious once all the facts are known. Coupled with this feeling is the fear, as we have seen, that the man who is concerned with policy will inevitably become the advocate of a pet scheme. If he collects facts, as well as thinks of policy, he will tend to select facts which support his policy rather than find the true answer by collecting all the facts. By having one man collect facts without thinking of policy and another use the facts to make policy, one at least guarantees that the policy man will have to face the unpleasant facts that do not support his policy. This reasoning implies not only that a set of facts contains a self-evident answer (and that every problem does, in fact, have an answer), but also that it contains only one true answer. It also implies that facts admit of only one interpretation and that any reasonable man cannot help seeing this single

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meaning if he is forced to look at *all* the facts. Thus the policy man who has become wedded to an incorrect policy can be faced with the unpleasant facts which he has ignored and be made to see the one right solution.

One might comment here that it is, to say the least, strange that these assumptions are accepted with so little question. Certainly anyone would agree that an investigator could spend his lifetime collecting facts about even the simplest problem in international relations and not make a dent in the infinite number available. If a man wishes to solve a problem, whether in everyday living or in foreign affairs, he obviously needs a certain number of facts. But he cannot begin, willy-nilly, to collect *all* the facts, for he would soon be buried in a mountainous pile of them—and most would be irrelevant. Inescapably, he must find some means to select the facts he needs.

It seems obvious that all thinking involves notions of how and why things happen. Even the "practical" man who despises theory has a number of assumptions and expectations which lead him to believe that when certain things are done, certain results follow. A decision, otherwise, would never be made, an action never taken. And these assumptions and expectations, even when they are only implicit, are just as much "theory" as the hypotheses of science, social or physical. It is this "theory" that helps a problem-solver select from the mass of facts surrounding him those which he hopes are relevant. Suppose, for example, that I have missed my way and decide to go up to the nearest house to ask for directions. The yard of this house is fenced, and in the yard is a dog. If I open the gate, will the dog bite me? To make a decision, I need some facts. But which of the thousands available will be useful? If I were an expert on dogs, I would be familiar with generalizations about which breeds tend to be friendly. Such a "theory" would be most suitable for my purpose, and I could collect facts about the hair, body, tail, ears, feet, and eyes—the facts indicated by other "theories" which describe the features categorizing a certain breed of dog. However, without the necessary "theory" I would end up with a jumble of facts that had no meaning *to me*, and from which I

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could draw no conclusions. But I do have another "theory"—that friendly dogs wag their tails, and that vicious ones growl. Watching it carefully, I observe that this dog neither wags its tail nor growls. Since I cannot get the facts necessary for this theory it is useless to me, and I still cannot make a decision. I have, however, one other theory—that most dogs bite when a stranger comes into their fenced-in yard. And I have already collected the facts and reached the primary conclusions necessary for this theory: my more basic theory about what characteristics determine whether or not a living creature falls into the category I call *dog* has directed me to certain facts; these I have noted by looking at the animal before me and reached the conclusion that it is a dog. I therefore decide to go to another house, the yard of which is free of any animals whatsoever.

In the above example, I was equipped with theories that told me not only what to expect if the facts were of one kind or another, but also what kind of facts to look for and where to look for them. Suppose, however, that the problem I face is new and that I simply cannot find a suitable theory. When the first man met the first dog, the man probably chose his course of action in terms of a set of assumptions appropriate to other animals but unsatisfactory for predicting the reactions of the new creature. The dog probably behaved in unexpected ways, and before the man met another dog, he undoubtedly thought about the problem and tried to work out a set of assumptions that would include the new facts.

The scientific observer presumably works in similar fashion. His interest in a problem may be roused because some facts have come to his attention which do not fit into the then current theories. Or it may be roused because some new concept from an apparently unrelated field may point to a body of facts previously ignored. He begins his investigation by making his assumptions and tentative hypotheses explicit. By logical thought he seeks to be able to say that if his hypothesis is correct, he should find a certain kind of fact in a certain place under certain conditions; and that if his hypothesis is false, he should find another kind of fact in another place under other conditions. He then makes

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a careful search for facts of both kinds. If he finds only facts that fit into his hypothesis, he assumes it to be correct; if he finds only facts that do not, he assumes it to be incorrect. If, as frequently happens, he finds some of both kinds, his next task again calls for thought: he must modify his hypothesis to include the two kinds of facts, or find a new hypothesis. He then proceeds once more to look for evidence.

Facts cannot in themselves contain self-evident or obvious answers. If they did, anyone could follow the above procedure and human knowledge would have grown at a much, much faster rate than it has. There seems to be a difference not only in the quality of the conceptual tools which different men bring to a problem, but in the quality of mind they bring as well. Certainly many of the great discoverers had no more facts available to them than were readily at hand to anyone. Although some facts may have been hidden from mankind until the development of tools such as the microscope, most have been in plain view but unnoticed until some able mind forged the tools of thought which revealed their importance.[17] Any reader of the New York or London *Times,* for instance, had in front of him the facts which Keynes used to foresee the economic consequences of Versailles. Yet of all the readers, many of whom read carefully and were thoroughly familiar with the facts, only Lord Keynes gave meaning and significance to those facts.

Although facts do not contain self-evident answers, in some circumstances they do, of course, convince. If two men have essentially identical expectations and assumptions, but disagree on the evidence, a new fact will settle the question. If we both agree that dogs that wag their tails do not bite, but disagree as to whether or not a particular dog will bite, then a fact—the dog suddenly wags its tail so that we both see the act—will settle the question so far as we two are concerned. But since many facts will fit rather nicely into two or more "theories," such happy circumstances do not occur as often as one might wish. We have all had the experience of thinking that some new fact will cer-

[17] And, more often than not, it was a conceptual tool that pointed out the need for a mechanical one such as the microscope.

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tainly have convinced the opponent in yesterday's argument of the error of his ways, only to find that the opponent has attached a quite different meaning to the same fact and is dismayed to find that it does not convince us of the error of our ways. Although it is widely felt that truth lies in the unvarnished facts, in a sense the contrary seems to be the case. The meaning, so to speak, is not in the facts themselves, but in the varnish!

Attitudes Toward Experience; Anti-Intellectualism. The operator's complex of attitudes toward experience seems to have as great an influence on his thinking about a role for intelligence as that toward facts. He looks down on the thinker, and says that only the man with practical experience can make policy successfully. But what does the operator mean by "experience"? Reading the pages of a book on, say, the Soviet Union is experience, but it is obvious that this is not the kind that is meant. When pressed, the operator gives as examples the experience in consular and diplomatic posts abroad and also that of being a policy man in Washington. The word "experience" thus seems to mean some special kind of first-hand participation as one of the actors in the specific kind of event under discussion.

Again, one might remark that little of what any man knows comes from this kind of experience. None of us know first-hand that Columbus discovered America or anything else that happened before our birth. We must also admit that few of the events of even our own time are known to us except through newspapers and the radio. And there are still other categories of knowledge that do not come primarily from experience. Scientists, for example, know much of the nature of both atoms and stars, but no man has experienced an atom, or known the stars from personal experience as anything but twinkling points of light in a telescope or as blobs on a photographic plate. The knowledge has come not so much from experience—even if "experience" is defined as gathering observable data—as from the analytical and creative processes of thought. All of us, in sum, speak with confidence about a thousand things we have never done, and know a great deal about things we have never seen,

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touched, smelled, tasted, nor heard. Of all we know, only a minimum comes from first-hand experience. And few would have it otherwise. A man does not wish his child to learn to stay away from high-voltage wires by being electrocuted or even by seeing someone else electrocuted, but rather by assimilating the knowledge created by other men.

This is not, of course, to say that first-hand experience is valueless. It is valuable in many ways. Teachers, for example, have long known that the knowledge that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen is more vividly demonstrated and easier to remember if the student actually performs an experiment in electrolysis. Secondly, a man who has absorbed everything available on a given subject with a minimum of first-hand experience may still have much to learn. In first-hand experience he gets the necessary practice in applying his knowledge to a specific problem. He perfects, in short, all the skills of application—a facility in a practical situation for picking out from a welter of extraneous detail the factors indicated by his knowledge; a sense of timing; an ability to attach weights to different factors which in the real world never occur in the isolation possible in the laboratory.

As a rule of thumb, it is also reasonable to expect a man with first-hand experience in a field to know more of that field than men who have had absolutely no experience in it, whether first-hand or second-hand. But notice that this is not because the man has absorbed the essence of the subject matter by some mysterious process similar to osmosis, but because he has from interest and necessity devoted more thought to the subject. If he has brains and ability he will thus have mastered the existing knowledge of the field and may, perhaps, have added to that knowledge as well. The same thing, however, can be said of the student. The "first-hand" experience of the student in studying, analyzing, and writing about a problem is usually as great an incentive for thought as the first-hand experience of the actual doer. Also, we might add that since the student often starts with better conceptual tools, he, as a type, probably has a slightly better chance

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of arriving at some valid conclusions. His greatest disadvantage is probably the limited opportunity for testing.

First-hand experience, finally, may give an opportunity to observe some kinds of facts which are not communicable to others and which are therefore available only to a principal actor in a certain type of event—say, war. It is equally true, however, that the student of war may have the opportunity to seek out many facts about war denied to the participant in any given war, and acquire a broader and deeper knowledge of military affairs—excluding always the skills of application—than the most battle-scarred of veterans. Clausewitz never commanded an army, nor Mahan a fleet, and Stephen Crane, who exactly captured the emotional impact of war in *The Red Badge of Courage*, never saw a battle nor heard a shot fired in anger.

Attitudes Toward Experience: "Know-How." The operators, however, seem to feel that the benefits of first-hand experience are of even greater significance than those received from second-hand participation. The implication of their expressed attitudes is that knowledge itself is the natural, automatic, and unsought by-product of a certain number of years of "practical" experience. Thus they attach very little importance to the role of thought in developing new knowledge. They feel that if a man wishes to add to the fund of knowledge needed to deal with problems in foreign affairs, he must get out and do. By actual doing he also acquires, they believe, an intuitive antenna of sensitivity to the significant fact, an instinctive feeling for the correct solution.[18] The man with long experience can thus "play by ear." He has acquired "know-how"—the talent in industrial and business America (where the term originated) for operating by feel in a complex but familiar and intimately known situation, the ability to overcome obstacles by improvisation on the basis of an informed hunch.[19]

[18] It is difficult to reconcile the inconsistency between the assumption that facts contain self-evident answers and the assumption that only the man with "practical" experience can choose an effective course of action. However, since attitudes and assumptions of this kind are partly subconscious, there is no necessity that they be consistent. Indeed, it would be cause for suspicion if they were.

[19] See also Almond, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

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THE ATTITUDES OF THE INTELLIGENCE MEN

One would expect that, if only from a desire for power, the position of intelligence people would differ greatly from that of the operators. In fact, however, neither the position nor the reasoning behind it differs significantly. Take, for example, two typical interviews. The first official was asked if intelligence had done anything to explore the possible courses of action open to the United States in any of the projects he had described. He said that they had not; their charter did not call for that sort of work. He felt, however, that this was not unwise. A line could be drawn between intelligence and policy, and if it could, there should be specialization. A good place to draw a line was between furnishing information on the one hand, and formulating and executing policy on the other. Of course, the line shouldn't be firm and fast, and policy people were now too sensitive to what was policy. But if one gave an intelligence organization an inch, it would take a mile; there would be very little information and lots of policy from intelligence if it did policy work of any sort. The job of intelligence should be to get the facts. An ideal intelligence organization should assemble the facts on a problem, and stay out of policy. Someone had to collect the facts. Even now, the official said, too many policy decisions were made without them.

The second official said that the need in the United States was for a level at which the facts could be collected and evaluated objectively. Policy-makers should be given the unvarnished facts so they would have a sufficiently large background and basis for decisions and would be aware of all the implications of what they were doing. The official said to take, for instance, the Soviet satellites. If conditions in the satellites were much better than we imagined, intelligence should say so. Even if the information was unfavorable to our policy, intelligence should pass it along. Intelligence should tell the whole story, but once the information had left the intelligence organization, its job was done. It was up to the geographic desk people to decide how to use the facts and information, and what to do about the problem. The idea was that in this way intelligence could be objective and avoid

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slanting information to fit policy. And in his opinion the idea was very sound.

Clearly, then, there is little difference of opinion between the intelligence man and the operator on the broad role of furnishing information and on the assumptions about facts which seem to lie directly behind that role. Most intelligence officers also implied an equal faith in the power of first-hand experience and the value of "know-how," the ability to *sense* the situation abroad. Accordingly, they tend to prefer the man with "area" experience or experience in wartime intelligence to the man with special training. They also find themselves unable to question the operator's assertion that only the man with operating experience is able to foresee the effects of alternative courses of action and to formulate policy recommendations.

Most intelligence officials also shared the other attitudes of the operator. These attitudes were operative in several fields, but one —the subject of "current" intelligence—will serve as an illustration. One official said that a big problem was reconciling research and intelligence (he added parenthetically that he defined intelligence in this case as dealing with *very* current events, as analyzing and commenting and making predictions about the future possibilities of current world developments). The problem was personnel. The man who liked to do research was not ready or qualified to do the "current" intelligence job. The "current" type of person was essentially a more lively person, although he was, perhaps, not so deep-thinking. People who were equally good at both jobs were rare indeed. Some research men were needed, but getting a true research man to comment on the "daily" was like yanking a tooth. The official personally welcomed the emphasis on "current" intelligence; he thought it was fun. He also thought it had to be emphasized in order to gear the intelligence unit in with the rest of the government. He did feel, however, that intelligence should not be expected to do the same amount of research as before.

A second official felt that the periodic report was the key to the whole intelligence operation. He said that the object of these reports—daily, weekly, and monthly—was to present a picture of

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the area as a whole in terms of American security. Intelligence should call attention to emerging events so the policy people could do something about them. Intelligence should always be "current." He said that the country survey called for research, but that estimating the situation in a country and what was going to happen in the future belonged to the estimates field. The job in current, reportorial intelligence, on the other hand, was evaluating information. In this, they took information and considered its source and probable validity and decided whether it meant anything—no research was required. The estimative type of intelligence, the most important type, was based on a number of reports and sometimes a little research came in, too. They decided on the capabilities of the enemy and his most probable line of action. This kind of work required ability. Although it was hard to generalize about personnel, one could say that most university people were of little use because they had spent all their lives on something like five minutes of the Battle of Gettysburg. In his office they didn't like the adulation of the printed word that was found in most university people. The official felt that as a general rule newspaper people were the best.

This emphasis on "current" intelligence testifies to the intense desire of most intelligence people to participate in the momentous goings-on of government. The cables leading in to Washington are continually hot with exciting daily problems; by a hurly-burly process decisions are reached, policy made, action taken, operations carried out. And most intelligence people want to be in on it all. It seems likely that in part this desire is personal ambition. But it also seems likely that both this desire and an emphasis on things "current" occur as a syndrome with an action orientation similar to that which is characteristic of the operator. Certainly we can say that neither the desire to take part in daily decisions nor an emphasis on the "current" is consistent with an orientation that could be called contemplative.

It is also clear that these men share the anti-intellectualism of the operator and do not think of themselves as intellectuals or even researchers. And this attitude is not necessarily the result of a quarrel between the officials who have higher academic de-

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grees and those who do not; the second official—the one who preferred newspapermen to scholars—was himself a doctor of philosophy.[20]

THE AREA OF DISHARMONY

Thus there seems to be the same complex of attitudes among the intelligence people as there is among the operators. But this does not mean that the two groups are in perfect accord. There is, for example, the old quarrel about the warning role. The operators, as the reader will recall, fell into two groups—those who were willing to let intelligence "interpret" information for warning, but not for policy, and those who refused to let them interpret anything at all. The intelligence men, on the other hand, were virtually unanimous in believing that warning is one of their primary and most important roles. They felt that if anyone is to interpret information to give warning, it should be intelligence.

However, as one might expect, intelligence officers are much more detailed in their ideas on the nature of warning. As they see it, warning is a much bigger job than merely the kind of analysis which would have revealed the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Warning to them also implies predicting the

[20] Although they were in the minority, some officials had a markedly different set of attitudes. One of these said that he was against the emphasis on "current" intelligence. The whole State Department was organized for quick news; what was lacking was an outfit to think and look deep. Intelligence was always being called on for the answers to spot questions, and was never given time for research. The official said that one of their best men had just resigned—simply because the atmosphere was getting to be such that a person with that kind of academic background and intellectual ability couldn't work. The real scholars were being driven out. This "current" intelligence was a curse. Take a country like Indonesia. Who was going to do the basic studies about its economics, politics, and commerce? Even if everyone worked on these studies, it would still not be enough—and the big contribution lay here. The U.P. and A.P. could do the "current" stuff; the big job should be done by intelligence. The official said that he wanted to underline again and again the problem of personnel. They must set the organization up in such a way that the right kind of people would find it a favorable environment. They had already lost too many of their good people. The vehement, emotionally charged reaction of this man to the pressure for "current" intelligence seems, at least in part, to be a personal withdrawal from the competitive, high-pressure environment of daily operations and decisions. He is obviously not anti-intellectual nor does he seem to feel any compulsion to come to a conclusion or make a decision. He seems more than willing to let any number of immediate problems lapse in order to delve into the particular kind of basic problem he thinks most important. There is little doubt that this official not only reaches different conclusions from most of his colleagues, but begins the mental journey from a different starting place.

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trend of international events—foreseeing future problems of every sort. Their job is to gather information on developments abroad, to assemble that information into a "picture" of the existing situation, and then to "project" that "picture" into the future. Intelligence, they feel, should be the organization responsible for recognizing that a problem exists; it should be the one to call attention to the need for policy wherever need appears.

There are also other sources of bickering and bitterness. The loose definition of the word "policy" provides a spacious theater for battles of any size. The equally loose definition of the word "fact" is also troublesome. A statement, for example, that a proposed ally is undemocratic is often regarded as an unvarnished fact by the man who makes the statement, and not as a conclusion. To the operator, on the other hand, it is likely to appear as neither a fact nor a conclusion, but an implied recommendation for policy.

And there are other differences. For one thing, there seem to be more atypical intelligence men than there are atypical operators. For what it is worth, there also seem to be more men with the higher academic degrees in intelligence than there are in policy. But there is one further difference that is probably more significant than any of the others: intelligence men, unlike the operators, are not very happy. One official, for example, said that in his opinion intelligence was isolated; there was not even a forum at which it could be heard. On one problem, about which the intelligence people had felt strongly, they had submitted their predictions in a special paper. But the paper was not even challenged—it was just ignored.

It is, of course, a humiliating experience to feel useless and unimportant. But when one believes, as most intelligence people apparently do, that correct policy—like Pallas Athene from the head of Zeus—springs full-blown from the facts, he is not only frustrated when he decides that policy is made without benefit of the information supplied by intelligence, but bewildered and indignant as well. One official, for example, said that "the whole damned thing" was wrong. Before they did anything else, policy people should call on intelligence for the information and an

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estimate. Then they should make their policy. In reality, however, policy was made without intelligence or was only supplemented by intelligence. Intelligence people always had to analyze what had already happened, or merely to give support for policy decisions that were already made. Intelligence did nothing but hack work and research. In practice, the thing was all backwards.

It may well be true that the practice is all backwards—at least in terms of what most officials think is the proper division of labor. If so, the unhappiness of the intelligence officer is understandable; it comes from the daily violence done to his beliefs by the routine behavior of the operator. And yet there is something more than this. So many intelligence officers put such great stress on their objectivity and freedom from the bias which they feel involvement in policy brings that the observer begins to think that they protest too much. There is no question of deliberate hypocrisy, yet one cannot help suspecting that although it is upsetting to feel that the logical sequence of events is disregarded and incorrect decisions therefore made, it is to the usual intelligence official even worse to feel that he himself is ineffective on *policy*. The special poignancy of his unhappiness seems to be precisely this—that it is double. The intelligence officer is hit with a kind of emotional one-two; he feels that the world is upside down, and that he and his work are, inexplicably and unjustly, impotent.

THE PRESENT SOLUTION

Thus the present solution of the intelligence problem has been hammered out by the alternating blows of both the situational and the cultural. One of these influences, as we have said, is the simple one of power and prestige. Another, of a different kind, is the setting in which the intelligence problem must be solved. Bureaucracy, whether public or private, has certain characteristics, and these provide a framework into which any solution, if it is to be workable, must fit.

But it seems clear that other forces have also been at work. The hypothesis offered here, to repeat, is that one of these has

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been a shared set of basic attitudes and assumptions. The word "intelligence" apparently conjures up in the minds of American officials a complex of assumptions about the role of facts, fears of bias in the use of facts, attitudes toward experience and "know-how," and feelings of anti-intellectualism—all of which occur in a milieu that is normally characterized by activism, simplism, and a faith in organizational tinkering.[21] The evidence available seems to support the supposition that much of the thinking of these officials on the problem of intelligence is done in terms of these assumptions, expectations, traits, and attitudes; that these are, in fact, the conceptual tools with which the problem is solved, the intelligence organizations are assigned a role, the doctrines on the operation of that role are built up, and the peculiar kind of receptivity, or lack of it, to the products of an intelligence unit is created.

Knowledge and Action: A Working Model

Thus, in compliance with current doctrine, the skills of the operator—skills of application, a sense of timing, a sense of the possible—and the analytical skills of the researcher are not combined, but are used independently in both time and space. Intelligence on the one hand and policy-making and action on the other are separated physically, organizationally, chronologically, functionally, and by skills—separated in every possible way. The question is whether this division of labor is a wise or even valid one.

I assume that the activities of statesmen—in fact, that all foreign affairs—can be reduced to the making of specific decisions by identifiable human beings.[22] However difficult the animistic structure of our language may make it to avoid personification, a nation is clearly not a living organism. It has neither a nervous system nor a personality, and its "behavior" cannot be explained

[21] There are undoubtedly other assumptions and attitudes which have also influenced thinking on the intelligence problem. However, since the human mind does not seem to be capable of using more than a limited number of thought-tools during a specific and relatively short space of time, it is not likely that the final number will be large.

[22] See Frederick S. Dunn, "Education and Foreign Affairs: A Challenge for the Universities," *The Public Service and University Education*, ed. by Joseph E. McLean, Princeton, N.J., 1949.

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by concepts about the psychology of forms of life that do. Although there are marked regularities in the behavior of people who belong to the same culture, this offers no support for an approach that treats states as beings capable of making a decision or taking action. Neither does it support a belief that a group has a mind and will above and beyond the individual minds of its leaders and members. Concepts which assume a "crowd personality" or "group mind" are not explanations of group behavior, but mere analogies.[23] In foreign affairs, as in all human action, individual or group, some one or more human beings must choose between different courses of action. Rarely in foreign affairs, rarely in any human action, are the different alternatives clearly right or wrong, good or bad.[24] Most often each has both desirable and undesirable aspects. It seems obvious that between imperfect means to a single end, or between competing, non-absolute ends, a choice can be made only by people, and not by nations or institutions. At all levels of international events, and in each stage of development, there are men and women making choices. Terrain, resources, manpower, habits of mind present obstacles to be overcome and may also limit the choices available, but it is the choices themselves that make up the body of international affairs.

The ideal toward which we should aim, then, is to make our decisions rationally and with a maximum of clarity about the values we seek. The criteria for this kind of decision are three. The first is that there should be rational consideration of alternative means. The second is systematic calculation of the subsidiary results of each of these—the effects on values other than those fulfilled by achieving the immediate end. And the third is conscious examination of the relative importance of different ends.[25] Using these criteria, one can construct a working model

[23] On the group-mind fallacy, see Floyd Henry Allport, *Social Psychology*, New York, 1924, pp. 4-10.

[24] See Arnold Wolfers, "Statesmanship and Moral Choice," *World Politics*, 1 (January 1949), p. 175.

[25] These criteria are those laid down by Max Weber. See Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York, 1947, pp. 115-18; and *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. by E. A. Shils and H. Finch, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, pp. 52-53.

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of decision-making that will bring out both the ideal relationship between knowledge and action, and the points at which information is needed.[26] It is obvious, however, that there are certain requirements basic to the achievement of these criteria. Adequate theory and knowledge must exist, and these and the necessary objective information must be available to the man who is to make the decision. This decision-maker, admittedly an ideal, must have existing knowledge at his command. He must also have certain necessary intellectual skills: the ability to analyze problems, to recognize the issues involved, and to order knowledge; the capacity for logical inference and sound generalization; the insight and empathy to draw distinctions between the superficially similar and to see interrelationships between the apparently dissimilar. Finally, our ideal must have the balanced personality and emotional stability necessary to allow him to examine his values consciously and without compulsiveness; he must be able to recognize a conflict in his values and to resolve that conflict by consciously suppressing one value in order to achieve another, or by postponing the achievement of one or the other until a later date.

The decision-maker's first step must be to examine his values. He cannot analyze a problem in foreign affairs—or any problem, for that matter—unless he knows what he wishes to protect or achieve. Indeed, he cannot even recognize the issue: for what is the issue in a problem to one person, because of his unique values, is not to another whose values are not involved.

If our decision-maker is the leader of a democratic state, this problem becomes one of consciously knowing not only his own personal values, but the values of his society as well. He needs an intimate knowledge of the concrete wants his people have today, a familiarity with the kinds of practical objectives that have served those wants in the past, and a sensitivity to what is likely

[26] By "working model" is understood not a description of reality, but a logically consistent and pure (no extraneous or non-essential elements or influences) system which is made up of only certain elements of reality and which is used only to evolve hypotheses or criteria. Similarly, by "ideal" is understood a logically consistent and pure construction which is made up of only certain elements of reality and which is used only to give a more logically precise and less ambiguous conception. Thus, in using the word "ideal," no valuation of any kind is intended.

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to satisfy them in the future. Ideally, however, he also needs to know the hierarchy in which the values of his society are arranged, the dynamism by which they change, and even how he may influence that process. He needs, in other words, the ideal statesman's skill of knowing how and when different groups can be educated to see their value conflicts and their misconceptions about the real world and how things happen in it.

Usually, however, the values of a group exert an influence on foreign policy only if the power of that group is significant. The decision-maker must therefore know the shifting power line-up well. He must also know if his decision will incidentally increase the power of one group at the expense of another and what the ultimate effect of this shift in power will be on his own position.

One might suppose that this step would be a simple one for the dictator. But the difference between democracy and dictatorship, however great it may be in degree, is not in this respect essentially different in kind. In either a democracy or a dictatorship, a man remains the head of state only so long as his decisions substantially achieve the values of those groups that can, one way or another, throw him out. These groups may be fewer in a dictatorship, but practical domestic politics will probably be an important element in foreign affairs no matter what the form of government.

The knowledge needed in this first step is vast; ideally it would include detailed hypotheses and generalizations about the psychological, sociological, political, and economic behavior of the decision-maker's people in the past and what it is likely to be in the future. And this in turn presumes knowledge of how any one factor develops and eventually interacts with the others. This step, in sum, is guided by knowledge and results in knowledge; action comes much later.

The decision-maker may now look at the specific problem. His first task is to determine which values of what groups are involved and to choose a tentative objective. Let us take an example. In the spring of 1950, the foreign minister of France proposes to the Bonn government of Western Germany that France and Germany pool their steel resources. American de-

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cision-makers must study this proposal, identify the American values affected, and select a tentative objective. Let us suppose that halting the spread of Communism is already established as an American goal, and that, knowing this, the American officials have already made the decision—based on both humanitarianism and the hypothesis that Communism makes few converts in a prosperous community—that Europe must be prosperous even if Americans have to make a certain sacrifice to help. Now if in this context the American decision-makers also believe that America owes her present prosperity to a home market of continental size, and that, to be prosperous, European nations must create a mass market of similar size by "integrating" their economies, they may tentatively decide that pooling French and German steel would serve American values, and that it should be an American objective to have the proposal adopted.

Suppose, however, that they hold a different hypothesis. If they believe that a number of factors other than a mass market are important in America's present prosperity, and that, because the economies of European countries are not complementary and because of certain political problems, the integration of Europe might result in the opposite of prosperity, they might decide that the steel proposal is contrary to American interest. Plainly, in either of these circumstances "knowledge" is essential. Some sort of hypothesis, assumption, or theory, right or wrong, is necessary before any sort of goal can be identified, correctly or incorrectly, in any given problem. Translating knowledge and information about the values of one's society into concrete, practical objectives, in other words, requires still more knowledge and still more information—hypotheses and generalizations about how things happen in the social and political affairs of men, and the objective information needed to make predictions by using these tools. For it is only by calculating the outcome of events that the decision-maker can see which of his values will be fulfilled and which harmed.

The next step would be to lay out the alternative courses of action to achieve the tentative objective, and to calculate the probable success of each course in achieving that end. Suppose

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that the decision-maker is concerned with the problem presented to the West by the Soviet blockade thrown around Berlin in the spring of 1948. Let us assume that he has made a preliminary exploration of the possible outcomes of the blockade and has concluded that although war or action which would be provocative must be avoided, the loss of Berlin would undermine faith in America's strength and leadership, and thus weaken the coalition of allies, and encourage the Kremlin to think that war now would give them a cheap and final victory. The tentative objective, then, is to hold Berlin.

Suppose that the different courses of action are roughly: (1) to present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union declaring that a state of war will exist if the blockade is not lifted within twenty-four hours; (2) to send a strong armored column to convoy supplies to Berlin and break the blockade; (3) to offer the Soviet Union substantial territorial concessions in exchange for a redefinition of the occupation zones so that the allies would control their own corridor to Berlin; (4) to supply Berlin by an airlift; (5) to institute a counter-blockade; (6) to offer the Soviet Union concessions, other than territorial ones, in exchange for a written guarantee not to blockade Berlin again; (7) to appeal to the United Nations for a ruling to force the Soviet Union to abandon the blockade. In order to calculate the probable success of each of these, our decision-maker must ideally have two bodies of knowledge. The first would identify the peculiarities of the set of interstate relations then existing and would give the developmental pattern in that set of relations of each kind of means listed above. The second would identify the attitude-systems of the elites of those nations party to the problem and describe how those elites would react to each kind of means in the context of the type of situation previously identified. Some of the means would be ruled out, for example, because the American or allied people do not have the psychological potential, so to speak, to support such an action in the specific context. Other means, to be effective, might require objective conditions which do not exist at this time and place. Others might be ruled out because sufficient allied resources do not exist to make them a realistic

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alternative. Still others might be ineffective because of the attitude-systems common among the men in the Kremlin.

Using a wide variety of both knowledge and information, then, our decision-maker would calculate the probable success of each alternative in achieving the tentative objective. As he did so, he would probably give some thought to possible subsidiary effects. However, if the steps in rational decision-making occur sequentially, as we must pretend they do for clear discussion, this would be the next step—a conscious, rational search for the effects of each alternative on values other than those served by the immediate objective. The purpose here, in other words, is to calculate the cost for each alternative. And each calculation will require knowledge and information similar to that used in predicting the primary effect for each alternative.

The rational decision-maker would next consider alternative ends. If, for example, the United States can hold either China or Berlin, but not both, it is obviously necessary to weigh the possibility that holding China would better serve American values than holding Berlin. Using knowledge and information similar to that used in considering the original objective, one must explore each of the means for achieving each different objective. A rational comparison of relative gain and cost could not otherwise be made.

But rational consideration of alternative ends also implies something even more basic—the relative importance of other values. Men have many values, not all of which can be fulfilled simultaneously, and the choice of a course of action is also a decision to pursue certain values at the cost of neglecting others. An ideal rationality would at some time require one to suppress, consciously and deliberately, a whole set of ultimate values in order to concentrate on another.

The decision-maker now has before him conclusions about both the probable success and predictable cost of the several means for accomplishing a certain objective. He also has similar data on the different means for accomplishing other, alternative objectives. The problem now is choosing. If the decision is to be made not in foreign affairs, but in everyday living—if the de-

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cision is one of choosing this career or that; of marrying this girl who is beautiful or that one who is rich; of buying a big new car that will impress the neighbors, or a small used one that is cheap enough to allow money for other things—then the decision-maker must examine his own desires and likes. He must attach priorities to his values, suppress this desire and postpone the achievement of that, recognize his ambivalences, and resolve the conflicts. And in this process, he makes his choice. If the choice is one in foreign affairs, however, the decision-maker must, as we have said, resort to knowledge of the values, attitudes, and preferences of the people of his nation. Be he dictator or democrat, he must have knowledge of the values of powerful groups and of the political and economic systems by which one decision or the other might work to impinge eventually on the values of people who may some day express their pleasure or displeasure in the voting booth, at the barricade, or in the darkened palace corridor. With these things in mind, the decision-maker must make his choice, thoughtfully weighing probable gain and predictable cost, balancing the power of those groups whose values are fulfilled against the power of those whose values are sacrificed.

A choice, then, is made; a policy adopted. And knowledge, great quantities of information, and many concepts of the cause and effect relationships in social, psychological, military, economic, and political processes have been required at every step. The end, however, has not yet been reached. A policy once chosen must be acted upon, and carrying out a course of action inevitably requires many more decisions. And the steps in making each of these secondary decisions should be identical with the steps in the basic decision, requiring the same knowledge and intellectual skills. Although made within the frame of reference provided by the policy decision, these later decisions will affect in more or less subtle ways the nature of the line of action being carried out, and will themselves to some extent become policy.

In the ideal process of conducting foreign affairs, furthermore, the setting in which action is carried out should be that of the laboratory. In this concept, the products of the basic policy analy-

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sis would be regarded as hypotheses to be tested in action. Policy would be thought of in instrumental terms; the operator would approach his task of taking action critically, alert both to the need for new or modified basic decisions and to problems and alternatives not sooner recognized. He would carry out the action analytically and creatively, seeking to add to the knowledge available for solving not only the problem at hand, but future ones as well.

The Validity of Current Doctrine

What now of the soundness of current doctrine? Let us consider first the warning role. The reader will recall that in the intelligence brotherhood the definition of warning is broad: to foresee problems of every sort, to call attention to the need for policy wherever need arises. Now in our working model, the decision-maker's first step in recognizing a problem is to predict the outcome if events are allowed to go unmolested. By doing this he hopes to make out what impact the problem will have on his values. In other words, he performs, for himself, a warning function. In our frame of reference, "warning" is merely the act of recognizing a problem and making a preliminary analysis of it. Under the present division of labor, then, the steps in solving a problem are: (1) intelligence sets out to acquire a knowledge of American values, or is given such knowledge by the operating divisions; (2) intelligence next recognizes that a problem exists, makes a preliminary analysis of it, and informs the operating divisions of the probable outcome and the effect on American values if nothing is done to influence the course events will take; (3) the operating divisions then analyze the problem to determine the alternatives open and the gains and costs of each. Both organizations thus do the same kind of work, and need the same information, knowledge, method, and skills. In a number of ways, in fact, this division of labor seems to be both arbitrary and awkward. Although we have broken the process of decision-making into a series of steps for the purposes of analysis, there is no reason to suppose that the solution of real problems falls into this ideal pattern. We can therefore expect that it will be difficult

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to evolve a rule defining the line between preliminary and detailed analysis that will be workable in a practical, bureaucratic sense. Since the organization responsible for the detailed analysis can make another preliminary analysis in passing (as it does its detailed analysis), there is also no guarantee either that this division of labor will save time and effort or that it will even be respected.[27]

However, it is obviously possible to let both organizations give "warning"—to let both do a preliminary analysis so that the one will check the work of the other. This would be a clear-cut case of that bugaboo,, "duplication," but it could be argued that if there are enough of the kind of expert who is qualified to do this sort of thing to staff both organizations, the government could afford the luxury. Notice, however, that if both organizations do this analysis, the "warning" role will tend to become a kind of critical role as well. One kind of warning, for example, could be given when a threat is not foreseen because no one even suspects that there may be a problem. In the past such a complete failure to recognize a problem has usually occurred when the necessary conceptual tools simply did not exist. The Great Plague is a case in point. Without knowledge of the cause and means of transmittal of disease, the filth and increase in rats which made the plague possible had no significance. Obviously, in such circumstances it would be unreasonable to expect much from intelligence.[28] Another kind of warning could be given when the operators have recognized the existence of a problem, but have decided after analysis that it will work itself out without harmful effects. If intelligence warns that there is a threat after all, it is in effect criticizing the analysis of the people who decided other-

[27] Insofar as the complaints of intelligence people that no one ever pays attention to their "warnings" are correct, this—the ease with which the operating divisions can make another preliminary analysis in passing—may be an explanation. Another may be that the operating divisions, having better information sooner, may have made their preliminary analysis first. Still another may be that although the operating divisions have not made their analysis first, they will have to do it eventually, and are too busy to bother with the intelligence version.

[28] The only hope in circumstances such as these is that the kind of people who forge new and world-shaking conceptual tools are alive at the time, that those minds are focused on the area of the unrecognized problem before the catastrophe and not after, that the groundwork for an advance in that field is already laid, and that people with the power to take action to meet the problem will listen to the man with the new idea.

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wise, and saying that the present policy of taking no action to meet the threat is wrong. A third type of warning could be given when a threat has already been recognized, and a decision to employ a certain means already made. In these circumstances, a warning that the threat will materialize after all implies that the chosen means is ineffective, or that it will bring new threats—again, that the policy is wrong. And notice that an intelligence unit could not justify a statement that the present course was not the proper one unless it had made a detailed analysis as well as a preliminary one. The "warning" role, in sum, will usually become a "warning-critic" one.

The only objection to this role for intelligence is that it means repeating work already done in the operating divisions. It does, that is, if we can assume that those divisions have both the time and skills necessary for systematic analysis. Still proceeding on this assumption, we can also say that there is not much to commend the role. A check on the operating divisions might occasionally be helpful, but this same "warning-critic" role is performed with varying thoroughness by a number of individuals and groups outside the government—scholars in the universities, newspaper editorialists and columnists, foreign policy associations, special interest groups, or any person who thinks and talks about foreign policy problems. The question really is: is it worth while to have an organization performing the role within the structure of government in addition to those performing it outside? To an important extent, the answer depends on whether or not our assumption is met—whether or not, that is, the people in the operating divisions have the time and skills necessary for rational analysis. If the operators meet these prerequisites adequately, a "warning-critic" intelligence unit will be of little benefit. However, for each unit of measurement by which the operators fall short there will be a corresponding increase in the value of a "warning-critic" organization that really criticizes. But this is true only if the members of that organization have the time and skills the operators lack. And it is difficult to believe at present either that lack of time is decisive or that the skills of the operator and those of the intelligence man differ significantly.

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The second basic role assigned to intelligence is that of furnishing the information on which policy is based. The reader will recall that this work is usually described as fitting together bits and pieces of information, like working a jigsaw puzzle, until a balanced "picture" of a foreign situation is built up. But if an intelligence unit goes through this process without any knowledge of the problems facing the operators, its work will often be irrelevant. Most people, however, recognize at least this minimum need for "coordination" or "guidance."[29] One could, of course, reverse one of the arguments for a separate intelligence unit—that the operators do not have time for research and analysis[30]—and say that there also may not be time for the necessary "guidance." Let us assume, however, that the policy people do succeed in giving intelligence a general kind of guidance—information on what the operating divisions have decided are the objectives, their general foreign policies and plans, and a list of the problems they are currently facing. The question is: would the information furnished by intelligence with this sort of guidance be that which is needed in each of the steps of decision-making outlined in the working model given above and would it come out in a usable form?

We saw above that the number of facts which could be amassed about the elements and persons involved in even a simple problem in international relations becomes impossible to conceive; that even the "practical" man has a number of notions which make him feel that when certain things take place, certain results follow; and that it is this "theory," these assumptions, expectations, or hypotheses which help him to select the facts he believes are pertinent. Thus the decision-maker's procedure is, first, to ask a question (what will be the effects of such and such a course of action?); secondly, to identify a theory with the question; and, finally, to look for the information indicated by the theory in order to answer the question.[31] For instance, if appease-

[29] See Kent, *op.cit.*, pp. 81-82; and Pettee, *op.cit.*, p. 104.

[30] Kent, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

[31] If, in the process of analysis, the decision-maker uncovers facts which in the framework of his thought seem to indicate that existing theory is inadequate or fallacious, he may have to modify it or develop new theory as he goes along. The course of action under consideration is also an hypothesis; it may be modified to fit facts which are

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ment, a concession to the demand of some nation, is under scrutiny as an alternative course of action, and the "theory" accepted by the decision-maker indicates that certain political and psychological conditions will determine whether or not a concession will accomplish the desired result, the decision-maker goes to current information looking for these particular points. He looks for information with both the theory and the specific question in mind, and he must know both before he can proceed rationally and economically. The work done in making a decision, in other words, is itself a form of research in which the decision-maker brings these two things to a body of data. He does not receive the data he wants in a vacuum, but seeks it out specifically, following the signposts erected by his theory. And he could not have been able to choose this theory if he had not known the specific question. The data, in sum, is not integrated into a "picture" and brought to the problem, but the problem is brought to the data.

A study prepared by an intelligence unit with only general "guidance," then, would have to be a sort of one-volume encyclopedia. To serve its purpose, the study would have to cover all the information which might be pertinent to some unknown alternative course of action, and, to be safe, pertinent to some unknown or dimly guessed theory or assumption as well. Considerable effort would go into its preparation, and yet much of the information contained in it would be irrelevant to the courses of action actually weighed and the theories actually used. Even so, since it would be prepared in relative isolation, such a study might well omit some significant bit of information made relevant by some unknown theory to some unknown course of action. In view of all this, it is not surprising that the operators do not seem to find the time to read very much of the product of intelligence units, and continue, consciously or unconsciously, to collect and use, with or without adequate analysis, their own data.[32]

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uncovered during investigation, or a course of action previously unrecognized may be evolved.

[32] Probably the tendency also is to continue to do the job of inferring, correctly or incorrectly, the "facts" which are needed from facts which are available. Since it is the policy man who is analyzing the alternative courses of action, it is he and only he who

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If the existing intelligence units must furnish information with only the more or less general guidance assumed here, there seems little reason to believe that their efforts either significantly improve the quality of decisions on foreign policy, or noticeably reduce the burden on the operating divisions and the top command.[33]

Since "guidance" which is merely general is not satisfactory, let us assume that intelligence is given a specific "guidance" that will enable it to furnish all the information required for a problem and only the information required. However, it is obvious from the preceding paragraphs that this would necessarily be the list of alternatives under study. No other "guidance" except this list could give intelligence all that it would need to decide what information was pertinent. Having received this list, intelligence could select the appropriate theory and seek out the data pointed to by that theory. Since the information needed is indicated both by the original question and theory and by the hypotheses and conclusions reached in the earlier phases of the analysis, intelligence would have to go through many of the same steps and would frequently complete the whole analytical process. If the goal

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can know what data are needed. If the policy man is actually going through a disciplined analysis, he will sometimes be grateful to have an intelligence unit dig up a particular bit of information for him, but there will be many times when he will not have the time to stop his work while the "liaison" machinery grinds away. If, as many do, the operator works partly according to intuition, even he will not know which facts are needed. The intelligence man, however, is lost in either case. If he is not asked a specific question, he will not know which facts are needed, and he will find himself doing nothing at all, amassing material of doubtful relevance, or spending a lot of time and energy in a mild form of interorganizational espionage, trying to find out what is going on so he can "anticipate" the needs of the policy people.

[33] It is frequently argued by supporters of "current" intelligence that the role of a newspaper is to furnish information without knowing the specific purpose for which it is to be used, and that intelligence is a kind of governmental newspaper, specializing in secret information, for the private use of policy people. It seems obvious, however, that even the best of newspapers could not furnish all the information wanted by a number of people who have different "theories." Even the most "objective" of newspapers, furthermore, must select the information it presents in terms of the expectations and assumptions of its reporters and editors. If it did not, and merely furnished information in the abstract, its stories would be a jumble of incoherency. An "objective" newspaper is not one which attempts the impossible task of giving *all* the facts, but one which gives all the facts, both for and against its own stand, *that its editors and reporters think are important*. And the facts its editors and reporters think are important are determined by their "theories." Presumably the editors of a conscientious newspaper would also try to add whatever information they think is relevant to the "theories" they suppose their readers hold. But more than this they cannot hope to do.

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of intelligence is to furnish exactly the information needed, the procedure seems to become a senseless one in which intelligence, in order to assemble that information, goes through much of the same analysis that the operating divisions are to make after they receive it. And frequently the operating divisions could not give the "guidance" required—the list of alternatives—until after they had made this same analysis.

If our reasoning is correct, there seems to be very little gain in having a large research and analysis unit, staffed with scarce and expensive people, engaged in "furnishing" information to the operating divisions. Insofar as it is necessary to have an organization to "furnish" information, a library and reference service could probably provide all that would be desired. Utilizing normal commercial and embassy facilities, with the addition of only a tiny field force of its own, this service could collect published, or "overt," materials of general interest on its own initiative, and materials of particular interest by special request. It could index, classify, and catalogue all this information and also the secret information accumulated by the espionage services. Much of the information needed by the analyst of a foreign policy problem would thus be available in a central location, properly filed and indexed. If the analyst could also directly and quickly call on both the State Department missions overseas and the espionage branches to seek out specific data, his position would be ideal—if only in the limited sense that whatever information was available to his government would also be available to him.[34]

There is, however, one other possible division of labor. Let us suppose that intelligence is given the list of alternatives, and then told to do the whole analysis, draw the conclusions, and estimate the probable gains and costs for each alternative furnished. This means that the one organization will do the preliminary analysis, including the work of selecting tentative objectives and of laying out alternative courses of action, and the other the detailed. In other words, this division of labor is a reversal, in all but minor points, of one of our earlier cases in which we had the intelligence

[34] From all accounts, neither the operator nor the intelligence analyst can now direct the secret agent to get specific data. See Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," *World Politics*, 1 (July 1949), p. 545; and Kent, *op.cit.*, pp. 167-68.

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people do the preliminary analysis (in order to give "warning"), and the operators the detailed. Similar objections apply: (1) both organizations would be doing the same kind of work, and both would need the same information, knowledge, method, and skills; (2) in real problems, the process of decision-making will not necessarily fall into the same pattern of sequential steps, and a workable rule defining the line between the two kinds of analysis would therefore be difficult to evolve; (3) there is no reason to believe that there would be a saving in time or effort since the people responsible for the detailed analysis would be able to do their own preliminary analysis in passing.

The end point of our reasoning is simply that the most satisfactory "guidance" is that of values. The relationship becomes, in other words, the familiar one of the layman and the expert. The layman tells the expert his desires; the expert, as completely as knowledge will permit, replies with the courses of action that are open, stating the probable gains and costs of each, and pointing to the values, if any, that are mutually exclusive. With this advice the layman weighs his values—and makes his choice.

The relationship between the elected officials of government on the one hand, and the bureaucrats in the State Department on the other, is presumably this same one of the layman and the expert. It is the President, his directly appointed representatives, and the members of Congress who express desires and make the final choice; it is the policy and operating officials in the State Department who are the government employees formally responsible for analyzing problems and offering technical advice on the probable gains and costs of each alternative. In this present arrangement, the relationship of intelligence is not primarily with the layman, although intelligence may sometimes "furnish" him information, but with the policy and operating "expert" in the State or Defense Department.

Suppose, however, that intelligence is given the responsibility for analyzing, planning, and recommending policy for the laymen, and the operating divisions are confined—with leeway for decisions on timing and for weighting factors on the spot—to

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carrying out policy.[35] The only arguments that will support such a division of labor are the same ones used for the "warning-critic" role. These are either that the operating divisions lack the skills for the necessary research and analysis, or that they lack the time. And, as we said before, it is difficult to believe that the skills of the two groups are not roughly equal. Intelligence, furthermore, falls short of what an organization supposedly devoted to analysis and research should be. In the first place, there is much room for improvement in the quality and composition of its staff; although there are able people in intelligence, more are needed. Also, there should be both a higher proportion of social scientists, and an on-the-job training program to help bring the rest up to a minimum standard. Then, too, the composition of the group of social scientists should be altered—at present, there is an unduly large group of historians in relation to men from the other disciplines.[36]

There is thus little reason to expect that there will be a noticeable improvement if intelligence is given sole responsibility for analyzing and recommending policy. However, the argument that lack of time is significant may have some validity. Of course, many of the decisions in foreign affairs are taken in haste by necessity. When South Korea was invaded, there was no time for leisurely analysis and research. A decision had to be made even though its implications could be only dimly seen. Nevertheless, the possibility of an attack had been recognized, and an organization with more time than was available to the operating divisions might have been able to have looked more deeply.

However, any benefits from this division of labor may be over-

[35] Presumably the present division of labor between the Policy Planning Staff and the operating divisions is basically different from this, since the Staff is supposed to be a kind of committee concerned with long-range planning and not with analyzing and recommending policy on current problems. In practice, however, and in spite of periodic attempts to extricate itself, the Staff seems to have entered more deeply into current problems than was ever intended (see the *New York Times*, April 14, 1950, pp. 1 and 3; and the Hoover Commission's Report on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Govt. Printing Office). Perhaps it could therefore be argued that the Policy Planning Staff is in fact already performing the role contemplated here, even if it is not explicitly charged with it.

[36] Emphasizing history to the point of neglecting the other disciplines is probably due to the influence of the doctrines. The result is primarily to make a break with those doctrines even more difficult, but there are also other undesirable effects. See Kendall, *op.cit.*, pp. 550-51.

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balanced by the drawbacks. In the first place, if the danger now is that there is too little of disciplined analysis, the danger of a sharp distinction between analysis and implementation is that analysis would be out of touch with reality—that action would be either completely isolated from knowledge, or forced into an arbitrary and rigid mold. If our working model has a point, it is that the need is not for a separation of knowledge and action, but for an integration of the two. In rationally conducted foreign affairs, the relationship of knowledge and action should be one of continuous interplay; knowledge and action should interact, should condition and control each other at every point. From the time that a problem is recognized the two should proceed in unison. Knowledge for these purposes must be adapted to the uses of action, shaped to the task of best utilizing the means for action that are at hand. From beginning to end, knowledge should be recipient as well as provider; it should be cast in the frame which action presents, nurtured by the information uncovered as action is carried out, and tested in the laboratory that action provides. Action in turn should not only be planned by knowledge, but guided by it at every stage—in the pause, perhaps, between question and reply in some vital negotiation. Action must be carried out with full understanding of alternatives and implications; the actor knowledgeably alert to new aspects, to the need for modification of assumptions and hypotheses, and to the new problem that arises or is created as the action goes forward. In the ideal diplomacy, the bringer of knowledge should work in a context of policy and action; the implementer should act in a framework of knowledge. The need is for a union, an amalgamation of knowledge and action; and until this condition is met, this integration achieved, it is not likely that a real and effective division of labor can be worked out.

In the second place, setting up an organization responsible for policy analysis does not guarantee that the analysis will be the systematic, disciplined, and rational kind that is needed. The policy and operating divisions are today responsible for analyzing policy problems, yet in spite of much good work there apparently remains a greater need for rational analysis than is

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justified by the argument that their staff is overworked. Although the operators recognize the importance of analysis and sober thought, they do not seem to understand the disciplined procedures of scientific research or the role of theory and conceptual tools in thinking. From all accounts, their thought-tools are often an ill-assorted collection of unrecognized or partly conscious cultural attitudes and prejudices; of logically inconsistent generalizations made from the haphazard samplings of reality that personal experience must ever be; of hypotheses fashioned from shibboleths, the imperfectly understood theories of others, and casually selected, partial information.[37] Too frequently, it seems, their decisions are jerry-built of these materials, slapped together with defective logic, and placed on a narrow and shaky foundation of facts. And, amazingly, these criticisms made of the operators are also applicable to many of the intelligence people—the researchers supposedly hired for their analytical skills.

Thus no clever organizational scheme or gadget, no ingenious division of labor is likely to solve the problem. By a painful process akin to self-analysis, both the operators and the researchers must dredge out and make explicit their hidden but nonetheless powerful attitudes and predispositions. These must then be coldly scrutinized to see which are unfit as a base for understanding reality, and therefore useless in the tasks that lie ahead. Both operators and researchers must overcome their tendencies to make off-the-cuff decisions in terms of these unexamined and only partly conscious assumptions, and train themselves for systematic, rational thought. They must rid themselves of attitudes which form mental blocks to a conscious use of knowledge, and then set to work to build a well-stocked kit of carefully inspected intellectual tools and to acquire a professional skill and facility in their use.

At the same time the researchers must become policy-oriented. An analysis of a problem in foreign affairs will rarely be of much practical use if it is not pitched to the needs of purposive action.

[37] See, for example, Dunn, *op.cit.*; Leighton, *op.cit.*; Almond, *op.cit.*; and Stephen Kemp Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946*, New York, 1950.

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No sort of analysis, in other words, that does not approach a problem in terms of the factors bearing upon it, and of the ways in which those factors can be influenced, will be as meaningful for the purpose of taking action as one that does. If the function of research and analysis is to be useful and significant, it should be frankly and consciously concerned with policy.

The first step in orienting intelligence toward policy is to free it from some of its unremunerative tasks. If it is wasteful and somewhat pointless to furnish information in the abstract rather than in terms of specific problems and the possible alternatives to meet those problems, the effort now spent in writing the numerous encyclopedic country surveys could be better applied elsewhere. The daily summary and comment could also be abandoned. If the present library and reference services are centralized and expanded, as suggested above, intelligence could also turn over to them the responsibility for furnishing spot information—for answering the telephoned request for a name or date. "Backstopping," on the other hand, would more properly be the function, no matter whether the analyst is a member of the operating or the intelligence divisions, of the analyst's research assistant. Intelligence, finally, should dispense with its formal periodic "estimate" of the "capabilities and intentions" of each nation. There is no point in continuing to use it as a vehicle either to "furnish" information or to give "warning"; and, for the rest, an analyst could certainly determine the "capabilities and intentions" of a nation more realistically and accurately if he calculated them not in isolation, but in the study of specific alternatives to deal with an actual problem.

But however helpful getting rid of these tasks might be, the important step for intelligence is an intellectual reorientation designed to create a new set of attitudes—a frame of mind which is manipulative, instrumental, action-conscious, policy-oriented. The major task before the researchers is one of recasting their thought to the context of action, and adapting their tools to the needs of policy.

Ultimately, both operators and researchers must move from hunch and intuition to an improved capacity for explicit and

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disciplined policy analysis. If at the same time the researchers become policy-oriented, there may develop a more effective integration of knowledge and action. A situation may thus be created in which a useful and practical division of labor between research and operations can be worked out. The problem, in sum, is only secondarily an organizational one. The first problem is one of attitudes and skills.

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NATIONAL INTEREST, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By P. E. CORBETT

AMERICAN foreign policy has recently become a favorite target-area for attacks upon an alleged moralizing and legalistic habit which ignores or condemns national interest. The criticism runs the whole gamut of our relations with the world outside, focusing with final virulence upon our effort to find peace in the United Nations. It covers most of the nation's history, tracing the decline from "realism" to moralistic fantasy back to the moment when the genius of the Federalists began to be corrupted by Jeffersonian sentimentalism. The vast complex of today's foreign relations furnishes innumerable points of assault. A folly of self-righteousness has led us—so the indictment reads—into tragic error in China, in Korea, in the Near and Middle East, even (though here some of the accusers desert) in Europe. We give quixotically where we should sell; but our purse-strings are tied with moral scruples where we should be lavish. Shrinking from the open use of power, we enter into wasteful and entangling alliances where we should keep a free hand. Crusading in the name of democracy and disregarding the limits of our resources, we undertake to assist peoples anywhere to establish free governments in the face of intervention from Moscow. We take up arms for the utopian aims of an international organization set up in postwar zeal for a new era and maintained at our expense. A course in this literature of calamity leaves us wondering how the nation has survived. It sounds like the dirge for a fallen empire.

These gloomy analyses of American diplomacy find a pseudo-rational starting-point in an arbitrarily narrowed concept of national interest. The sole national interest which they would recognize in the field of foreign policy is "security," identified with predominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere

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and the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe and in Asia. American policy-makers and their countrymen are charged with condemning national interest as immoral, and with neglecting it in favor of misguided efforts to refashion the world in their image. The sophisticated statesman, according to this doctrine, knows that in our dealings with the world as it is, there can be no national interest in morals.

The onslaught has shown up soft spots and highlighted miscalculations. That much is good. Certainly moral generalization, noble as it may sound, and the closely related reliance upon legal formulas, are no substitute for hard-thinking analysis of the forces with which we have to contend in the world arena. But the extreme form of the criticism leaves a distorted perspective of aims and possibilities in our foreign relations. If its purpose was to sharpen our weapons for the contemporary conflict, the confusion it has engendered threatens to dull them. The attempt to insulate foreign policy decisions from moral judgment means sacrificing an important source of national morale. The subtraction of all imponderables from national interest so desiccates that concept that it ceases to merit the devotion of free men.

What do people mean when they say "national interest"? A person is commonly said to have an interest in any object, activity, or occurrence which, in the speaker's belief, may affect the conditions of that person's life. Similarly, a nation is said to have an interest in anything that is believed by the speaker to have a bearing on the welfare of its people, or of that portion of its people which he has in mind when he says "the nation." People say "national interest" to express their idea of the balance of advantage for the nation in any matter which happens to be under discussion. They aver that it is to the advantage of the nation that citizen A, who has an oil concession in the Middle East, should be protected against extortion there, or that citizen B, a missionary in Africa, should not be penalized for spreading the gospel to the native population. Or, again, they declare that the nation has an interest—even possibly a "vital interest"—in maintaining a naval base in Guam, in preventing the conquest of France, in free elections in Bulgaria, in the relief of famine in

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India, in the fight against illiteracy everywhere. The words "national interest" are thus used to suggest an immense, bewildering, and conflicting variety of desiderata. In any given case, the desideratum may be peculiar to the speaker or some group which he represents, for the identification of person or group with nation is frequent in this context; or it may be the desire of anything up to a large majority of the national population. In any given case, different persons or groups may find the national interest in such contrary modes as control and liberty, severity and mercy, candor and concealment, caution and boldness, passivity and action, liberality and parsimony. There is only one constant; the words always assert an advantage—a contribution to or element in the welfare of the nation. The advantage and welfare contemplated may, as can be seen from the examples offered, be material, intellectual, or spiritual; or they may consist of any combination of these.

The speaker using the words "national interest" usually has in mind some quite concrete object or act which, he asserts, is or would be an advantage to the nation, a contribution to its welfare. Is there, then, any possibility of establishing a class of such objects and acts as are truly to the national advantage, or is this a realm of unmitigated subjectivity where one man's notion is as good as another's? In *Power and Society*[1] Lasswell and Kaplan define an interest as "a pattern of demands and its supporting expectations." This suggests a high degree of subjectivity, but a limit is set later by the authors' insistence on a distinction between "valid" and merely "assumed" interests. No explicit definition of national interest is provided, though the subject is glimpsed under the caption of groups,[2] where the authors distinguish between "interests falsely accepted as such" and "what is in fact to the national interest." At another point[3] they explain the characterization "in fact" as a reference to "scientific and impartial estimates," and they should therefore perhaps be acquitted of asserting the objective existence of something to be dubbed "a" or "the valid national interest," the difference be-

[1] New Haven, Conn., 1950, p. 23.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

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tween "valid" and "assumed" depending merely on the qualification of the persons holding the opinion.

It is true that certain goals or values may be inferred from a nation's history, and that wise or expert persons may be able to give informed, possibly even sound, advice as to how these may be safeguarded or secured in any given situation. This kind of activity is a large part of government, and it is sometimes taken as proof that national interest is not entirely a subjective world of competing notions. Assuming the goals or values, anything held by relevantly skilled persons to tend toward their realization may deserve stable description as "national interest." The same description may be appropriate for certain more or less hereditary ideas about ways of securing national objectives. Settled responses to repetitive situations are often ascribed to "vital interests." The British policy that no hostile Power should control the Channel Ports, and the Monroe Doctrine in this country, are among the more famous instances. These are stereotypes of national interest, and they constitute both guidance and some measure of restraint for persons having to make decisions for the nation. They are a sort of framework, though a flexible one, within which the official exercises what discretion law and convention leave him. The framework is flexible because the goals or values on which the stereotypes are based are themselves matters of opinion; the experts frequently differ both as to what they are and as to how they can be secured in any given circumstances; and they are subject to change by shifts in ruling opinion. Finally, where there is conflict in council, the national interest which operates at the point of decision, regardless of "validity," is the notion held at the moment by the person or persons with political power in the premises. With all these qualifications, it remains true that some of these stabilizations of the content of "national interest" are long-lived and well known to the world at large. They serve as guides not only to officials of the nation establishing them, but to other States planning action in the international field.

Over a large area of governmental activity, major and minor stereotypes, in the form of doctrines, conventions, statutes, trea-

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ties, and accumulated precedents, make decision a relatively easy matter of routine. But even when an issue can be handled entirely within a government department, the factors bearing upon the choice between alternatives, whether the field be foreign or domestic, cannot be exclusively material, nor can all the factors be given their due weight by a merely technical expertise. Most calculations in terms of what are deemed the major values of the national society involve moral judgment. In democratic countries, a great variety of constitutional rules call for participation of representative bodies even in the day-to-day work of departments concerned with foreign relations, while major issues such as peace or war, changes in the national domain, protection or free trade, cannot be formally disposed of without reference to legislatures and sometimes even to electorates. New problems are constantly presenting themselves, and then it may be expedient, if not imperative, to throw the choice of alternatives into the hands of the voters or their representatives. In all cases where legislature or electorate participates in decision, abstract moral notions of national interest are particularly apt to mingle with purely material considerations, and the blending is often so intricate that neither participants nor observers can tell where one stops and the other begins. The new consulting apparatus of the opinion poll, which has had an important part in many recent decisions in the field of world politics, operates largely in a domain of moral preferences.[4] Those who hold that the conduct of States is not a proper subject for moral judgment lay themselves open to the suspicion, among others, that they wish to exclude popular consultation in matters of foreign policy, since it is upon the moral rather than what may be called the technical aspects of policy that the unskilled voter has most title to be heard.

Some of the best-known clichés about national interest revolve about security. National security is usually said to include the capacity not only to prevent conquest but to preserve the nation's way of life. These two elements of security are summed up in one of the recurrent phrases of international documents—

[4] For a general discussion of this subject, see Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1950.

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"territorial integrity and political independence." Here we have the accepted formula for an alleged objective and unchanging national interest—something absolute to cling to in a morass of relativism. Yet there is a suspicious ring of totalitarianism in the phrase. Territorial integrity and political independence are the classifying marks of the State as a distinct and sovereign entity in world politics, and to characterize them as in all circumstances the supreme end of foreign policy leads to conclusions that do not fit easily into democratic doctrine. It seems to make the preservation of the State—that is to say, the structure of authority in a given territory—a supreme end of government. For democratic purposes it seems worth while to insist that the prime object of foreign policy, as of all other national policies, is the welfare of the individuals and groups organized as a national society. Insofar as territorial integrity and political independence are judged to minister to that welfare, they may well be described as the mediate and instrumental objective to which foreign policy is especially directed. But there have frequently been circumstances in which a government consulting the welfare of its people has held itself obliged to surrender the nation's territory and the fate of its population, with or without qualification, into alien hands. This is what happens after defeat in war when a government, though it still commands means of resistance, believes that fighting on would impose excessive damage and suffering. This is what happened under duress short of war in Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. Such a decision may eventually be judged wrong, because it rested on factual error or on consideration for some particular rather than national interest. Or, again, it may be held to have been the fulfillment of a clear duty. Whatever the "verdict of history" may be, the government is in effect abandoning the State to a disposition which may involve loss of land and population or even extinction. It is giving priority to its people's interest in their lives and property over their interest in territorial and political integrity. An equally conscientious government may of course decide that the foreseeable consequences of surrender are so disastrous that resistance to the last man is preferable.

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Short of this supreme test of its position in the hierarchy of national interests, territorial and political integrity has undoubtedly held high rank. It has been an active and constant concern in many of the States of Europe. With us, once the early perils of the Republic were past, it was until very recent times taken for granted. As late as 1944, the possibilities of transoceanic bombardment were still only vaguely apprehended, and nothing had been heard of atomic weapons. Even now, the territorial security appealed to in justification of American defense expenditure means primarily keeping the war, if we have to fight one, as much as possible and as far as possible away from home. The fear of conquest, of subjugation, has hardly yet crossed our horizon. On the other hand, the horror of atomic bombardment has sharpened and generalized the sense of national interest not only in measures calculated to keep the fighting distant, but in the more radical effort to create international organs strong enough to impose adjustment and adjudication as a substitute for violence in the settlement of conflict.

This is a point that has received little or no attention from those who would have us regard solely a narrowly conceived "national interest" in the formulation and conduct of our foreign policy. They summarily dismiss collective organization for the avoidance of total war as a concession to morals. From the point of view taken in this article, this is not a condemnation; but it seems to me to convey a distorted image of American character and practice. The view that foreign policy is a domain alien to morals is patently untenable. We must therefore assume that writers who appear to adopt this view are merely overaccenting their warnings against quixotic adventurism and the doctrinaire pursuit of utopias. But the issue which they raise is no longer so grave as they make it out. Americans are not in great danger of having their national feet lifted off the ground by moral balloons. Their bargain-driving habits (which, incidentally, they share with the British and the French) guarantee adequate attention to the material aspects of any plan or proposal. Intensive and disillusioning experience since the end of the war is rapidly teach-

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ing them to apply their native shrewdness to the problems of world politics.

It is true that the American government, supported apparently by a majority of its people, is finding and implementing an urgent national interest in a degree of help to various foreign peoples which would have been politically inconceivable before World War II. This liberality is justified, however, by reference to one or more of the well-established formulas of national interest, such as expansion of foreign trade or the protection of our way of life. We fear infiltrating Communism only less than atomic bombs, and we see a hope of limiting its spread by helping to maintain or raise the living standards of threatened peoples. Moreover, we need assured and expanding sources of defense materials. The moral duty of the strong to help the weak is also invoked; but both in Congress and in the nation such a motive still needs the reinforcement of powerful "practical considerations" when the cost runs into billions.

Similarly, the United States is putting its back into the work of international organization with an energy that few would have predicted even in 1945. A majority conviction that this is the moral way to conduct the relations of States would be adequate justification. There is some evidence that such a conviction exists. But it is not invoked as the only or even the principal motive of our United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty policy. Those who oppose these policies cannot dismiss them in one stroke as concessions to moral pressure. They are bound to examine in detail the ideas of concrete national interest which support them. I do not suggest that the examination must result in conviction. There is still room for debate whether international organization pays any nation substantial dividends on over-all account, and whether any specific issue can be handled more effectively by traditional diplomacy or by the new collective agencies. But the debate should not be conducted as one between idealism or morals on the one side and realism or expediency on the other. Its proper subject is the comparative efficiency of alternative means in the service of stated ends.

No less painstaking an examination from the point of view of

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national interests is incumbent on those who champion the United Nations. There is undoubtedly some tendency on the part of those private citizens who know anything about that organization to be either all for it or all against it. It is as if the institution were a good or evil in itself and not simply an instrumentality good or bad in terms of what it does. Relatively little effort seems to have been made by students of collective organization to weigh dispassionately what it has done or might do which could not be equally well done by national agencies working independently or in *ad hoc* consultation. This in spite of the generally accepted principle that the burden of proof rests on the proposers of new methods.

It must be admitted at once that this kind of examination is not easy. If we are looking at the past record, how is it possible to judge whether a given problem dealt with by an international agency would have been better or worse handled by traditional diplomatic procedures? Any verdict that can carry conviction to the sceptical rationalist must have something better to go on than gratuitous speculations about what might have happened if other methods had been employed. Yet the controlled experiment by which the physical scientist tests his hypotheses is even more difficult here than in domestic politics. There are perhaps issues of which it can be said that by their very nature they would defy any but collective solution. Some such will be suggested in this paper. But apart from cases of this kind we are thrown back upon diplomatic history and the search for analogous situations and problems. Finding the analogues, we must study, with the nearest possible approach to impartiality, the procedures employed and the results achieved. Even then we shall have to be content with rough approximations, since no situation or problem is ever repeated without significant variations. However, some comfort may be derived from the fact that the method has worked reasonably well in the administration of justice. Even in those legal systems which do not theoretically recognize the principle of *stare decisis*, reliance upon precedent is an important factor in decisions; and many a new situation is met by extending the reasoning of an earlier judgment on analogous facts.

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The popular appeal for strong standing international organization is based largely upon the fact that traditional diplomacy, with its reliance upon an uninstitutionalized balance of power, has not been able to prevent war. The appeal goes on to cite, often with some exaggeration, the success achieved in the control of violence, and in the pacific settlement of disputes, by the centralization of authority in national governments. From these premises the argument jumps to the conclusion that war can be prevented by setting up supranational organization with powers comparable to those of national governments, and in no other way. This becomes the prime tenet of a doctrine which is held with such intensity that many of its adherents declare it immoral for a government to be weak in its support of international organization in general or to withhold any specific issue from collective treatment.

There can be few better reasons for trying new methods than that those already familiar have repeatedly failed to produce a desired result. But when the power or welfare of nations is at stake, officials are not usually eager to experiment. One can be excused for failing in a familiar way. But to try something new and fail is to face condemnation that may well be fatal to a career and temporarily disastrous to a party. Even to propose a radical departure in foreign policy may mean abject political defeat. What happened to President Wilson and the Democratic Party in 1920 is a well-remembered case in point. It required a second world war to bring the American people to the degree of emotional tension necessary for a drastic revision of policy.

How little of sober calculation lay behind the optimistic assumptions on which the United Nations Organization was built in 1945 has since become all too apparent. In the principal tasks for which it was designed—namely, the world-wide non-violent settlement of disputes, and world-wide collaboration for social, economic, and political advancement—the Organization has hitherto proved woefully inadequate. It has been unable to prevent the rise and spread of insecurity with a resultant race in rearmament and in the fabrication of alliance and counteralliance.

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In a word, we have been thrown back upon devices traditional in European, if not in American, diplomacy.

It is often argued that organization is necessary to engender the spirit and habit of collaboration, and that even an ineffective organization is therefore better than none at all. It may gather effectiveness with time. There is something to be said for this view. To some extent organizations can lift themselves by their own bootstraps. But the United Nations has been eloquent proof that the boots must be strong. No amount of the legal obligation that goes with organization can overcome basic differences of aim and practice. If the legal obligation is to prevail, it must be backed by sufficient power to make the risks outweigh the possible profits of violation. International organization does not displace the balance of power; it merely institutionalizes it. These considerations need all to be borne in mind in deciding whether an issue should be referred to an international agency or met with resources under the control of the State or States principally concerned.

The checks suffered by the United Nations in its efforts to carry into effect decisions arrived at by overwhelming majorities —even, it should be noted, when the recalcitrant has been a small State not endowed with a veto—have reinforced earlier doubts about the relevancy of national constitutions, whether unitary or federal, as models for international organization. Critics long ago pointed out that the vast preponderance of the State's power over the individual is not duplicated in the relations between even the most general international organization and its member States. And, when a government sets itself against an international decision, all the motives that sometimes prompt the individual's resistance to State authority are aggravated by national pride, and at the same time dramatically freed of personal inhibitions by the fact of acting for the nation.

Historically, the control of violence—the keeping of order—was recognized very early as standing alongside external defense among the prime purposes of government. But it may be that the State analogy is misleading us when we make this the prime purpose of international organization, especially if we are bent,

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as we appear to be, upon the organization of States rather than of individuals. Possibly we should be focusing the effort of our general organization, not upon the extremely difficult task of controlling the use of force by such powerful and stubbornly independent group units as States are, but upon some less spectacular and more encompassable forms of collaboration. Possibly those activities which we have been in the habit of describing as marginal in the agenda of the United Nations should be regarded as its chief, because feasible, business. This would not mean abandoning the hope that it may gradually accumulate the strength necessary for direct keeping of the peace. It *would* mean continuing for the time being to place our chief reliance in the search for security upon means other than world organization. This is in fact what we have been driven to do by the revealed weakness of the United Nations.

I have not forgotten the constantly cited success in Iran, 1946. There are circumstances in which even a weak intervention will induce a State to delay or change the form of a marginal enterprise. Nor have I forgotten the long drawn-out agony of Korea, which for all its cost in suffering may yet go down in history as the beginning of salvation for our generation. Korea brought knowledge of the enemy before it was too late, and it has been an object lesson in the potentialities and the perils of international police action. The enterprise has from the beginning been essentially American in initiative and maintenance, though carried on under the formal auspices of the United Nations; and there is more than a little difference of opinion in this country whether the advantages of acting through the collective organization, including the contributions of arms and men made by the other members, have balanced the disadvantage of divided councils. However this account may stand, it is clear that the military activity of the United Nations does not mark the center of gravity in the security policy of the United States or of those members who have assisted this country in Korea. It is outranked not only by armament under national command, but also by that expanding regional arrangement, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-

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tion, by the group of security pacts in the Pacific, and by the whole broad flow of American military and economic aid.

As we look back over the years since 1945, taking into consideration, in addition to the experience summarized above, the action taken in Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, there can surely be little doubt that on security account we have gained more by action outside the United Nations than by anything done, or that could have been done at this stage in its development, through that organization. Of course, if the United Nations had worked as its sponsors in 1945 apparently hoped it would, the intervening scramble for security would have been unnecessary. Some therefore attribute the fault not to the organization, but to the refusal of certain Powers (the Soviet Union if the commentator is on our side, the United States and Britain if he is on the other) to fulfill their obligations under the Charter. This is the platitude that international organization will keep the peace if States want it to, and it has only the most superficial bearing on the problems of our day. If, as we have admitted, there may be some educational value in machinery which cannot operate because it is too far in advance of the will needed to make it work (and against such value we must set off the disillusionment of failure), it is clearly political folly to rely upon such machinery. A State seriously desiring to develop an effective world society may indeed try to use it, but prudence will compel the State at the same time to employ supplementary means, and these means will almost inevitably be of such a nature as themselves to prevent the general collective agency from taking any firm grasp on the relevant issue. Thus the North Atlantic arrangement, fully justified as it is by the proved weakness of the United Nations, constitutes in itself a further obstacle to the use of that organization as a means of reconciling conflict between the Soviet and the Western blocs.

The United States, then, does not rely primarily upon the United Nations for security, which obviously ranks high among the commonly recognized national interests. Nevertheless, the present Administration continues to insist that the national interest demands unflagging support and undimmed respect for

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the organization. President Truman makes this plain in every speech that he devotes to foreign policy. He sees an immediate and concrete national interest in an organization which rallies so much support to the greater part of United States foreign policy. Nor is this view nullified by the fact that the support is still largely moral. The material value of moral support in the international field is so well understood that it has long been one of the standard aims of diplomacy. No one knows better than our chief competitor how it reduces the friction, the cost, and the risks of implementing policy. We tend to forget what the United Nations does for us in this respect when we complain about the superiority of Soviet propaganda.

The Department of State reinforces the President's stand. That the departmental eye is not trained exclusively on a remote future in doing this has been demonstrated repeatedly. Two examples may suffice.

The plan to use the General Assembly for preventing or stopping aggression so long as the Security Council is paralyzed by the veto was devised by the Department and introduced in the General Assembly by Secretary Acheson. It emerged as the first of the three "Uniting for Peace" Resolutions adopted on November 2, 1950. The action taken in Korea was possible with some semblance of constitutional propriety because of the Soviet Union's absence from the Security Council at midsummer of 1950. The Resolution is an elaborate device for securing the same kind of action despite the presence of an opposing Soviet representative, and it was of course opposed by the Soviet bloc, being adopted by 52 votes against 5, with 2 abstentions. It is at once an assertion of United States interest in a collective procedure for meeting threats to the peace, and an adjustment of that procedure toward closer conformity with conditions actually obtaining in world politics. The procedure laid down for the Security Council in the Charter was intended to culminate in decisions legally binding on members of the United Nations. The General Assembly has no such power of binding decision; it recommends, but it cannot order. The Resolution of November 2, 1950, therefore sets up a scheme of voluntary collaboration

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for security against aggression. This makes a realistic concession to the stubborn adherence of States to their sovereignty. Theoretically, the scheme could be brought into operation over the veto of the United States, and in view of the way in which positions are reversed over periods of time in international relations, this possibility should not be dismissed as a legalistic fantasy.

The second example is the disarmament plan submitted to the General Assembly in 1951. Again Secretary Acheson was the bearer, although President Truman had on the previous evening (November 7, 1951) described the project over the radio. Britain and France joined in the submission. Their text calls first for a census of armaments by an elaborate process of disclosure and verification with disinterested and effective inspection. This would cover all types of arms and forces, including those designed for atomic war, and would proceed by stages from least secret to most secret armament. Only when reliable information has been accumulated in this way, and adequate safeguards provided against violation, would any treaty for balanced reduction and regulation come into effect. This happy event would, further, have to depend on ratification by "at least those states whose military resources are so substantial that their absence from the program would endanger it."

A strong case can be made out for the necessity of every successive step in this program. Few governments other than the Soviet argue that any useful degree of disarmament can be achieved at one stroke. Nevertheless, the long drawn-out procedure proposed by the United States, Britain, and France creates such an impression of remoteness that the sincerity of the sponsors has been questioned by some loyal champions of the Western democracies. As for the Russians, their Foreign Minister, Mr. Vishinsky (who is not famed for his merriment), apparently lost an entire night in paroxysms of laughter. On recovery, he immediately rejected the proposal in the name of the Soviet Union. The General Assembly, unabashed by a somewhat overdone mockery, adopted by a vote of 42 to 5 with 7 abstentions a resolution embodying the proposal and referring it to a new Disarmament Commission. This body, composed of the

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members of the Security Council plus Canada, takes over the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, both of which have been dissolved. It is now (June 1952) in session, and Mr. Malik continues to pour Soviet scorn on the Western proposal.

To say that the primary purpose of submitting such a project now is to steal the thunder of Soviet propaganda, which has kept up a barrage of disarmament proposals, is not to condemn it utterly, even from the moral point of view. Neither the President nor Mr. Acheson has any illusions about the possibility of disarmament, by their plan or any other, so long as international tension remains at its present level. They made this plain in their speeches. There is no reason, however, to doubt their sincere desire to turn to other purposes the resources that now have to be employed in armament and military training. They are therefore justified in refusing to allow the Soviet Union a monopoly of such moral advantage as can be derived from launching disarmament schemes.

The basic problem of disarmament is international confidence, and any program must either assume this confidence, which would make it totally inapplicable to our world, or set out the steps by which confidence may be created. The American government has chosen the second alternative. If there is one valid criticism, it is that the texts so far do not sufficiently stress the essential connection between disarmament and organized international security. The one set of treaties which ever resulted in a substantial scrapping of armament—namely, those concluded at Washington in 1922—probably helped to place Japan in the position from which she was willing twenty years later to challenge the United States and Great Britain in war. This experience suggests that real and lasting disarmament will only be achieved as part of a general system which can be relied upon to prevent the use of force by States at their discretion. The United Nations is not such a system now and shows little sign of becoming one in any near future. It can only develop in that direction if and as all its activities, reinforced by other modes of international collaboration, gradually overcome the conditions,

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forces, and attitudes which make for violent conflict. Those prophets who assert that the present over-all trend is in that direction, and who foretell an early culmination in world government and enduring peace would appear to depend upon sources of inspiration inscrutable to scientific enquiry.

Disarmament is something to which the United States, Britain and the other nations of the "Commonwealth," France, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries have all shown a propensity strong enough to be dangerous, given the world in which we have to live. They have now come to realize that, while disarmament would make general security easier to maintain, it can only be achieved under conditions which promise general security. In all these countries there is a common recognition of national interest in relief from the burdens of military preparedness; but there is also a growing knowledge that this is an interest which cannot be secured without strong and multilateral organization. At best, the prospect of success is a long-term one; but it is well that even now such organization as exists should be studying the complex of problems involved in a world-wide reduction and regulation of arms, learning thoroughly the interconnections of these problems and bringing to light the real obstacles to progress.

The conditions which weaken the United Nations as a policing system, and as a substitute for national armaments, also weaken it as a mediator in disputes. In the diplomacy of the nineteenth century, the offer of mediation might be interpreted as an interested intervention and was something to be indulged in only by the strong. Indeed, the line between mediation and a threat of participation on one side was often blurred. The United Nations has attempted a number of mediations, in Indonesia, Palestine, and Kashmir; but it cannot yet be established that its success has been greater than that achieved by the great Powers of Europe adjusting separately or in concert an uninstitutionalized balance of power, or by the United States applying the Monroe Doctrine. Theoretically, it may seem profitable to have a standing agency of conciliation ready to intervene even though the stage of organization which has sure sanctions in the back-

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ground has not yet been reached. There is the risk, however, that indecisive mediation may aggravate a dispute.

Aside from the sharper issues of international politics, the foreign policy of the United States operates through the United Nations and related agencies for various social, humanitarian, and technical purposes. The collective administration of some of these activities is dictated by obvious considerations of efficiency. No one nowadays questions the value of the Universal Postal and Telecommunication Unions. The more recent World Health Organization is regarded as indispensable by modern States other than the Soviet Union. The control of epidemics demands simultaneous action in many countries. Similar reasons support the effort to bring international civil aviation under unified regulation. The advantages of this revolutionary mode of transportation cannot be realized without unhampered passage over scores of national frontiers, nor can its dangers be avoided without the international coordination of sanitary and safety devices and practices. The International Labor Organization owes its establishment and continued existence to the conviction that only a world-wide approach can cope with the substandard labor conditions which give an inhuman advantage in world markets to the products of some countries.

The institutions mentioned deal with a class of problems which by their nature demand collective solution. The secret of success would appear to lie in a combination of the following features: (a) a firm conviction of national interest; (b) conclusive reasons for believing that the interest will be more economically and completely implemented by a standing collective organization than by national action taken alone or in *ad hoc* cooperation with others; and (c) a limited competence and a measurable and controllable draft on national resources. The record of accomplishment is an uneven one; but sufficient service has been rendered by the relevant agencies to stimulate rapid proliferation into fields where the immediate and concrete returns are less discernible. Here the motives which prompt American participation range from the altruistic desire to relieve suffering to long-term calculations of profit plus tranquillity from increased

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productivity and improved living conditions in underdeveloped or temporarily depressed countries.

The multiplication of social enterprises which harmonize and serve the interests of some sixty nations through permanent agencies acting by majority vote seems an appreciable advance toward effective world society. Unfortunately the Soviet Union stands aloof. In the social field, as in that of political security, the interests which it espouses cannot be secured through organizations in which it is habitually outvoted by overwhelming majorities. The fact that these interests are not considered legitimate by the rest of the world has no visible effect upon the Soviet conviction of rightness. Chronic opposition is glorified for Communist consumption as championship of the equal sovereignty of nations against the subtle and sinister designs of American imperialism. The resulting rift demonstrates the impossibility of compensating with constitutional machinery for basic international conflicts between notions of both moral and material interest. Until these are reconciled by profound change in governing doctrines and attitudes, there may indeed be important partial international organizations, but they will operate under a cloud of fear and suspicion, while the major energies of the great States are absorbed in preparation for war.

While this condition of affairs persists, pronouncements that the United Nations forms the "cornerstone" of our foreign policy must be regarded as expressions of hope rather than fact. There is nonetheless a fallacious dichotomy in the dictum that this is a time for exclusive attention to national interest as distinct from the objectives of international organization. For the motives which recommend collective action are frequently of the most "practical" type. Even if they were in some cases of a peculiarly moral nature, there would still be room for them. For the notions of national interest which guide our foreign policy should be and are large enough in critical as in "normal" times to accommodate official or popular moral aspirations. There must of course be measure in all things. Only the fanatic denies the immorality of indulging moral impulse without counting costs. The interest in maintaining self-respect and a reputation

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for probity is no less "real" than our interest in maintaining a high standard of living by advantageous international arrangements or by striving to reduce armaments. The foreign policy of the United States, like that of other democracies, will continue to be a rough and shifting balance where ethical elements weigh with those of physical security and economic welfare.

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THE STALINIST REVISION OF HISTORY: THE CASE OF BREST-LITOVSK

By RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

THE events leading to the rise of Stalin to sole prominence in the Soviet Union and the general political picture of the totalitarian Stalinist regime are now familiar, but specific forms of the evolution of "Stalinism" are often not adequately understood. Evolving Soviet historiography is an unusually informative mirror of these developments, since it not only attempts to describe them, but implicitly embodies them as well. The present article is an analysis of one theme from early Soviet history, treatment of which in Soviet historiography exemplifies both the trend of Soviet historiography as a whole, and the trend of Stalinism as an emergent totalitarian ideology based on Bolshevism.

Analysis of the changing pattern of interpretation is useful as a means of (a) indicating the picture which the Soviet leadership wishes to present to the population, (b) illuminating the purposes of the responsible Soviet leadership, and (c) suggesting the actual thought-pattern of that leadership. This is increasingly true as one turns from the early accepted Leninist interpretations to the later conscious distortion of truth for readily discernible purposes.

I

The intra-Party debates of January to March 1918 over the issue of accepting or rejecting the harsh German-proffered Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were the first post-revolutionary test of applying the Marxist-Leninist (Bolshevik) ideology to a concrete situation of decision. The Bolshevik theory of "calculation of the relation of forces" held such decisions to be merely a matter of rational estimation of the situation.[1] Hence, the fact that the

[1] For an analysis of this "calculation of the relation of forces" in Soviet policy-making, see R. L. Garthoff, "The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policy-making," *World Politics*, VI (October 1951), pp. 85-111.

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Bolshevik leaders found themselves in serious disagreement was a problem not only of direct political import, but also of ideological significance. Accordingly, the antagonists on both sides claimed to be calculating the relation of forces correctly, and accused their opponents of failure to do so. Later, when the policy of acceptance of the treaty seemed to have proved successful, the original claims to correct calculation were generally accepted as having been right. Since, in the Bolshevik view, there can be only *one* correct calculation and line on any question, "success" seems to justify the line pursued as the *only* correct possibility, thus perpetuating claims to the virtual infallibility of the Party.

Lenin led the adherents of acceptance of the treaty, who for a time were in the minority but eventually gained victory in the debates. Trotsky occupied a middle position, and the ultimate abstention of his group permitted Lenin's policy to be adopted. Bukharin led the so-called "Left" Communists or "Lefts," those who favored the more utopian plan of rejecting the treaty and placing reliance upon the assistance of the rising proletariat of Germany (and of the Western powers) to prevent the military crushing of Bolshevik power in Russia.

Lenin's characterization of the "Lefts," both at the time and subsequently, was that they were not rationally calculating the relation of forces (the situation), but were permitting their emotional preferences to interfere. Thus, in 1922 Lenin wrote that the "Lefts" were "incapable of giving thought to the relation of forces, the calculation of the relation of forces. This is the main point in Marxism and Marxian tactics, but they disdainfully brush aside the 'main point' with 'proud phrases'. . . ."[2] At the height of the bitter debate Lenin declared that he was "nine-tenths in agreement with Bukharin," but that the situation dictated the tactic of acceptance of the unpleasant treaty. "Our disagreements will vanish once we recognize that tactic," he declared.[3] Lenin thus considered the *motivations* of the "Left"

[2] Lenin, "'Left-wing' Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality," *Selected Works*, New York, n.d., VII, p. 354.

[3] Lenin, in *Sedmoi S'ezd Rosiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii* [Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party], stenographic account, March 6-8, 1918, Gosizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1923, p. 126 (hereafter cited as *Sedmoi S'ezd*).

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Communists to be well-meant, but their policy incorrect. He said that it "*objectively* can have only one effect, *viz.*, by their vacillation the 'Lefts' are *helping* the imperialists to provoke the Russian Soviet Republic into a clearly disadvantageous war. . . ."[4]

This Leninist characterization of the motivations of the "Lefts" prevailed in the period down to 1934. Thus, for example, Sorin wrote in 1925 that "The Left Communists in a most decisive manner cut themselves off from the demands of a Marxist policy, of which the calculation of class forces is the most important rule . . . ,"[5] and "The Left Communists *subjectively stood on the point of view of the proletariat,* but *objectively they became unconscious tools of the bourgeoisie.* . . ."[6] Similar characterizations of the subjective intentions of the "Lefts" as genuine, despite the serious objective effect their incorrect view had on the Brest issue, are found in all the other Party histories of the period.[7] In 1934 the Party gave the first direct "guidance" to Soviet historiographers by appointing a Commission of the Central Committee, composed of Stalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov, to recommend measures on this subject. An initial result was the writing of a new Party history edited by V. Knorin, which was published in 1934. This study maintained the previous interpretation reviewed above, but went on to conclude that "The *position* of the 'Lefts' and of Trotskyism bore a *criminally* adventurist and capitulatory character."[8] This was not, however,

[4] Lenin, *Selected Works*, VII, p. 355; italics mine.

[5] Vladimir Sorin, *Partiia i Oppozitsiia* [The Party and the Opposition], Part I, Moscow, 1925, p. 71. Sorin, incidentally, like many other early Soviet historians, had been a "Left" in 1918.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[7] See A. Bubnov, "The VKP (B)," *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* [The Great Soviet Encyclopedia], II, 1930, cols. 446 and 448; E. Yaroslavsky, *Istoriia VKP (B)* [History of the CPSU (B)], IV, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, p. 318; L. Rovinsky and A. Slepkov, *Partiia Protiv Oppozitsiia* [The Party Against Opposition], Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, pp. XV-XVI (from the Foreword by E. Yaroslavsky); M. Tanin, *Desiat' Let Vneshnei Politiki SSSR (1917-1927)* [Ten Years of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1927], Moscow, 1927, p. 12; I. I. Mints, "The Brest Peace," *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Moscow, 1927, cols. 437-62; and N. Popov, *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, International Publishers, 1934, II, p. 17 (this is a translation from the fifteenth or sixteenth revised edition of a work first appearing in 1925). Both Bubnov and Yaroslavsky, like Sorin, had been prominent "Lefts" in 1918.

[8] V. Knorin, *Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Short History*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, pp. 242-43. (This official English translation was made from the second Russian edition, also of 1934.)

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considered by the Soviet leadership to be sufficient. In February 1936 the Commission reports were publicly printed for the first time, in *Bol'shevik*, together with a new decree by the Central Committee (Party) and Sovnarkom (Government).[9] A year later, articles by Stalin and Knorin declared the inadequacy of the existing histories (those by Yaroslavsky, Popov, and Knorin).[10]

The year 1938 is among the most fascinating in Soviet history —and historiography. The assassination of Kirov in December 1934 had permitted Stalin to consolidate complete control, and led to the great purges of all his potential rivals or critics from the Party and state apparatus. By 1938 the *Yezhovshchina* drew to its final climax of repression in the third purge trial of old Bolsheviks (March 2-13, 1938).[11]

At the evening session on March 5, Vyshinsky, the State Prosecutor, suddenly asked Bukharin:

V: But were you not in favour of the assassination of leaders of our Party and Government in 1918?
B: No, I was not.
V: Were you not in favour of the arrest of Lenin?
B: This arrest? There were two such cases—about the first of which I told Lenin himself; as to the second, I kept silent about it for reasons of secrecy—regarding which, if you like, I can speak in greater detail. It did take place.[12]

In his final plea, on the evening of March 12, Bukharin reviewed this matter:

It is not true that before the Brest-Litovsk Peace the "Left-Communists" and the Trotskyites wanted to effect a *coup d'état* by forcible means;

[9] "Historical Science and Leninism," editorial, *Bol'shevik*, No. 3 (February 1, 1936), pp. 1-9; "On the Front of Historical Science: In the Sovnarkom of the USSR and C. C. of the CPSU (B)," *ibid.*, pp. 60-62; J. Stalin, A. Zhdanov, and S. Kirov [written August 8, 1934], "Observations on the Line of a Textbook on the History of the USSR," *ibid.*, pp. 63-64; and Stalin, Zhdanov, and Kirov [written August 9, 1934], "Observations on a Conspectus for a Textbook of 'New History,'" *ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

[10] J. Stalin, "On a Textbook on the History of the CPSU (B)," *Bol'shevik*, No. 9 (May 1, 1937), pp. 8-10; and V. Knorin, "On the Study of the History of the CPSU (B)," *ibid.*, pp. 11-24.

[11] *Yezhovshchina* is the pejorative of Yezhov, then head of the NKVD and chief executor. Early in 1938, Yezhov was replaced by L. Beria. Beria, incidentally, had not only been NKVD (GPU) chief in Georgia, but had written the *History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia* (in July 1935) which "remolded" the image of the early prerevolutionary role of Stalin.

[12] *Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites,"* verbatim report, People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Moscow, 1938, pp. 377-78.

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it is untrue because the Trotskyites and the so-called "Lefts" had the majority in the Central Committee, and if the Trotskyites had not capitulated at the decisive moment when the vote on the question of the Brest-Litovsk Peace was taken, the Trotskyites and the "Lefts" would have had the majority in the Central Committee. That being the case, how can it be supposed that they then capitulated in order to resort to conspiratorial methods? Everybody who lived through that period remembers perfectly well that the feelings of the "Left Communists" at that time, before the Brest-Litovsk Peace, were such that they hoped to win a Party majority at the next Party Congress.[13]

Bukharin then noted sarcastically that other "still respected members of the Party," notably Kuibyshev (a Party associate of Stalin), Yaroslavsky (the historian whom we have cited), and Menzhinsky (second head of the GPU), had also been leaders of the "Lefts" in 1918. (They had all died previous to the purges, and hence their role in the public eye was never changed; they remained great early Bolsheviks.) He declared that "Yakovleva, the principal witness against me [on this matter], is mixing things up with an entirely different period, the period following the Brest-Litovsk Peace. . . ." (Yakovleva herself was a former "Left," but in this trial obviously played the role of provocateur.) Bukharin admitted that there had been "feelers," at first summarily rejected, from the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries Karelin and Kamkov, but that later negotiations were conducted.

And as regards the fact that negotiations were subsequently conducted through Pyatakov with the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries—*and this may be considered, as Citizen the Procurator, if I am not mistaken, formulated it,* an attempt to overthrow the Soviet power by forcible means—this I admit; it was the case. As to the plan of physical extermination, I categorically deny it, and here the logic to which Citizen the State Prosecutor referred, namely, that forcible arrest implied physical extermination, will not help in the least. The Constituent Assembly was arrested, but nobody suffered physically. We arrested the faction of the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries, yet not a single man of them suffered physically. The "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries arrested Dzerzhinsky, yet he did not suffer physically. And I say—and this was omitted from the speech of the State Prosecutor—that in these criminal and dastardly conversations, it was specifically stipulated that not one hair of the persons concerned should be injured. You may think what you like, but it is a real fact.[14]

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 778.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 774; italics mine. See *ibid.*, pp. 367-512 and 767-79, for the full trial discussion of the Brest period.

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Finally, he stated accurately that this "Left" Bolshevik-"Left" S. R. conspiracy was very short-lived, because of the S. R. revolts, following which the S.R.'s were arrested, and that he and other "Lefts" had aided in putting down this abortive revolt.

The foregoing, then, is the purge record as printed by the Commissariat of Justice of the USSR.

On March 5, 1938, the same day that Bukharin's first testimony was given, an important editorial appeared in *Bol'shevik* entitled "The Brest Peace and the Struggle of the Party of Bolsheviks Against the Trotskyite-Bukharinist Provocateurs of War."[15] This article, based on the data and the spirit of the purge, set the course for all subsequent Soviet historiography concerning the Brest period. Although this editorial appeared a full week before Bukharin's concluding plea and the judgment of the court, it states with no qualifications that the Bukharinites ("Lefts") and Trotskyites had planned to overthrow the Soviet regime and arrest and kill Stalin, Lenin, and Sverdlov. (Sverdlov is included because he had died "in time.") Thus even the testimony, even the allegations of the Prosecutor, are distorted. Trotsky had no part in the talks concerning the possibility of arresting Lenin; *no* plans had ever been made to kill anyone. The editorial also maintains that the "Left" S. R.-Bukharinist schemes coincided with the "Left" S. R. revolt, a sheer distortion (as Bukharin correctly stated at the trial). Finally, the article declares: "Only now, after twenty years, have the heinous plans of that scum of humanity become known."[16] In the first place, such charges, which might raise questions in the minds of some as to the effectiveness of a power which permitted spies to infiltrate into the top councils and remain undetected for two decades, or why this opposition could not have seized power when they held a clear majority of the Politburo and other top organs, could not be made today. More important to our immediate interest, this is simply an abuse of the facts well-known to the authors of the editorial. Bukharin had notified the Party leaders, including Lenin, in 1923 about the talks in 1918 concerning plans to arrest Lenin, and this had been commented upon in *Pravda*, No. 2, 1924.

[15] *Bol'shevik*, No. 5 (March 5, 1938), pp. 60-73. [16] *Ibid.*, p. 65; see also p. 72.

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However, a few articles in *Bol'shevik* such as the one cited above could not be expected to supersede the now greatly outdated histories by Popov and Knorin. Therefore, in the same magic year, 1938, *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course* appeared, attributed to the Party Historical Commission. On the tenth anniversary of this occasion, it was suddenly revealed that the history had been entirely written by Stalin himself.[17] This work, christened by Zhdanov "the encyclopedia of dialectical materialism," remains the basic Party history and indoctrination text today, and has not been revised. It has been published in over eight million copies.

Concerning the issue of the Brest Peace, it states:

> Trotsky and the group of "Left Communists" began a fierce struggle within the Party against Lenin, demanding the continuation of the war. These people were clearly playing into the hands of the German imperialists and the counter-revolutionaries within the country, for they were working to expose the young Soviet Republic, which had not yet any army, to the blows of German imperialism. This was really a policy of provocateurs, skillfully masked by Left phraseology. . . .
>
> Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov had to wage a stubborn fight on the Central Committee against Trotsky, Bukharin and the other Trotskyites before they secured a decision in favour of the conclusion of peace. Bukharin and Trotsky, Lenin declared, "actually *helped* the German imperialists and *hindered* the growth and development of the revolution in Germany." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. XXII, p. 307.)
>
> On February 23, the Central Committee decided to accept the terms of the German Command and to sign the peace treaty. The treachery of Trotsky and Bukharin cost the Soviet Republic dearly. . . .
>
> At that time the real cause of this anti-Party behaviour of Trotsky and the "Left Communists" was not yet clear to the Party. But the recent trial of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" has now revealed that Bukharin and the group of "Left Communists" headed by him, together with Trotsky and the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries, were at that time secretly conspiring against the Soviet Government. Now it is known that Bukharin, Trotsky, and their fellow-conspirators had determined to wreck the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, arrest V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov, assassinate them, and form a new government consisting of Bukharinites, Trotskyites, and "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries. . . .[18]

[17] "The Short Course of History of the CPSU (B)—The Great Weapon of the Ideas of Bolshevism," editorial, *Bol'shevik*, No. 17 (September 15, 1948), pp. 1-14.

[18] Stalin, *The History of the C.P.S.U. (B): Short Course*, New York, 1939, pp. 216-18.

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Thus the Stalinist line was developed. A recent commentary on the *Short Course* will serve to underline its role and the deception employed to conceal the actual manipulation of fact and interpretation to revise "facts" on the basis of *post facto* interpretation. Poskrebyshev, Stalin's private secretary, wrote:

> Comrade Stalin paid much attention to the question of history, especially the question of the history of Bolshevism. Historical truth is the basis of any history. History must not be made better, nor made worse—Comrade Stalin repeatedly demonstrated. History must expound just as it was, nothing being added.
>
> The unequalled model of a scientific, Bolshevik statement of the history of the Party is the work of Comrade Stalin—"The Short Course on the History of the C.P.S.U. (B)."[19]

The *Short Course* consolidated not only past, but also future, Soviet historiography. One of the unwritten laws of Soviet intellectual life is that nothing can be added, or subtracted, by anyone but the top leadership. The canonization of this work by the acknowledgment of Stalin's authorship in 1948 was merely the culmination of this attitude. All Soviet historical works and monographs have restated the themes developed in it.[20] For example, in a recent commentary on the volume of the new (fourth) edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* which deals with this period, the *Pravda* editorial writer Stepanov carefully selected for comment Lenin's most bitter remarks against the *objective* result of the policy of the "Lefts," and comments upon

[19] A. Poskrebyshev, "Beloved Father and Great Teacher," *Pravda*, December 21, 1949, p. 11 (written on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday anniversary).

[20] Concerning the theme of the Brest-Litovsk debates, see I. I. Mints and E. Gorodetsky, eds., *Dokumenty po Istorii Grazhdanskoi Voiny v SSSR* [Documents on the History of the Civil War in the USSR], I, Moscow, OGIZ, 1940, pp. 78-97; G. Alexandrov, *et al.*, *Politicheskii Slovar'* [Political Dictionary], Moscow, 1940, *passim*; Vl. Potëmkin, ed., *Istoriia Diplomatii* [History of Diplomacy], Moscow, 1945, II, pp. 319-57 (no mention of the intra-Party struggle); A. M. Pankratova, *Istoriia SSSR* [History of the USSR], Moscow, 1946, III, pp. 210-21; "The Brest Peace," *SSSR* [The USSR]; supplementary volume to the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Moscow, 1948, cols. 639-42; I. I. Mints, *Istoriia SSSR, 1917-1925* [History of the USSR, 1917-1925], Moscow, 1947, *passim*; E. A. Korovin, *Osnovye Printsipy Sovetskoi Vneshnei Politiki* [Fundamental Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy], Moscow, 1947, *passim*; N. L. Rubinshtein, *Tridtsat' Let Sovetskoi Vneshnei Politiki* [Thirty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy], Moscow, 1948, *passim*; and G. A. Deborin, *Pervye Mezhdunarodnye Akty Sovetskogo Gosudarstva i Ego Vneshniaia Politika v Gody Inostrannoi Interventsii i Grazhdanskoi Voiny (1917-1922)* [The First International Acts of the Soviet State and Its Foreign Policy in the Years of Foreign Intervention and Civil War, 1917-1922], Moscow, 1947, *passim*.

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them as "proof" of the alleged *subjective* intent of the "Lefts" to destroy the Soviet regime.[21]

II

Another theme which underwent gradual evolution is the characterization of the role of Trotsky in the negotiations with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk and in the debates in the Party over its acceptance.

Lenin, in commenting on Trotsky's part in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, declared at the Seventh Party Congress:

> The tactics of Trotsky, insofar as they were delaying, were correct; they became incorrect when the condition of war was declared at an end and peace not signed. I proposed quite definitely to sign the peace. We could not receive a better peace than Brest. It was clear to all that the breathing space would last for months, that we would not lose.[22]

Trotsky himself maintained at this time that the Party had previously understood that the delaying tactics of Brest were the correct "revolutionary" procedure, and that all realized that the terms were becoming more harsh; that if good terms were the aim, they should have agreed in November 1917.[23]

Sorin, writing in 1925, and Tanin in 1927, still discussed Trotsky as a prominent Bolshevik leader of 1918. Mints' article in the *Encyclopedia* (1927) on the Brest-Litovsk peace also reported the proceedings accurately. On one point this became significant, as we shall see in connection with later Stalinist "revision" of history. Mints states correctly that "Trotsky took to Brest, *as the Party directive*, his formula: 'Neither peace, nor war.' . . ."[24]

By 1929 the tide was swinging strongly against Trotsky's judgment (although his loyalty was not yet challenged), and Yaroslavsky stated: "For the sake of a doubtful psychological effect, based on the unlikely hope that the Germans would not attack, Trotsky took the risk, bound up with the possible ruin of the Republic of the Soviets" of his "Neither peace nor war" plan.[25] Yaroslavsky

[21] V. Stepanov, "Volume XXVII of Lenin's Collected Works," *Pravda*, February 17, 1950, p. 2.
[22] Lenin, in *Sedmoi S'ezd*, p. 129.
[23] Trotsky, in *Sedmoi S'ezd*, pp. 79-80.
[24] Mints, in *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, VII, 1927, col. 454; italics mine.
[25] Yaroslavsky, *op.cit.*, p. 300.

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criticizes Trotsky's understanding of several Bolshevik tenets, and incorrectly accuses Trotsky of readiness even "to reconcile himself to the ruin of Soviet power in Russia."[26]

It is doubtful that Yaroslavsky was sincere in imputing these "attitudes" to Trotsky. Nonetheless, a blurring of fact and interpretation occurs which is different from the clearly interpretative nature of the more "theoretical" errors attributed to Trotsky and presented above. This is a very significant tendency which was consciously exploited in the later period. By 1934, Knorin stated that Trotsky failed to carry out the instructions given him by "Lenin personally," and the "Neither peace nor war" declaration went "against an order by Lenin and Stalin." Thus, "The responsibility for these consequences [harsher peace terms], attended with such difficulties for Soviet Russia, rested upon Trotsky's policy, for at Brest-Litovsk he had willfully violated the instructions given him by the Party and the Soviet government."[27] The extent of distortion is obvious when this is compared to the statement in the *Encyclopedia* in 1927, cited above, which correctly notes that Trotsky implemented this declaration pursuant to a Party directive which had overridden Lenin and Stalin.[28]

Even though Lenin had praised Trotsky for his negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, and attacked only his unwisdom in not accepting the peace when (in Lenin's view) it became necessary, two decades gave the Communist Party a new perspective, labeled "an uncovering of treason." "Judas-Trotsky" is accused of going against both Lenin's directive and the telegram of Lenin and Stalin in making his "Neither peace nor war" declaration. This is merely a repetition of the falsification introduced by Knorin (based on actual telegrams, but misrepresenting the Party attitude by retroactively ascribing full power to Lenin and Stalin at a period when they were not equatable with the will of "the Party and Government"). By 1938, Trotsky was accused of directly treasonable actions and espionage.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 303-4, 311, and 313. (This was a view held by some "Lefts.")
[27] Knorin. *op.cit.*, pp. 245-46.
[28] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, VII, 1927, col. 454; and see D. Shub, *Lenin*, New York, 1948, p. 298.

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> In secret talks with the representative of the German General Staff, Judas-Trotsky declared that the Soviet power was impotent, that it was "a corpse, which anyone could take away." Judas-Trotsky took all measures in order to open wide the doors of the Soviet republic to the German imperialist beast of prey.[29]

The *Short Course* similarly stated:

> On February 10, 1918, the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk were broken off. Although Lenin and Stalin, *in the name of the Central Committee of the Party*, had insisted that peace be signed, Trotsky, who was chairman of the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk, treacherously violated the direct instructions of the Bolshevik Party. He announced that the Soviet Republic refused to conclude peace on the terms proposed by Germany. At the same time he informed the Germans that the Soviet Republic would not fight and would continue to demobilize the army. This was monstrous. The German imperialists could have desired nothing more from this traitor to the interests of the Soviet country.[30]

Trotsky was likewise accused of treasonable contact with the British. Subsequent Soviet historiography has continued this falsified interpretation, without further "development."

There is a foundation in fact upon which all these false charges are based, but, in each case, a fact is elaborated on interpretively and this peculiar interpretation stated as fact. Thus Trotsky's "secret contacts" with the German and British officials existed, but not in the context set for them by the Stalinist "historians." In his official capacity as People's Commissar for Foreign Relations, Trotsky, with the knowledge and obvious tacit approval of the other Party and state leaders (including Lenin and Stalin), did have such contacts, but not treasonable ones. The telegram from Lenin and Stalin advising acceptance of the terms proffered (and thus against Trotsky's "Neither peace nor war" declaration) is genuine, but this does not mean that Trotsky was "violating the instructions of Party and Government," since his stand had been commissioned by the Party.

Attendant upon the fall of Bukharin and other former "Lefts" (on the Brest issue) in the late 1920's, the image of this controversy was reshaped to place the "Lefts" and Trotsky in the same camp. Thus Popov wrote about "the disastrous tactics of Trotsky

[29] *Bol'shevik*, No. 5 (March 1938), p. 62.
[30] Stalin, *History of the C.P.S.U. (B): Short Course*, p. 216; italics mine.

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and his followers, the 'Left' Communists. . . ."[31] Popov also declared that "Trotsky held essentially the same position as the 'Left' Communists. He was in fact their superior."[32] Trotsky reacted vigorously against this allegation (from exile), and he is correct on this matter. He wrote in 1930:

> It was obvious that going on with the war was impossible. On this point, there was not even a shadow of disagreement between Lenin and me. We were both equally bewildered at Bukharin and the other apostles of a "revolutionary war."[33]

This merging of the actually quite distinct Trotskyite and "Left" views is taken for granted and presented as fact in the Party history edited by Knorin in 1934.

The "purge of history" in 1938 led to the climax of this tendency to fuse the "Lefts" and Trotsky, with the latter as the arch-traitor and leader of "The Opposition." The article in *Bol'shevik* of March 1938 stated the new line:

> Trotsky and his accomplices—the Bukharinists—came forth as the agents of the imperialistic bourgeoisie in our Party, allies of all anti-Soviet elements. Trotsky knew that the Soviet Republic was in no condition to fight. This base virtuoso of disguises and double-dealer concealed his criminal position as a provocateur of war by the slogan: "Neither peace nor war." . . .
>
> There was complete unity on everything between Trotsky and the Bukharinists. . . . At one with them were the base traitors and double-dealers Kamenev and Zinoviev.[34]

Bukharin is thus accused of espousing the "Neither peace nor war" stand which he had vigorously opposed, and Zinoviev, who supported Lenin fully in the debates, is also accused of the same stand. The *Short Course* similarly discussed ". . . Trotsky and his accomplice Bukharin, the latter, together with Radek and Pyatakov, heading a group which was hostile to the Party but camouflaged itself under the name of 'Left Communists.' "[35]

Thus "The Opposition" was created by the Stalinist revisers of history, *after* its principals had been purged.

[31] Popov, *op.cit.*, p. 17.
[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20 and 28-29.
[33] L. Trotsky, *My Life*, London, 1930, p. 326.
[34] *Bol'shevik*, No. 5 (March 1938), pp. 61-62.
[35] Stalin, *History of the C.P.S.U. (B): Short Course*, p. 216.

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III

Another theme which underwent change in the Stalinist revision of history is the role of Stalin in the Brest-Litovsk debates. His actual role was very insignificant, although he did support Lenin. Stalin's *Collected Works* contain but one page on his contribution to this vital decision.[36] At the Seventh Party Congress which decided this matter (and in which Stalin did not participate) the election of the Party "Commission" indicates approximately his relative importance *in the Party* at that time. Seven out of nine candidates were elected; Stalin was the seventh (Lenin—37 votes; Trotsky—37; Bukharin—36; Smirnov—32; Zinoviev—30; Sokolnikov—25; Stalin—21; Radek—19; and Obolensky [Osinsky]—7).[37] Stalin later liquidated, by death or imprisonment, *all* of these colleagues except Lenin.

The relatively minor role which Stalin played at this time, even though he was already an important Bolshevik, becomes an obvious field for "revision" if distortion is employed, and for this reason is another index for analysis of changing historical presentation. In the accounts by Sorin, Tanin, Mints (in the *Encyclopedia*, 1927), Bubnov, Yaroslavsky, and Popov, Stalin is completely ignored.[38] Knorin merely mentions him as supporting Lenin on January 21, 1918.[39]

Since 1938 the chief means of enhancing Stalin's role has been the silent elimination of his peers and chiefs of 1918. Elevation of Stalin's name (together with that of the dead Sverdlov) to being coupled with Lenin's as the targets of the alleged assassination plot represents the remnant of "safe" leaders who had not been discredited, but more, it is also an attempt to create the image of Stalin as a man close enough to, and important enough to, Lenin to be considered worthy of this "honor." Stalin sup-

[36] Stalin, *Sochineniia* [Collected Works], IV, 1947, p. 27. Even in this support of Lenin, Stalin incurred Lenin's displeasure and criticism for his remarks on the lack of a revolutionary movement in the West (see Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1929, XXII, p. 202). Needless to say, this has passed without notice in Stalinist historiography.

[37] *Sedmoi S'ezd*, p. 186.

[38] The only exceptions are one appearance of Stalin's name, on a diagram-poster of the voting on peace at one session, in Yaroslavsky, *op.cit.*, p. 303, and two mentions of his name in voting and election lists in Bubnov's *Encyclopedia* article of 1930.

[39] Knorin, *op.cit.*, p. 245.

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ported Lenin in the days of Brest-Litovsk when almost all the other Party leaders were in opposition to him. However, the available data (which unfortunately is not sufficient to be conclusive) indicates that the "Left" conspiracy, such as it was, was not directed especially against Stalin (or Sverdlov) as is the Stalinist claim. This is probably another instance of fabrication to enhance retroactively Stalin's role in 1918.

Thus, in general, Stalin's role in 1918 is magnified by omission of reference to his peers, and exaggeration of his importance in the Party.

IV

The special circumstances which surround the particular theme we have analyzed, the debates over the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, are of a nature to enhance its value, rather than to render it peculiar and less capable of generalization. The actual decision concerning Brest-Litovsk was unique in being the first significant instance of applying the Bolshevik theory to decision-making. That this proved more difficult than the theory had anticipated may be interpreted as an indication that the division of attitudes was a natural consequence of fallible human calculation about the pattern of *the* dialectic of history. Or, as the Leninist view holds, it may mean that some segments (and important enough ones to control the Party briefly in February, despite Lenin) were "un-Marxian" in their calculation. The Stalinist view has mercilessly "simplified" Leninism to the extent of maintaining (by clear implication) that almost all of the Bolshevik leadership, including even more than the "Lefts" and Trotskyites, were traitors in 1918. The questions which this immediately raises in an inquiring mind are stifled, silently and implicitly, by the nature of the Stalinist regime.

From this study there emerges a picture of the Bolshevik mind which, while far from complete, seems useful at the least as an hypothesis for further testing. The simplification which Stalinism has introduced into the popular presentation of theory and history reveals two things. First, the modified processes of Leninism, robbed of all "superfluous" subtlety, are more clearly re-

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vealed. Secondly, an underlying feeling that the original record is weak has led to the apparent belief that fabrication will more effectively serve the purposes of the elite; and this implicit, unconscious recognition of insecurity by the elite should not pass unobserved.

The emergent complex of implicit presuppositions and attitudes are here made explicit and artificially separated for clarity of apprehension and analysis. Their interrelation is quite obvious.

(1) *Orientation on Effect*: Soviet theory, insofar as it is not a hollow echo of abstract Marxian ideology, serves the purpose of instilling conformity. This assignation of purpose to theory and historiography makes them means, not ends, and therefore the element of truthfulness in any transcendent (or empirical) sense is eliminated. No more can there be "history for history's sake" than "art for art's sake." This tendency, like the others discussed below, has been increasingly extended and enforced in recent years. This "effect-orientation" is in part a reaction to the abstract, metaphysical, soul-searching "truth-orientation" (even obsession) which apparently characterized a considerable segment of the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia (and if this characterization is not correct, it does nonetheless represent the Bolshevik idea about the intelligentsia attitude). Sympathetically put, this idea is that if the empirical truth "confuses" people as to what they should do, should it not be replaced by a selective "truth" invented to inspire and encourage socially useful and progressive action?

(2) *"Objectification" of the Alleged Subjective*: One of the most readily rationalized means of implementing an effect in the writing of history is to begin with empirical facts and then extrapolate logical presuppositions and conclusions which, while they may logically be interpreted as cause or consequence, may not be or were not actually so. More specifically, we have seen that even in the pre-Stalinist era, a strong tendency existed to impute ill-intent where ill-result was seen. This is justified both dialectically and didactically; a "sterile" accounting of isolated "truths" is felt to represent an inherent bias toward staticism, and the past is

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considered of interest to the present not for itself, but as a guide (and therefore facts that fit rather uncomfortably should be omitted because of the "effect" they will create). There is a distinction between the Leninist and Stalinist degree of "objectification" of the subjective which, while only a small (and erroneous) step in logic, has profound practical consequences. The following example adopted from our present study will serve to illustrate this proposition. The Bolshevik analysis and Leninist presentation was:

A. Bukharin wants a "revolutionary war," not peace.
B. "Objectively" (*in effect*) "revolutionary war" would mean only destruction, since we have no army.
C. Therefore, Bukharin's policy is defeatist and incorrect.

There is no evidence to suggest that Stalin's own view of Bukharin's actions and intents goes beyond this analysis. However, Stalin's view on what the exoteric popular "history" of this matter should be has become increasingly more extreme. The first "modification" took place in the early and mid-1930's, and C. became:

C. Therefore, Bukharin actually (in effect *and in intent*) wanted defeat.

The next step is logically and didactically clear. In its extreme (and the Bolsheviks are not immune to the general Russian predilection for extremes) this was articulated and made "history" in 1938:

C. Therefore, Bukharin actively sought the defeat and destruction of the Soviet power and Communist cause. He tried to subvert the government, to assassinate Lenin and Stalin, spy for the Germans, and achieve the victory of the counter-revolution.

Alleged subjective intent is thus deduced from, and transformed into, objective "fact."

(3) *The Didactic Essence of History*: In the effect-oriented Bolshevik approach to intellectual creativity, the role of history is naturally justification of the basic exoteric ideology (including probably some ideas which have atrophied or been revised in the operationally effective esoteric ideology) by reference to the past.

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The Soviet historian is taught that ideas and facts which contradict the presumably fundamental dialectical course of history must be omitted or even their opposites be fabricated in order to render history a better instructional guide. The harsh consequences of error, and emphatic stress on conformity to the political "line," deny any alternative approach. The didactic motivations in the instance analyzed in this article are obvious; exaltation of Stalin's role, and amalgamation of all dissidents into a sinister and treasonous Opposition.

(4) *Simplification*: The Stalinist universe has become startlingly simple. Those values which the elite may consider relative are all rendered absolute for the "guidance" of the "masses." Everything is seen, or at the least depicted, as being either black or white. Early (Leninist) distinctions between the correct (and thus necessarily "good") Trotsky of December and January 1918 and the incorrect (not yet necessarily "evil") Trotsky of February are all simplified, and "Judas-Trotsky" is said to have been a "traitor" even long before the Revolution. Thus all negative symbols are rendered entirely negative, just as all positive symbols must bear no blemish.

(5) *The Power of Silence*: Silence can often make itself heard more loudly than words. Its usual application is in cases of unfavorable events, or those which are consciously ignored for reasons of effect in didactic simplification. When I say that silence can make itself heard, I mean, of course, to those who know the items being omitted. Over a long span of time, silence can become an effective tool in a totalitarian society. Thus Stalin's role is retroactively enhanced by omission of mention of all colleagues in similar positions (excepting some who have died and are "safe"). Similarly, the support given Lenin by Zinoviev, Sokolnikov, and Smilga, quite as consistent and important as that rendered by Stalin, is silently excised. Silence is one of the means of facilitating and implementing the technique of simplification.

(6) *The Instrumentality of Truth*: We have already noted the orientation on effect, purpose, and simple education which has as its concomitant an instrumental view of truth. Again there is quite a basic difference in interpretation of the dialectic by Lenin

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and Stalin. Lenin seems to have had a deeper faith; to him, the truth about Brest-Litovsk apparently was sufficient in itself. The dialectic moves independently of man; man's duty is to coordinate his society and development with the dialectic of nature. As we have noted, to Stalin the universe is (or must be made to appear) more simple; moreover, it must be explained in the most effective manner. If the truth seems "weak," it should be bolstered by the "objectification" of the alleged subjective, and by fabrication. In this way, the truth surrounding Brest-Litovsk is severely "modified." The dialectic is given a boost by Stalin's elimination of countercurrents in the rushing stream of progress toward Communism.

(7) *History as the Projection of Politics into the Past*: Stalinist historiography is the art of changing the picture of the past to mirror the image of the present, just as Soviet realism in literature is the art of describing what purports to represent the present in the terms of what is expected to be the future. This image of the present exists on three levels; the real image, the image which the elite thinks is the real one (which sometimes is and sometimes is not), and finally the desired image. An example of mirroring the real image of the present is the retroactive exaltation of Stalin to enhance the role he played in 1918. An example of history as a reflection of fantasies enjoyed and/or perpetrated by the elite is the retroactive transformation of all dissidents (of the present) into traitors (of the past). An instance of the desired image is the strong implication that the judgment of the Party is infallible.

(8) *Distinction Between Elite and Mass*: Implicit in many of these techniques and purposes of Stalinist historiography is the presupposition, perhaps not fully conscious, that the "masses" are incapable of understanding the processes clear to the leadership with its unique ability to discern the dialectic. Marxism, particularly in its Bolshevik form, does imply the need for a specially endowed "vanguard" which will lead the proletariat to victory by guiding it along the dialectical path. Nonetheless, here, as in other respects, there is a difference of considerable significance between the Leninist and Stalinist interpretations of capability

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of the "masses." Although Lenin stressed the didactic role of history, and its orientation on effect, the ungarnished and unvarnished truth (as perceived and evaluated by the Marxian) seemed sufficient to him to accomplish its due purpose of preparing the proletariat of the world, and especially its vanguard, the Party, for its mission. However, Stalin considered it necessary to simplify this dialectical vision for popular consumption, and his "refinement" of the exoteric ideology took the form of remolding history in a much simplified form. Rewriting of history, which to us appears to be sheer distortion, is rationalized by the Stalinist as a mere modification of nature, rendering it more viable and effective in the struggle toward progress with the dialectic. But the Stalinist assumption that the masses must be given a severely simplified version of actual events indicates a rather lower estimate of their ability than that held by Lenin (and Marx). (Speculation suggests this may in part be a reflection of Stalin's own apparent preference for simplified and categorized theory.) The effects of this distinction are several; for one thing, the elite tends to acquire a feeling of its separateness, not of course as a "class" [*klass*], but as a "stratum" [*sloi*] of society. A further effect is the reverse seepage of exoteric fantasy into esoteric calculation, as the subordinate levels must exercise a certain degree of discretion and evaluation in furnishing information (including intelligence) to the upper policy-making stratum. (This circular retribution of falsification is a vengeance which history is wreaking on its "modifiers.")

(9) *The Amalgamation of "The Opposition"*: We have seen that the sharpening of demarcation between positive and negative symbols led to the amalgamation of diverse and incompatible forms of opposition into The Opposition. Thus the "Lefts," such as Bukharin and Trotsky, are combined in Soviet historiography by 1938, without concern for historical fact, into a huge and sinister syndicate of treason known as "The Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" (the "Lefts" of 1918 having become Rights on the later issues of industrialization and collectivization). Trotsky is considered the arch-traitor; Bukharin an accomplice or subordinate. (Trotsky is considered most dangerous

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because he disarms the unwary by open disassociation from the "Lefts.") This example is not unique; it is no accident that the Titoist opposition is also said to be Trotskyite. All these Opposition segments are said to be serving foreign (national and ideological) interests.

(10) *The Exaltation of the Leader*: Although the case of Brest-Litovsk is relatively weaker than many in stressing this underlying theme, it too bears witness to the attempt retroactively to exalt Stalin, the *vozhd'* or leader of today, into a much more prominent leader of 1918 than was the fact. Lenin, the acknowledged *vozhd'* of 1918, and Stalin, his disciple and successor, are both made to appear infallible (as is the Party, which it is sought practically to equate with them). The aim is to instill great confidence and inspiration in the Leader.

This differentiation of aspects of the Stalinist theory of historiography and some of its psychological-ideological basic assumptions could not, of course, have been attempted in the Soviet Union. Not only can these very real rules of historiography not be rendered explicit, but even the very *prohibition* on articulation cannot be made explicit. Generally, the leadership is probably unaware of these hidden postulates of action; but, assuredly, to whatever extent it is aware of them, it prevents their articulation.

The changing kaleidoscope of historiographical presentation, one small but revealing incident of which we have followed in this paper, is of interest because of its reflection of the changes in Party, ideology, methods, and outlook. Historical analysis is especially valuable for such a purpose because of its simultaneous dual nature of being a part of the cultural complex and a reflection of the complex as well.

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COLONIALISM AS A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By PHILIP W. BELL*

COLONIALISM has been a sore spot in the handling of American foreign policy in the post-World War II period largely because of ambivalent forces, domestic and foreign, which have been tugging at the United States.[1] At the heart of the colonial problem which has faced this country is the central issue of eventual political status for colonial territories. On this question United States policy has traditionally been and continues to be one of condemnation of colonialism and in favor of independence for colonial peoples, with certain reservations added in small print—the grant of independence should not be too hurried and it should be given only to peoples who desire it and are capable of assuming the responsibilities involved.[2] In

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[1] The term "colonialism" in this paper is used to describe the relationship between metropolitan countries and non-contiguous territories which are avowedly dependent politically upon them. It explicitly excludes, therefore, certain types of dependence which might be classified as "colonialism" in a broader use of the term: (1) minority, or even majority, groups under political domination of others within the boundaries of a nation-state; (2) contiguous dependent relationships, as in Tibet or in the outlying Soviet Republics in fact, if not in theory; and (3) all forms of "concealed colonialism," both of a purposeful nature as in the Soviet-satellite relationships, and of an accidental nature, brought about, for example, by the preponderance of a small country's exports on a single large-country market, as in the case of Bolivia and the United States, or New Zealand and Ireland and the United Kingdom. "Colonialism" frequently connotes a state of mind, either on the part of peoples in the metropole or in the overseas territories, and is sometimes used interchangeably with "imperialism." Technically, "colonialism" should probably be used to describe the relationship between a mother country and politically dependent territories populated by groups transplanted from the mother country, and "imperialism" the dependent relationship between a metropolitan country and subject territories in which people are of different origin from that of the metropole. In most existing non-self-governing territories there is a combination of both elements, however, and "colonialism" has now come to mean a politically dependent relationship without distinction as to how it arose and without connotation of any specific state of mind on the part of the people in the metropole or in the territory—i.e., it describes an existing political fact.

[2] Space does not permit detailed documentation of American policy on colonialism. It is to be found in a great variety of sources, including wartime proclamations (the Atlantic Charter and statements by Secretary of State Hull), debates and voting on non-

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earlier years, when American interest and influence in the colonial world were not so great, such a position could be maintained as a general moral-political attitude, without its having any extensive practical implications aside from those of the Monroe Doctrine. Today, in the face of United States membership in the United Nations and the expanding strategic and economic interest of this country in colonial territories, this attitude deserves re-examination from the standpoint of its applicability to American purposes and to external realities.

The American attitude condemning the traditional form of colonialism goes deep into our history and our beliefs, but like so many foreign policy issues which have been put in moral terms, it is an attitude which has been reinforced by economic considerations, with respect both to our own colonies and to those of other countries. The role of economic pressure groups in the grant of Philippine independence is a matter of public record, and the expensiveness of Puerto Rico has frequently led to demands for that island's independence by various groups in this country.[3] Similarly, because of discriminatory trade and investment restrictions in the colonies of European countries, agitation for independence

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self-governing territorial questions in the United Nations, abstentions from resolutions of the Organization of American States, and unilateral statements by high State Department officials. While many of our words, votes, and deeds have been of the "pinprick" variety, this has been true neither of the example set in our colonies (which has not been antithetical to our own direct interests but has had extensive repercussions in the dependencies of other countries), nor of the important role this country played in the establishment of the Indonesian and Libyan republics. It has been made clear by the State Department that failure to vote with the anti-colonial bloc in the recent Moroccan and Tunisian cases brought before the United Nations has been a matter of temporary expediency rather than any basic change in policy.

[3] The strong influence of farm and dairy groups and the American Federation of Labor in promoting Philippine independence in the early 1930's has been traced in J. W. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment*, New York, 1950, pp. 302-3. The Bell Trade Act of 1946 specified that equal rights should be granted United States citizens in the development of Philippine natural resources (necessitating an amendment to the Philippine Constitution) before large-scale payments could be made under the 1946 Rehabilitation Act. This provision was more an injudicious use of dollar diplomacy to further private economic interests than a string attached to the grant of independence, but the timing of the measure leaves this country open to the charge of replacing standard colonialism with a form of concealed colonialism. Cf. Rupert Emerson's review of pamphlets in *Pacific Affairs*, XX (December 1947), p. 451; and E. G. Crossman, "American-Philippine Relations: The Prospect," *Proceedings* of the Academy of Political Science, XXII (January 1948), p. 31. The average annual expenditure of around $150 million in Puerto Rico during the post-World War II period has led to numerous demands by Millard Tydings and others that Puerto Rico be given its independence.

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of all colonies has served the economic interests of business and other groups in the United States.

The traditional basis for our attitude toward colonialism has been superseded to some extent since formation of the United Nations by the need for finding some middle ground in the world public opinion battle—ground which would lend itself to our advancement of "every effort to convince the European governments that we are not trying, out of sheer fuzzy-minded liberalism, to aid and abet those who want to give their Empires away," but not put us "in the position of trying to prop up the decaying structures of last-century imperialism."[4] Our basic aims have not been changed, but debates and resolutions on colonial matters in the United Nations have served to smoke us out on a number of issues which we otherwise might have avoided. The assumption that colonial matters of other countries did not materially affect the national interest of the United States, which earlier allowed us the luxury of sticking to what we conceived to be our moral-political ideals supported by minor economic interests, has now led us to a role based on making ourselves least antagonistic to the rest of the world. We have generally tried to water down proposals of the anti-colonial bloc in the United Nations and then vote with it against the European colonial powers, thus maintaining our traditional principles, yet not antagonizing European countries as much as we might have.[5]

Such a middle-road policy has been criticized for its "lack of character," its tendency to avoid a strong, principled stand. Abstention from an extreme may well be our best policy, however, if we have no substantial interests involved. Unfortunately this is no longer true. A policy condemning colonialism and favoring independence, with hesitations and reservations, is now an unreal policy, for it is attuned neither to developments in colonial relationships nor to the vast increase in the degree of national interest involved in the problem.

[4] G. Kirk, "Declining Empires and American Interest," *Survey*, LXXXV (May 1949), p. 257.

[5] In a few cases, where a resolution was particularly objectionable to colonial powers, we have sided with them or abstained, and recently we have recognized our own interests involved in North Africa and, temporarily at least, helped to prevent airing of the Moroccan and Tunisian disputes.

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II

Analysis of the problem of colonial dependency today leads us to four inferences which are relevant for the formation of United States policy.[6] First, the issue of eventual political status for colonial territories is not *a* problem at all, but a collection of diverse problems, each quite distinct but all nevertheless interdependent. Under such conditions interrelationships must be recognized, yet general principles are difficult to formulate and apply.

This variety is caused by the presence in different degree of a multitude of factors which affect the political relationship between colony and mother country. It was recognized recently by the Special Committee on non-self-governing territories in the United Nations when it sought to establish certain standards to determine whether or not a territory should be classified as non-self-governing. The Committee's report allowed that no simple tests existed, that the factors entering into the problem of a justifiable final status for a colony were so many and so varied that the best the Committee could do was to list the many considerations.[7] Geographic factors, ethnic and cultural bonds between metropolitan country and colony, plural societies within a colony (i.e., extent of cultural homogeneity), the desires of the colonial population, the degree of political, economic, and educational development, the extent of interests of mother country and colony in the political ties—all vary in degree in different colonial relationships. No two colonial situations are identical, although of course distinctions may be carried too far. The hostility between Berbers and Arabs in Morocco, which French colonial authorities have utilized to their advantage, probably does not make the Moroccan problem very different from the Tuni-

[6] There has been no comprehensive study made of colonial problems since that of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in the 1930's. Cf. *The Colonial Problem*, London, 1937. Of the many works published on the topic since then, none has been so exhaustive and only a few, all of British authorship, have indicated a keen insight into the complex of diverse problems involved; for example, J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, Cambridge, 1948.

[7] United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter*, 1950, pp. 41-43.

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sian. But the issue of status in these areas is surely quite different from that of Madagascar because of strategic and geographic considerations, or from that of French Guiana because of the degree of development, the desires of the local inhabitants, the cultural bonds with the mother country, and so forth.

A second conclusion which may be drawn from a survey of existing colonial relationships is that colonies are almost entirely European problems, with the remaining dependencies in the tropics and these mostly in Africa. Ninety-seven per cent of the people in the world living under what has been defined as a colonial relationship are tied to European countries. Of these 200 million people, three-quarters are in Africa—Indochina, Malaya, and the Caribbean region being the only other large outposts of the colonial system which remain. Ranked in order of the number of people overseas attached to metropolitan countries, the colonial powers of the world are: (1) France, (2) United Kingdom, (3) Belgium, (4) Portugal, (5) United States, (6) Spain, (7) Australia, (8) Netherlands, (9) New Zealand, and (10) Denmark.[8] If land area is considered the relevant factor, the ten powers would be ranked the same, except that Denmark, with the large, underpopulated land mass of Greenland, is in fourth place, with Portugal and those following on the list each moved down a notch. Colonial problems enter into our foreign policy in both the Far East and Latin American areas, but for the most part the issues bear upon our relations with European countries and their dependencies in Africa.

Thirdly, almost all colonial relationships are in a state of transition, evolving into something new all the time. This is one of the fundamental aspects of colonial dependency. There are exceptions, some temporary, a few not. Stagnation in the political development of Portuguese and Spanish territories is probably temporary; with economic development and outside pressures, political subjection of indigenous inhabitants will probably evolve into new relationships between mother country and colony. The political situation in most territories is one of constant

[8] Italy, which has a temporary ten-year trusteeship over Italian Somaliland under United Nations auspices, is not here included.

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change, moving toward a status which may or may not be clearly defined.

Our fourth inference from analysis of existing colonial relationships concerns this "final" status into which the various colonial arrangements are being resolved but which few have yet reached. The political objectives for about 80 per cent of the world's colonial peoples are known, having been expressed on paper or in practice by the colonial powers. The aims are varied and for the most part involve a middle ground between the extremes of subjection and full independent sovereignty. The four powers whose colonial aims are fairly well established are France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States.

The road ahead for the French Union, comprising Title VIII of the 1946 constitution, will be bumpy, but the blueprint is clear in establishing objectives for French overseas territories. The basic conflict of loose federation vs. full assimilation, reflected both in domestic French politics and in the desires of people in the territories, is compromised by granting local autonomy to the Associated States (Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam in Indochina and presumably Morocco and Tunisia) and assimilation into the "one and indivisible" French Republic for all overseas departments and territories. The practical application of this blueprint is proving to be extremely difficult, however, because metropolitan France is a minority in the Union with the result that essentially undemocratic means must be employed to ensure French control, because of the lack of consideration of the desires of the inhabitants of overseas territories, and because of the centralized nature of the French administrative structure, which even in France tends to restrict the expression of local interests and freedoms.[9] The concept of the French Union will

[9] The undemocratic nature of the French Union is to be found both in the organization of the legislative superstructure, which thus far has hardly functioned and even on paper affords the Associated States only an advisory voice in foreign affairs and security matters of the Union, and in the legislature of the Republic, which, because of dual electoral colleges in overseas territories heavily populated by non-European inhabitants, results in these regions averaging "only one deputy for 800,000 inhabitants, the metropolitan French one for 75,000 inhabitants" (F. Luchaire, *Manuel de droit d'outre-mer*, Paris, 1949, p. 134). French citizenship was extended to all peoples in the Republic by the constitution, but the means by which nationals of overseas territories exercise their rights as citizens is laid down by law (Article 80), thus allowing one

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probably have to be modified considerably, especially to provide for greater decentralization and local autonomy, before any long-run stability can be achieved. But the objectives are clear, and slow development toward these aims may be expected.

Unlike the French, British colonial aims are not expressed in detail on paper, but the "final status" toward which most of the colonies are moving is clear. Where human and physical resources allow, the British are striving toward new Dominions by federating contiguous colonies—in Central Africa (the Rhodesias and Nyasaland), East Africa, West Africa, Malaya, and the British West Indies. Some small territories, mostly islands and strategic outposts, will be locally self-governing units, with foreign affairs and defense in the hands of Great Britain. The status of a few small protectorates, a number of which "fit" geographically into other nation-states, may be decided by self-determination or some other acceptable means.[10]

The newly federated states will presumably have eventual full independent sovereignty much the same as do existing members of the Commonwealth. Some may choose to be completely independent, like Ireland and Burma, others to be Dominions, still others to be independent members of the Commonwealth, like India recognizing the Crown as head of the Commonwealth but not sovereign over their own country. Attainment of full sovereignty in any form, however, will be a gradual and pragmatic process.

The "final status" for the emasculated Netherlands Kingdom

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million European French in the three Algerian departments to elect the same number of delegates to the French Parliament as eight million Moslems, and similar discrimination exists in Madagascar and French Equatorial Africa. Also, while local autonomy has in principle been granted the Indochinese, in practice economic and financial affairs are by treaty under a quadripartite board with members from each of the three states and France. The provisions of the treaties which concern the board are vaguely worded and allow considerable latitude for French control. For a brief criticism of French centralization in the metropole, cf. A. Cobban, *National Self-Determination*, Chicago, 1947, p. 143.

[10] About fifteen colonies would be left without full sovereignty (i.e., with only local autonomy) if the tentative hopes for federated Dominions were realized: the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, the Falklands, Fiji, Gibraltar, Gilbert and Ellice, Hong Kong, Malta, Mauritius, Pitcairn, Seychelles, Singapore, the Solomons, and St. Helena. Some of these, of course, like Cyprus and Hong Kong, might be ceded to other nations, as may be eventually expected of Aden, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, British Somaliland, Brunei, Sarawak, and Swaziland.

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is nearer fruition than that of any other colonial empire. Surinam and the islands of the Netherlands West Indies, which now have complete control over their own domestic affairs, are to be full partners in a federation joined together under the Dutch Crown. Foreign affairs and defense are to be in the hands of a superstructure still to be established, which the Netherlands will control as a result of its preponderant wealth and population but in which the two territories will have a voice. On paper, Netherlands territories have a status similar to that of the French Associated States, but, partly because of the metropolitan country's majority in the Kingdom, a real voice, without loss of control, may be given the overseas territories in foreign affairs and defense, and local autonomy is accepted more literally by the Dutch than by the French.

Assuming some modifications and loosening of the French Union concept, French, British, and Dutch colonial relationships are moving toward a framework not very different from that of the American "Empire." Statehood for the two incorporated[11] territories of Alaska and Hawaii will leave this country with the unincorporated territories of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa and the strategic trust islands in the Pacific. The new constitution for Puerto Rico presumably establishes some pattern by which the unincorporated territories may become locally autonomous units, with foreign affairs and defense in the hands of the United States, protected only by a resident commissioner (now provided only for Puerto Rico) in Washington.

The inferences which may be drawn from an analysis of existing colonial relationships—that what is involved is a variety of problems, primarily related to Europe and Africa, which are constantly evolving toward a series of pragmatically determined "ends"—have an important bearing on United States policy. This, then, is the colonialism that concerns this country. The

[11] In 1901 the Supreme Court in De Lima vs. Bidwell and Downes vs. Bidwell drew the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories; the former, established by the express or implied will of Congress, are subject to all provisions of the Constitution not obviously meant for states, while for the latter only certain "fundamental" provisions of the Constitution apply.

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question now must be raised as to why we are interested in it, i.e., what aspects of the national interest bear upon this group of problems categorized as "colonial."

III

In the concept of the national interest of the United States is embodied a large number of components which are impossible to ferret out, classify, and order; the concept defies a complete and accurate definition acceptable to all Americans, or even to the bulk of them.[12] But if political interests are considered intermediate ends rather than final ends—they are final ends only insofar as the existence of certain political conditions abroad is of interest to us for their own sake, e.g., if democracies everywhere add to the happiness of people in the United States or contribute confidence in our own institutions—then security and economic considerations form at least a very large part of the national interest involved in colonial problems. Certain less tangible, perhaps moral considerations, such as the effect of colonies on the institutions of the mother country, or of our support of colonial relationships on our own way of life, are not here excluded. But they enter by a back door, at the point where policy becomes reprehensible to the mother country or to ourselves, and may be postponed until reappraisal of our policy in the next section.

In considering security and economic factors against a "cold war" background, distinction between the two is probably not a useful dichotomy, especially in relation to colonialism because of its bearing on the raw materials problem, which is both a matter of security and economic welfare, and its bearing on the economic interests of European countries which are, in turn, a strategic interest of the United States. Artificial division may be avoided by merely moving along a spectrum of our interests from

12 George F. Kennan has made a start at defining "national interest" by indicating what it is not. Cf. "The National Interest of the United States," *Illinois Law Review*, XLV (January-February 1951), pp. 730-42. I will not enter here into whether or not the national interest should be the objective of American policy but will accept this as a dictum, following Kennan and others in believing that it is all we can "know" and that our first responsibility is to ourselves.

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pure security factors, such as military bases and manpower, through the raw materials problem, which is of some direct economic and strategic interest to us, to other economic considerations which largely affect Europe but are of indirect interest to this country.[13]

Perhaps the most obvious of our interests involved in colonial matters are the air and naval bases in dependent territories which help us maintain control of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, defend the Panama Canal and inter-American supply route, afford us important strategic bombing bases which can be supplied by seapower, and provide keys to naval operations in the Mediterranean.[14] The vital importance of most of these bases was proven in the last war, the only new element being Moroccan and Greenland airfields for strategic bombing purposes. Their value, especially in the case of Morocco, lies in their location within range of Russian industrial targets, outside possible land penetration on the Continent, and yet at points which are easily supplied by seapower.

The value of potential military manpower in colonial territories is of more doubtful importance. Only for France has this factor been a major consideration in the past. In World War I there were 275,000 colonial troops in metropolitan France fighting the Germans.[15] and Clemenceau insisted in 1918 that his major concern with respect to overseas territories was "an unlimited right of levying black troops to assist in the defense of French territory if France were attacked in the future by Germany."[16] A still larger number of colonial troops were in France

[13] The extent of United States national interest involved in colonialism has received little attention, Professor Jacob Viner's wartime study being the only comprehensive investigation. Cf. J. Viner, *et al., The United States in a Multi-National Economy*, New York, 1945, Chapter 1.

[14] These bases include United States trusteeship islands, Guam, Samoa, Singapore, Hawaii, Alaska, and a network of small islands scattered over the Pacific; Bermuda and the Azores (technically an integral part of Portugal) in the Atlantic; Trinidad, Puerto Rico, and inactive leased bases in the British West Indies for defense in that region; Morocco and Greenland as strategic bombing bases with naval protection; and Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus in the Mediterranean. The United States maintains or has specific plans to operate bases in all of these territories except Singapore, Gibraltar, and Malta, where the British have important facilities.

[15] *The Round Table*, No. 119 (June 1940), p. 551.

[16] Quoted from David Lloyd George's *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, in H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, 1951, p. 129.

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in World War II, and it was reliably reported in February of 1940 that 700,000 colonials were mobilized.[17] There was also some utilization of imported civilian workers from the colonies. But the changed spirit in French overseas territories, characterized by strong objections to "exploitation" of the colonial soldier and inequalities between him and his French counterpart, will undoubtedly diminish the value of this manpower source in any future period of hostilities. In overseas territories of other European countries, manpower has been used only sparsely outside of the colonies themselves.

As in the case of these purely strategic considerations, the important bearing of colonialism on world raw material supplies is of direct interest to both Europe and the United States. The recent boom in primary product prices following the outbreak of the Korean conflict focused attention on a basic, long-term problem which the industrial countries of the West have been slow to recognize, that is, the progressive failure of raw material supply to keep pace with demand since 1913. W. Arthur Lewis has calculated that on the basis 1913 = 100, manufacturing production had reached 247 in 1950, while primary production stood at 155.[18] The annual increase in agricultural production especially, both of food and raw materials, has declined from 1.1 per cent between 1913 and 1929 to 0.3 per cent between 1937 and 1950. Growth in manufacturing production over the same period has forced industrial countries into greater and greater dependence on overseas sources for supplies of raw materials.

These developments pose a twofold problem for the West: (1) the need for ever-increasing assurance on delivery of primary products absolutely essential in wartime; and (2) the need for generally expanding raw material supply to offset the tendency for the terms of trade to move against the industrial countries, i.e., to offset industrial centers having to pay more and more in terms of goods for a given volume of necessary food and raw materials. It should be noted that expansion of production would probably also be in the interests of primary-producing countries,

[17] *New York Times*, November 30, 1939, p. 8, and February 9, 1940, p. 3.

[18] W. A. Lewis, "Food and Raw Materials," *District Bank Review* (Manchester), September 1951, pp. 1-11.

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since gain from trade may increase although the terms of trade move adversely or are prevented from moving favorably by increased output. For the United States, this latter problem is not so important; for Europe, and especially Great Britain, it is crucial.

Existing and potential production in colonial territories are vital to meeting these needs of Western industrial countries. Colonies today produce 53 per cent of the non-Soviet world supply of bauxite, 26 per cent of chrome ore, 21 per cent of copper, 50 per cent of manganese ore, 40 per cent of phosphate rock for fertilizer, 48 per cent of tin, 50 per cent of rubber, and a very large percentage of certain specialized agricultural products such as cocoa beans, copra, groundnuts, palm oil and kernels, and sisal.[19] Dependence on colonial supply is also very high for industrial diamonds, graphite, cobalt, mica, and a number of other products which do not bulk large in world trade. For the United States, the proportion of imports of certain strategic materials from European dependencies is significant. For example, 97 per cent of our columbian ore came from Nigeria and the Belgian Congo in 1950, 82 per cent of our bauxite from Surinam and British Guiana, 81 per cent of our palm oil, 68 per cent of our cobalt, and 52 per cent of our industrial diamonds from the Belgian Congo, 51 per cent of our tin and 48 per cent of our rubber from Malaya, and 23 per cent of our manganese ore from the Gold Coast and French Morocco.[20]

[19] Percentages are computed from 1949 production figures in the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, 1949-50.

[20] The areas of supply listed are the principal sources. Cf. Mutual Security Agency, *The Overseas Territories in the Mutual Security Program*, March 31, 1952, p. 2. This country's dependence on colonial territories is steadily increasing, as is shown by comparing 1950 figures with those of 1943 compiled in United States Military Academy, *Raw Materials in War and Peace* (New York, 1947), although the imports above were partially for stockpiles.

Professor Edward S. Mason has argued that for the United States, alone and at war, loss of any or all of the raw material supplies outside of the Western Hemisphere would, after full allowance is made for substitution, involve a relatively small decline in the output of war materials. Cf. "American Security and Access to Raw Materials," *World Politics*, 1 (January 1949), p. 150. While this may be correct, and it might not be in our own interests (excluding supply considerations of our allies) to divert military forces in order to protect strategic material supplies in Africa or in the Far East, it is surely beneficial to avoid the substitution costs and the production of some inferior goods if possible. And against a "cold war" background, preservation of Western Hemisphere supplies by use of the products of other areas is clearly to our advantage.

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Even with large-scale stockpiling, both Europe and the United States will continue to be interested in the steady flow of strategic raw materials from colonial territories, the most important producers being in the southern and western portions of Africa, in the Caribbean, and in Malaya. In addition, regular operation of the oil refineries in the Netherlands West Indies and Trinidad, which together refine much of the Venezuelan crude, is of primary concern. In the long run, however, expansion in colonial raw material production may prove to be of even greater importance than the uninterrupted export of existing output. This has been recognized in the allocation of ECA-MSA funds and by the European metropolitan countries which have fostered large-scale development schemes for their overseas territories.[21] Colonies are especially important in this respect because of the reluctance of independent underdeveloped countries to undertake raw material, as opposed to industrial, expansion, and the uncertainties and restrictions which limit the flow of private capital into these regions. Realizing the potential of colonies in primary product supply is a slow and difficult process because of the many social, rather than technical, obstacles. But if the tendency for the terms of trade to shift against manufactured products is to be stemmed, it is for the most part colonial raw material production which must be increased.

This actual and potential supply is one of the major "plus" items in the colonial contribution to the economic health of Europe, which has in recent years become a major concern of the United States. Colonies also contribute to the other side of the trade coin; they serve as export markets, and they provide European countries with income from the sale of services and the return on investment, and, most important of all in the last few years, they either earn or lose dollars. The question is whether or not these benefits to metropolitan countries are sufficient to outweigh the cost of colonies—the old question of whether or not colonies "pay," which Grover Clark answered in the negative in considering the long history of imperialism before the last

[21] For an account of the development plans in Africa, cf. Organization for European Economic Cooperation, *Investments in Overseas Territories in Africa, South of the Sahara*, Paris, 1951.

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war.[22] But if colonialism has not "paid" in the past, it may still in present circumstances contribute to the economic welfare of European mother countries because current benefits exceed current costs, which is probably the case for all of the metropolitan countries except France, or because of the need for protecting vested interests already existing in colonial territories.

The gain from the considerable volume of colonial trade, which in 1948-1950 averaged annually between five and six billion dollars for all Europe with overseas dependencies, and the income derived from provision of banking, insurance, and shipping facilities are important economic benefits of colonialism. Close political association normally tends to beget business confidence, promote complementary production, foster economic contacts and the provision of information, and generally create a framework of similar business customs and practices which is favorable to international exchange. Without political ties, such a large volume of trade, which for France and Great Britain amounts to two billion dollars each, or one-third of the former's and one-seventh of the latter's total trade, would be unlikely.[23]

For Great Britain in the postwar period there have been, in addition, the dollar earnings of the colonies, which amounted to $798 million over the period 1946-1950 and made up about 15 per cent of the United Kingdom dollar deficit.[24] Dutch, Belgian, and, to a minor extent, Portuguese colonies are small dollar earners, while French territories used dollar resources of the metropolitan country to the extent of $718 million between 1946 and 1950, or in other words contributed 15 per cent of the total Franc Area deficit with the Dollar Area.[25] In the immediate future, colonies are expected to continue to drain France of dollars, although development of known raw material supplies

[22] G. Clark, *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism*, New York, 1936.

[23] Trade data are derived from United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Joint Publication), *Direction of International Trade*, Series T, Volumes I and II.

[24] Cmd. 8065, pp. 24-5, and Cmd. 8195, p. 36. This does not include an unallocated dollar deficit on the whole Sterling Area account of $876 million as a result of payment agreements with non-sterling countries, but this should be more properly attributed to the United Kingdom than to the colonies, It also does not include gold sales to Britain by the colonies, which increase dollar earnings by $50-$100 million over the period.

[25] International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments Yearbook*, III (1949-50), pp. 197-201.

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and new geological discoveries may change this over a longer period.

In addition to the benefits derived from commodity trade and the dollar earnings of all except French territories, colonial powers have "at stake" a considerable amount of existing investment and the earnings from this capital. For example, probably between one-eighth and one-quarter of total British overseas investment, or between one and two billion dollars, are in British colonies. The amounts for other metropolitan powers is undoubtedly considerably less, although no data are available for even rough estimates.[26] Protection of investments and investment income and the potential future investment opportunities in raw materials and small manufacturing is a primary concern of all colonial powers. What do they pay for this protection and for the benefits which accrue from colonialism? For Great Britain the cost is amazingly low—between 1946 and 1950 expenses to the British taxpayer were probably less than £100 million ($280 million), or less than one-quarter of the amount of the United States contributed to the tiny island of Puerto Rico over the same period and only about one-tenth of the French colonial expenditures which can be estimated from the metropolitan budget.[27] These figures for France and Great Britain total "housekeeping" costs, development grants, and military expenses which can be allocated to the colonies. None of the cost of the British Navy, however, is included. A large part of French expenses have, of course, been for the war in Indochina, which has cost the French more than the total of Marshall Plan aid and amounted in 1951 alone

[26] Total known British capital in the colonies from data on securities traded amounted to £245 million in 1948 ($700 million at the current rate of exchange). Cf. Bank of England, *United Kingdom Overseas Investments, 1938 to 1948*, London, 1950. Material presented at the Washington loan negotiations and subsequent balance of payments data indicate that private investments not registered on the stock exchanges would bring total investment up to around twice this known amount.

[27] The British taxpayer cost for the period January 1, 1944, to July 20, 1949, was given in Parliament as £180.4 million, but this includes the total of £120 million allotted under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1945 for a ten-year period. Cf. *The Economist Records and Statistics Supplement*, August 20, 1949, p. 163. The £100 million estimate above was arrived at by adding the amounts actually used from the Development and Welfare Fund through 1950 to other costs given in the above source. Expenditures of the United States in Puerto Rico are given in the latter's balance of payments data. The breakdown of the French budget is presented in supplements to Ministère des Finances, *Statistiques et études financières*.

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to francs equivalent to one billion dollars. But even if Indochinese costs are excluded, French colonial expenses in the postwar period have been roughly three or four times those of Great Britain. For smaller European metropolitan countries, the costs of colonialism now are very small, although the drain of Indonesia on the Dutch was considerable until settlement was effected.

When the current benefits and vested interests of colonialism to Europe are measured against the costs, it is clear that preservation of some colonial relationship is to the economic interest of all metropolitan countries, with the possible exception of France (and, it may be added, the bond is probably in the economic interest of most of the overseas territories also). Even if the Indochinese question is excluded and assumed to be swallowed up in larger world problems, it is questionable whether or not current French benefits from colonialism outweigh the total expenditures, which are now at an annual rate of $300-400 million, and the annual dollar deficit of $150 million. The economic advantages to the French depend largely on the potential future value of the colonies.

It is clear that the most important direct United States interests in colonial territories, military bases, and the expansion and steady flow of strategic raw materials coincide with the interests of European metropolitan countries. Similarly, our national interest is fostered indirectly by the colonial contribution to the economic health of Europe. These interests of the United States are largely new phenomena which have superseded the relatively minor considerations of commercial policy in the colonies, a frequent source of conflict between European countries and the United States in the past. There is still considerable discrimination against United States exports to European dependencies and even against investment by this country. No discrimination exists, however, in the matter of major concern to us—equal access to raw materials and investment in such products as are necessary for this country's economy. Discrimination by preference arrangements (in which, of course, this country is also guilty), legislation restricting foreign investment, which exists only in the French territories and is now being by-passed by the

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grant of special permission, and import and exchange controls are perhaps annoying. But insofar as the economic interests of this country are concerned, such restrictions are of minor importance.

IV

We come now to tying together the three strands of our argument: United States policy toward traditional colonialism, the nature of and recent developments in dependent relationships, and the extent and nature of national interest which is involved in colonial problems. A reformulated American policy should be based on protection and furthering of our economic and strategic interests in colonial territories with the proviso that our actions or support of the actions of others should not (1) react adversely on our interests elsewhere, or (2) be morally corrupting to our own culture or institutions.

It is first clear that a narrow concept of the national interest dictates general support of the European colonial powers. Insofar as our security and economic interests are concerned, the best possible situation is a series of "happy" colonial relationships, which would serve as protection for military bases, allow for the maximum amount of development of raw material supplies, and contribute to the economic welfare of Europe. The main burden of colonialism for the mother country—extensive military expenditures—would be avoided. There would also be no problem of possible secondary effects on colonies in one area produced by a grant of independence in another.

If such is the case, the first political objective of the United States should be the discouragement of sentiment for independence rather than the promotion of it, while at the same time working quietly, but with force, to push the mother country into making reforms which may be necessary for any "happy" relationship. Certainly modification of the French Union concept is needed for long-run stability. Many territories cannot ever realistically aspire to full sovereignty, because of meager human and natural resources, and in others no real sentiment for full independence now exists. The "small print" of United States policy

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has sometimes recognized both these exigencies, but it has usually been swallowed up in the broader sweep of our words and deeds fostering the general concept of independence and condemning colonialism. The Caribbean area is a case in point.[28] Colonial territories in this region are of significant strategic importance to the United States because of naval and air bases for the protection of the Panama Canal and the inter-American supply route, and bauxite (British Guiana, Surinam, and Jamaica), crude oil (Trinidad), and oil refineries (the Netherlands Antilles and Trinidad). Because of the patchwork of races and cultures, there is no fervent "nationalism," nor is there, at present, any real demand for independence produced by xenophobia, although the desire for local autonomy is quite real in most of the territories. It is extremely doubtful that any of the dependencies could at present stand alone as fully sovereign states. To grant the fiction of legal sovereignty to territories which are heavily dependent economically or militarily or both is always to run the risk of abusing the theory of sovereign independence and to invite confusion and bitterness and create tensions and misunderstandings worse than anything involved in the more honest and applicable institution of colonial status. All of the colonies have arrived at, or are clearly in sight of, a final status of local autonomy, or assimilation as overseas departments in the case of the French territories, which is satisfactory to most of the indigenous inhabitants. In spite of all this, the United States did not object strongly or vote against (it abstained) an inter-American resolution at Bogota in 1948 which favored "putting an end to colonialism and the occupation of American territories by extracontinental countries" and set up an American Commission of Dependent Territories "to find an adequate solution" to the colonial question in the Western Hemisphere.[29]

If support of some form of "happy" dependent relationship is indicated when it is feasible or is the only realistic arrangement, what of situations where it is impossible, where rabid nationalism

[28] The Ford Foundation made it possible for the author to spend the month of January 1952 in the British, United States, French, and Netherlands territories in the Caribbean.

[29] *New York Times*, May 1, 1948, p. 7.

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or xenophobia is likely to create instability for as long as any type of political ties endure? When, if at all, is such a territory to achieve independence? The only real test available for such a situation is the final recognition by the mother country that its own national interest is no longer served, on balance, by the continuation of the effort to hold the colony in subjection. This point was reached in England with respect to the thirteen colonies at the time of Cornwallis' surrender; it was reached with respect to Cuba in the final weeks before the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Spain; it was reached by the British with respect to India in the immediate aftermath of World War II, or perhaps somewhat earlier; it was reached by the Dutch with respect to Indonesia in 1947, but only in the light of the fact that the opposition of a large part of the international community had added to the opposition of the colonial peoples involved. It is probably being reached by the French at the present time, in the sense that there appears to be a decisive swing of authoritative French opinion to the view that the maintenance of the colonial status for Indochina is no longer justified by French interests alone; in other words, the colonial problem of Indochina is being swallowed up by larger world problems.

In any case, when this stage is reached there has been an important turning point—and perhaps the only fully decisive one—in the colonial relationship. Experience has shown that except where a mother country has reasons of its own—ideological or economic—for wishing to relinquish its control over a colonial territory, the only really pertinent test of fitness for independence has generally been the ability of the colonial people to make itself so much of a trouble and nuisance to the mother country as to render the continuation of the relationship unprofitable to the latter. Situations of this sort can be created by a variety of components, of which the degree of resentment of the colonial people and of the resultant civil disorder and resistance is only one. Other things, such as geography, economic value to the mother country, the importance of the creation of precedent, effect on the interest of third powers, and domestic preoccupation of the mother country—all these play an important part in de-

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termining when the crucial point has been reached at which a colonial relationship may be regarded as exhausted and conducive to no further constructive purpose.

Such a conclusion assumes that the national interest of the United States coincides with that of the European mother country, which is a plausible general proposition, although certainly not true in every case. For example, a dispute *between* two European countries with respect to a colonial issue obviously cannot find the United States on both sides simultaneously. We must be careful of situations in which the national interest of the metropolitan country is distorted by pressure from private interest groups, by considerations of pride or prestige, or by our own contributions to the economic burden involved. It is in the case of the French colonial empire that misjudgments of this kind are most likely. Here again, however, the interdependence of colonial developments must be recognized—of Libyan independence on all of French North Africa, and resolution of the Tunisian case on Algeria and Morocco, and even, in the longer run, on French territories further south. There is a lesson to be learned from the case of Libya, which achieved its independence, against the better judgment of all who studied carefully its capacity to assume the responsibilities involved, by virtue of a single vote in the General Assembly—a vote which can be attributed more to the tiny republic of Liberia, which had no essential interests involved, than to any other country.[30] That Libyan independence has had much to do with the disturbances in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco can hardly be doubted.

Support of the national interest of the mother country raises the issue of the menace to peace of colonial discontent, either directly through a spreading of the conflict, or indirectly through the encouragement of Communism in unstable political situa-

[30] The crucial vote on tripartite trusteeship for the area among France, Great Britain, and Italy came in 1949 following the failure of four-power agreement and submission of the issue to the General Assembly. British administration of Cyrenaica and French administration of the Fezzan were barely approved by the necessary two-thirds majority, but Italian trusteeship lacked one affirmative vote. Liberia, which had voted in favor of Great Britain and France, abstained in the case of Italy. Defeat of this section caused the entire South American bloc to smother the whole resolution, and Libyan independence was decided upon at the next session of the Assembly.

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tions. Chronic disturbances do cause frictions and tensions, but the objective of political stability can be dangerous if it is made a fetish and pursued to the exclusion of other pertinent considerations. Walter Hines Page once said of the British, "They have a mania for order, sheer order, order for the sake of order and—of trade."[31] At some stage in some territories independence may clearly be the best step, but the United States has, in effect, frustrated the objective of political stability in recent times by fomenting revolutions through its condemnation of colonialism and general advocacy of indiscriminate independence.[32] Prevention of inroads by Communism in colonial regions may very well be easier when control is in the hands of a European country than when there is considerable political instability following newly won independence, although probably the spread of Communism has actually been fostered in some areas under French control, such as the Caribbean islands, because of the strength and Messianic aims of the party in the metropole.

The pursuit of what may be termed by some a "hard," by others a "realistic," policy on colonial questions must meet the test of two criticisms, which together form the basis for the traditional and existing American attitude. It must not be only a short-run policy which would damage our long-run interests outside of Europe. And it must not react adversely on our own culture and institutions.

So far as our long-run interests outside of Europe are concerned, the problem is a real one and should be recognized as such, but at the same time the potential damage is easily exaggerated because of failure to distinguish between the sentimental and the real factors involved. Rupert Emerson makes the strongest case for the importance of this issue by arguing that this country should align itself with the forces of the future

[31] Quoted in A. K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny*, Baltimore, 1935, p. 423.

[32] Cf., e.g., the 1950 statement of George C. McGhee, then head of the African Affairs Division of the State Department, advocating the "advancement toward independence" of colonial territories in Africa (United States Department of State *Bulletin*, XXII [June 19, 1950], pp. 999-1003), or John Foster Dulles' statement before the General Assembly in 1947: "The colonial system is obsolete and should be done away with as soon as possible," quoted in W. R. Crocker, *Self-Government for the Colonies*, London, 1949, p. 10.

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rather than of the past.[33] The thesis is partially based on the assumption that nations, like elephants, have long memories. The Irish have proved that this can be the case, but India and other former dependencies which have chosen to join the Commonwealth of Nations, as well as such countries as Haiti, which frequently breaks away from the Central and South American bloc in the United Nations to vote for France but for no other European power, are proving the adverse also. The argument, secondly, places great weight on the importance of United States popularity among peoples and governments in other parts of the world. That this factor should not be entirely discounted is clear; but at the same time it should not be overrated and become an aim of foreign policy, rather than merely a consideration to be taken into account.[34]

Our main difficulty in this respect is that we often fail to distinguish between "anti-colonialism" which is an expression of national interest and "anti-colonialism" which is an expression of grass-roots moral fervor. When Argentina and Guatemala object strenuously to European colonies in the Western Hemisphere, it must be remembered that the maps of each country are already drawn to include the Falkland Islands in the case of the former, and British Honduras (Belize) in the case of the latter. Similarly, the demands of Egypt and other Arab countries with respect to parts of Northern Africa are hardly an expression of disinterested morality. When the issue is one of opposing national interests, we should recognize it as such and act accordingly. Because of the substantial concern of Europe and ourselves in colonies and the interdependence of actions in the different territories, the national interest of the United States will generally lie with the colonial powers.

The effect of a more realistic policy toward the existence of

[33] R. Emerson, "American Policy Toward Pacific Dependencies," *Pacific Affairs*, xx (September 1947), pp. 259-75.

[34] An example of what seems to be disproportionate weighting of this factor is the following statement: "To win praise instead of disapproval, the United States must find an answer to a most difficult question: What policy compatible with our democratic values can we adopt toward our own colonies and those of other powers which will reconcile these two demands [freedom and welfare] and thus diminish conflicts within dependent areas and concerning them?" (A. B. Fox, *Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean*, New York, 1949, p. 3).

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colonial dependence on our ideological position in the world turns mainly on the nature of colonial relationships and how we present our case. If colonialism is unjust tyranny, not only are we morally wrong in the eyes of world public opinion, but we should be in our own eyes also, i.e., our policy is likely to corrupt the national objectives we are endeavoring to preserve. In a forceful exposition on the historical development of imperialism, Hannah Arendt argues that no democracy can keep another people in subjection and survive, that a successful empire comprising different cultures necessitates a totalitarian regime at home.[35] Similarly, Reinhold Niebuhr states:

> The economic consequences of imperialism were certainly not as unambiguously evil as the Marxist propaganda claims; for it introduced technical skills and education to the agrarian world. Perhaps the most deleterious consequences of imperialism are in the spiritual rather than the economic realm. For arrogance is the inevitable consequence of the relation of power to weakness. In this case the arrogance of power reinforced ethnic prejudices; for the industrial world was "white" and the non-technical world was "colored."[36]

Such considerations must surely be kept constantly in mind, but two observations are in order concerning their relevance to present circumstances. First, colonialism today, while it obviously has some defects from any "objective" viewpoint (if such were possible), is not the old-fashioned tyranny that it once was in many parts of the world. It was pointed out in Section II that most colonial relationships are steadily evolving toward a series of varied, pragmatically determined "ends" that are at neither the extreme of complete subjection nor of full independent sovereignty. Secondly, there are so-called "rights" involved on both sides of colonial issues, none of them being in themselves absolute. People in the United States tend to visualize a colonial relationship as involving only one "right"—the "right" of self-determination—and this "right" is seen as being infringed upon. In his careful study, Alfred Cobban answers this argument succinctly:

> In short, are there not geographical, historical, economic, and political considerations which rule out national self-determination in the form

[35] Arendt, *op.cit.*, Part Two.
[36] R. Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, New York, 1952, pp. 112-13.

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of the sovereign state for many of the smaller nationalities of the world? . . . The true rights of man are his liberties—political, economic, national, religious—and these may necessitate some degree of separate statehood, or they may not, and such political independence may be objectively possible, or it may not. Circumstances, in the end, are the determining factor.[37]

Support, rather than general condemnation, of colonialism is clearly the path for the United States where such a relationship is the only feasible alternative because of meager resources, or where the relationship is not subject to dispute. In other cases, a reasoned policy of general non-interference, in words as well as actions, recognizing the extent of national interest involved and the fact that in colonial issues, as in most problems, there are no absolutes, no clear "rights" and "wrongs"—a policy devoid of sentiment but not of moral content—should not be damaging to ourselves nor, if honestly expressed, to our ideological position in the world. If we recognize that political status may be, and in some cases must be, relative, bordering on neither the extreme of subjugation nor of full independent sovereignty, we should not feel guilty about presenting this possibility to the rest of the world. Such a policy will be harshly criticized in some sectors, of course. But we should not let our "rabbit ears," often so sensitive to foreign criticism, dominate decisions in which a substantial degree of the national interest is at stake and in which there are no clear moral "rights" and "wrongs."

[37] Cobban, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

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Review Articles

IN SEARCH OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

By GRAYSON L. KIRK

George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. viii, 154. $2.75.

Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, pp. xii, 283. $3.50.

THERE are fads in scholarship as well as in fashion. Just now, the current fad, with respect to American diplomatic history, is to belabor what is called "Wilsonianism" with all the sarcasm and dignified invective at the writer's disposal. It is almost *de rigueur* to expatiate upon the prescient wisdom of the Founding Fathers, to pass over most of the period between John Quincy Adams and William McKinley as relatively unimportant, and to concentrate the heaviest guns of criticism upon the "Utopianism" of the first half of the twentieth century. Only now, and belatedly, we are told, is the United States beginning to come down from the clouds of illusion and to survey realistically the true nature of the world with which its diplomatists and policy-makers must cope. Only now are we beginning once again to measure possible policy decisions by the yardsticks of power and "the national interest."

This seems to me to be the essence of Professor Morgenthau's thesis. He refers to the time of our constitution-making as one of "Realism"; he characterizes the nineteenth century as "The Ideological Period" in which the precepts of moral law and conceptions of the national interest happily seemed to coincide; and he speaks of the past half-century as "Utopianism" in which policy has been made on the basis of moral principles completely divorced from considerations of the national interest. In other words, we have tended recently to allow ourselves to be deluded by the intellectual errors of "Utopianism," "Legalism," "Senti-

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mentalism," and "Neo-Isolationism." In so doing, we have blundered hopelessly and helplessly in both Europe and Asia, and our successes have been gained by accident and not by design. We can escape from our present folly only if we follow unswervingly the lodestar of our national interest and if we understand that moral principles must be derived from political reality and not divorced from it.

Ambassador Kennan's lectures make no such ambitious effort to divide all American history into a few rigid categories. He does, however, start his inquiry by saying that in the past fifty years there seems to have been no real agreement concerning the basic concepts which should underlie American foreign policy. Largely for the benefit of his own usefulness as a policy-maker, he undertook to study the record of our twentieth-century diplomacy in an effort to discover what operational concepts had motivated our decision-makers, and the extent to which these had contributed to the startling decline in the international security position of the United States during this time.

Like Professor Morgenthau, he concludes that we have been excessively legalistic and moralistic in our approach to international problems. He comments that we have had a tendency "to achieve our foreign policy objectives by inducing other governments to sign up to professions of high moral and legal principle" and he stresses the point that "If . . . instead of making ourselves slaves of the concepts of international law and morality, we would confine these concepts to the unobtrusive, almost feminine, function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest in which they find their true value . . . posterity might look back upon our efforts with fewer and less troubled questions" (p. 54).

His second conclusion is that our other great danger lies in the gap between challenge and response in foreign affairs. Like many another observer, he laments the disastrous effects of popular abuse and distrust of professional diplomatists, and he feels that only evil results can come from the current tendency of the executive branch of the government to be beholden to short-term public opinion attitudes toward foreign questions. To this point any reviewer can but say, "Amen."

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A host of questions crowd to one's mind as he reads these provocative books. First of all, one must ask: Is there any real agreement or understanding as to what constitutes the national interest? Both authors indicate that our statesmen in recent times have tended to disregard it in favor of moral abstractions. But before such a sweeping condemnation can be accepted, there must be some consensus as to what it is that has been disregarded. Is it something which has reality in itself or is it merely a criterion by which policy alternatives must be judged?

Professor Morgenthau is disturbingly brief about this. He indicates (pp. 5-6) merely that our national interest is to maintain a preponderant power position in this hemisphere and a balance of power in Europe and Asia. He does not reach the conclusion—which one might well do—that our participation in both world wars, undertaken during the heyday of "Utopianism," was precisely to maintain this national interest and not an action in the service of a moral abstraction.

George Kennan's views on this subject are to be found more extensively in his Northwestern University lectures than in the volume under consideration.[1] At Evanston, he defined the national interest negatively by saying that it is "not a detached interest in our international environment for its own sake, independent of our own aspirations and problems here at home." He said further that it did not consist in abstractions, and that, in essence, it was less a matter of purpose or objective than one of method. Positively, he observed that "The fundamental interest of our government in international affairs is . . . to assure that we should be permitted, as a people, to continue our Pilgrim's Progress toward a better America under the most favorable possible conditions, with a minimum of foreign interference, and also with a minimum of inconvenience or provocation to the interests of other nations" (p. 734).

Clearly, our authors have had difficulty in trying to be explicit about the concept which Professor Morgenthau particularly feels we have disregarded. One is reminded of the late Charles A.

[1] George F. Kennan, "Lectures on Foreign Policy," *Illinois Law Review*, XLV (1951), pp. 718-42.

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Beard's conclusion which he reached after writing his lengthy analysis on *The Idea of National Interest* some twenty years ago. He said, "In studying thousands of actions justified by the appellation, 'national interest,' I was tempted to conclude that the conception was simply a telling formula which politicians and private interests employed whenever they wished to accomplish any particular designs in the field of foreign affairs."[2]

At the risk of being regarded as old-fashioned, this reviewer would suggest that one source of this difficulty lies in an unwillingness to admit that many of our policy-makers, during this so-called Utopian period, have undertaken to express the national interests of the United States in terms of moral principles, not because they were confused theorists, but because they honestly believed that our best national interests lay in the widest possible acceptance of certain moral and legal principles as guides of international conduct. I would further suggest that in most cases where decisions of gravity had to be taken, the final choice was based on what was believed to be the defense of our true national interests, and not because of an irresponsible servitude to abstract principles. I believe this to be as true of the past fifty years as of any other period of our history.

A second, and derivative, question might be expressed as follows: To what extent have our policy-makers felt constrained, in defending the national interests, to express them in moral and legal terms in order to secure maximum support at home and abroad? It is clear that Mr. Kennan would agree that this has occurred and frequently. Professor Morgenthau would approve of this as a general practice, but he does not believe that our leaders in recent times have had that much wisdom and political skill.

The truth undoubtedly lies somewhere in between the two positions. Our people have had a phobia about "power politics" and everything connoted by that term. They have believed deeply that international relations could and should be regulated to a reasonable degree by moral and legal norms. They have be-

[2] Charles A. Beard, *The Open Door at Home*, New York, 1935, pp. v-vi.

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lieved that a democratic society should not operate either at home or abroad except in accordance with principles of right conduct. It would be too much to expect that our leaders themselves would not be infected with this belief, and it would certainly be too much to expect these leaders to disregard this powerful feeling in explaining their decisions to their people. On balance, I would argue that our tendency to express issues in moral and legal terms, and not in the language of power diplomacy, has been more of an asset than a handicap to the long-range international leadership of this country. There is a reality in spiritual strength, apart from considerations of physical power, and the latter is never so strong as when it is expressed in terms of service toward achievement of an ideal. Since Soviet imperialism does combine the two, we can do no less if we are to meet the challenge successfully.

Professor Morgenthau could have made the point, though I do not recall that he did, that excessive reliance upon a moralistic-legalistic position hampers diplomacy because it reduces the flexibility in the hands of the decision-maker. It can also be argued that too rigid a conceptual structure concerning the nature and objectives of national power can be equally confining. The distribution of power in the world has changed enormously within the past two decades. We are by no means sure that this period of upheaval is over and that we can now look ahead to a time of a new stability and a new balance. On the contrary, it seems quite clear that we are still very far removed from a situation in which the elements of a new equilibrium are sharply defined. Under these circumstances, our best policy is to maximize our strength in all categories, to continue to reassert our aspiration that the world can work back toward the recreation of an international society based on accepted rules of conduct, and, unfailingly, to do what we can, by example as well as by precept, to encourage realistic progress toward that end.

We should not be discouraged by our inability to look very far ahead in these troubled times. A century ago an experienced diplomatist set down certain observations that have particular force for our day. He said:

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> . . . la politique, dont tout le code peut se résumer dans les mots *prévoir* et *prévenir,* ne saurait porter trop loin ses regards pour découvrir le *punctum saliens* des événements futurs. Il lui est en effet démontré que, rarement, les calculs et les combinaisons de la diplomatie offrent de ces avantages que l'on puisse saisir tout à coup, si on ne les a fait naître ou long-temps à l'avance préparés: elle ne se presse donc jamais de construire, mais elle ne cesse de rassembler des matériaux, prévoyant bien qu'un jour l'occasion se présentera de les utiliser.[3]

In summation, I do not believe that the picture of our past is one of as much ineptitude and confused star-gazing as both authors imply. I do believe that we have been slow to reassess our international position in terms of the changes imposed by war and technological revolution, but I do not believe that our lethargy has been produced by any excessive solicitude for moral abstractions totally divorced from political realities or from failure to make a proper evaluation of our national interests. This lethargy may at least as easily be explained by our great distance from the main theater of world political conflict in Europe. The powers of Europe have had to adjust their policies almost from day to day. Now that the ocean no longer seems so safe a barrier, we are asserting a leadership in world politics which, whatever its merits, is certainly not lethargic. Without a great deal of preparation, in terms of experience in world leadership, we have been catapulted by events into a situation which no state has faced since the rise of the modern state system. To me, the striking feature of our present situation is that we have reoriented our thinking so rapidly and, on the whole, so effectively—and precisely in terms of our long-range national interests.

[3] Le comte de Garden, *Traité complet de diplomatie,* 3 vols., Paris, 1833, I, p. 7.

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REALISM AND IDEALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By QUINCY WRIGHT

John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp. xii, 275. $3.75.

"REALISM" and "idealism" are both terms which have been used in differing, sometimes opposite, senses in the history of philosophy. They must therefore be employed with great caution. Dr. John H. Herz, in his recent study of the application of these terms to politics, seeks to define the sense in which he uses them. He writes in his preface that the book was in the main finished when the last war was ended and that little which had happened since required modification of his conclusions. To the reviewer it seems that further thought on the concepts employed in a perspective more removed from the disturbing influences of the war period would have been desirable.

By "realism" Dr. Herz does not mean the Platonic doctrine attributing reality to abstract ideas (what ought to be) or the scientific concept attributing reality to the actual situation (what is), nor does he mean the political doctrine of expediency (Machiavelli) or the philosophic doctrine of empiricism (Locke).[1] Rather he defines "realism" as thought which "takes into consideration the implications for political life of those security and power factors which are inherent in human society."[2] Those factors, he believes, grow out of the "security dilemma" which flows from the individual's consciousness that others are seeking his destruction and that he must be continuously ready to kill them before they kill him.[3] The question may be raised whether many people in civilized societies are aware of any such "di-

[1] Bertrand Russell has made the interesting comment that authoritarian political systems such as those of Catholicism, Nazism, and Communism emerged from idealistic philosophies like those of Aquinas and Hegel, while liberal and democratic political systems developed from empirical philosophies like that of Locke (*Unpopular Essays*, New York, 1950, p. 2).

[2] Herz, *op.cit.*, p. 18. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

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lemma" and in what way such an individual motivation, if it exists, is related to the security situation with which states are faced. One would suppose such a dilemma is presented more often to states than to individuals, and that serious writers on political problems would seldom fail to pass as "realists" under this definition. Many such writers would question Herz's psychological explanation but few have failed to consider the security and power factors inherent in human society.

Political idealism, according to Dr. Herz, is the type of political thinking which "does not recognize the problems arising from the security and power dilemma," or "takes notice of them only in a perfunctory way, and concentrates its interest upon rational conditions or rational solutions."[4]

Dr. Herz derives such theories from an exaggerated emphasis upon the psychological element of "pity, the urge to oppose suffering and pain,"[5] accentuating the "security dilemma" because pity must be ignored in the struggle for existence. The usage of the word "rational" raises problems. Does Dr. Herz imply that reason plays no part in "realistic" efforts to win in the competition of life? Few writers could be classified as political idealists under Dr. Herz's definition unless the term "perfunctory way" is given a very liberal application. "Idealistic" propagandists seem usually to have known what they were up against and it would be hard to find a serious political writer who did not give more than perfunctory treatment to power and conflict in political life.

It is clear that Dr. Herz's distinction is not qualitative but quantitative, not absolute but relative. It depends upon how much weight a particular writer gives to the oppositional, and how much to the cooperative, aspects of political life. Most sociologists, following Simmel, recognize that both conflict and cooperation are to be found in all human and intergroup relations.[6] Even enemies in war cooperate in exchanging prisoners and in observing some rules of war. Even members of happy families occasion-

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 18. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[6] Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, IX (January 1903), pp. 490ff.; R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chicago, 1924, p. 583; W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology*, Boston, 1940, pp. 344ff.; Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, Chicago, 1942, p. 957; *idem*, "The Nature of Conflict," *Western Political Quarterly*, IV (June 1951), pp. 199ff.

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ally quarrel. The issue is, how much? All that Dr. Herz appears to be saying is that "idealists" overemphasize the cooperative aspects of life and "realists" overemphasize the oppositional. Opinions would greatly differ on which side of this line a particular writer should be placed. Erasmus, Grotius, and Kant, whom some might classify as "idealists," certainly gave no less attention to the disposition of states to fight than did Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Metternich, who would often be classified as "realists." It may be that the first three were somewhat more optimistic than the latter about the possibility of human reason developing cooperation at the expense of war. Perhaps the distinction Dr. Herz has in mind is that between a relative optimism and a relative pessimism in respect to the capacity of man to solve problems by the application of reason. Writers like Locke, Montesquieu, Burke, or Gentz would be very difficult to classify as "idealists" or "realists" by any criterion. Dr. Herz does not in fact align himself with either the "realists" or the "idealists," but seeks a middle way which he calls "realist liberalism," illustrated by a quotation from Spinoza, "Men are not born fit for citizenship, but must be made so."[7]

In the body of his book, Dr. Herz deals with the course of certain movements for democracy and aristocracy, for nationalism and internationalism, for competitive and planned economy, indicating how the "idealistic" propagandas behind such movements always ran into "realistic" snags. These narrations, however, do not deny that the idealistic propagandas had real effects. It is clear that in the scientific sense "realism" must take into account, for purposes of prediction and control, the ideal symbols and propagandas with which men identify themselves, no less than such material conditions as armaments, geography, and production. The direction in which soldiers shoot, dependent at least in part on the ideas and ideals in their heads, is just as important in political history and sociological analysis as the efficiency of their weapons. With this relativism in mind it is a little difficult to follow the author's categorical statement that "the rationalist credo of political idealism" has failed in the

[7] Spinoza, *Tractatus Politicus*, Chap. 5, sec. 2; Herz, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

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modern world.[8] All he can mean is that these movements fell short of realizing their objectives in the full. He certainly does not demonstrate that they accomplished nothing.

The book stimulates by suggesting doubts and questions in almost every paragraph. To this reviewer it suffers from an effort to treat practical problems in terms of absolute categories. The author seems to be struggling with a conviction that there must be absolute truths and principles in the political world, a conviction which he is reluctant to abandon because he fears to do so would be cynical. He is seeking to appraise political writings in a scientific spirit but is hampered by a philosophical conception which has no real relevance to his problem. To the reviewer the book demonstrates that the distinction between "realism" and "idealism" is of doubtful value in either political analysis or political philosophy.

A philosophy may be useful because it guides efforts toward making a world that better satisfies human wishes or because it reconciles the individual to being satisfied with the conditions in which he lives. A philosophy which centers around a distinction between "realism" and "idealism" would seem to have neither of these utilities but would engender lethargy and inaction because it asserts that ideals are not real, or despair because it asserts that reality cannot be ideal. Such thinking is ethically and politically useless and lacks the scientific virtue of looking at human and political activity as it is—a complex in which both values and conditions play a part and which can in a degree be predicted and manipulated toward desired goals, and to which one can in a measure adapt oneself by rethinking the situation. Absolutism has no place in political thinking and Dr. Herz's book unconsciously demonstrates this.

The history of the period since World War I would certainly provide no clear evidence that policies which could be identified with internationalism were less "realistic" than policies which could be identified with nationalism. Neither Mussolini nor Hitler, the high priests of nationalism, did very well for themselves or their states. The other great powers were only a trifle less na-

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 121ff.

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tionalistic. Public opinion in none of these states was dominantly "internationalistic" and it is therefore not surprising that the policies of government could in all cases be better described as nationalistic than as internationalistic. It is, however, possible that statesmen would have come out better if they had attempted and been able to win more favorable attention to the League of Nations and other symbols of internationalism, and to pursue the policies which those symbols suggested.

It will be said that it was impossible for them to do so because "realism" should have taught them that national power is the end of policy. But does this mean that people today attach high value to national power or does it mean that people are by nature nationalists? The "realists" have been uncertain whether their key terms refer to necessary assumptions or to desirable goals and they have also been uncertain as to the respective roles of observation and of values in either.[9]

This analysis suggests that "realism" and "idealism" have functioned as propaganda terms according to which everyone sought to commend whatever policy he favored by calling it "realistic." The terms do not, in other words, throw light on the policies, institutions, personalities, or theories which they are used to qualify but only on the attitude toward them of the speaker and, it is hoped, of the listener. From this usage we learn that in the past two decades political propagandists have regarded "realism" as a plus term and "idealism" as a minus term.

"Realism" has been associated by some philosophers with the acceptance of the necessary consequences of necessary assumptions.[10] It is "realistic" to accept Euclid's axioms as self-evident and not to shrink from any of Euclid's conclusions which follow from them by irresistible logic. So the political "realists" insist it is "realistic" to accept the proposition that "states seek to enhance their power" as axiomatic and not to shrink from any conclusions which follow from it by irresistible logic.[11] The opposite

[9] Robert W. Tucker, "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political Realism," *American Political Science Review*, XLVI (March 1952), pp. 214ff.

[10] It was also associated with empiricism. Both mathematicians and experimentalists have been called "realists" in modern times.

[11] Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," *World Politics*, IV (October 1951), p. 40.

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of "realism" in this sense is to reject assumptions which, however self-evident, are disliked and to reject unpalatable results which logically flow from them. It is difficult to see why such irrationality should be called "idealism." It is obvious, however, that few people are ready to denominate themselves "idealists," when that term is made synonymous with foolishness.

There is a flaw in the application of this geometric analogy to international politics. Few assumptions are completely uncontroversial. Some of Euclid's axioms have been questioned and non-Euclidian geometries, developed from different, and to most people highly improbable, axioms, have been found by Einstein to lead to a description of the time-space in which we live more adequate than that of Euclid. The alleged axiom about the disposition of states to enhance their power is even more questionable. Modern "realists" recognize that this disposition is more developed in some states than in others, and classify states as "status quo" or "imperialistic" according as they use power to maintain or to change the existing distribution of territory and power.[12] This qualification suggests that power is an instrument for the achievement of values. It is not a necessary property of states, as the axiom of the straight line was said by Euclid to be a property of space; as inertia was said by Newton to be a property of mass in motion; or as combination in simple proportions by volume was said by Gay Lussac to be a property of gases. Consequently one cannot hope to deduce from the alleged disposition to enhance power consequences which can be verified by observations under different conditions and circumstances, thus providing the basis for a science predicting the behavior of states.[13] Instead one has to acknowledge that both the magnitude and the utilization of power by a state are influenced by the values it holds and the policies it pursues. Does it want stability or

[12] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, New York, 1948, pp. 21ff.

[13] Morgenthau states that politics is not amenable to rational or scientific treatment but is an art to be judged only historically by its success (*Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, Chicago, 1936, p. 10). To say that politics is an art which to succeed must employ tools other than reason and that the assumptions of politics are relative is not to say that scientific generalization about political behavior is impossible. See Quincy Wright, "Political Science and World Stabilization," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV (March 1950), pp. 1ff.

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progress? Does it want order or justice? Does it want peace or plenty? It is true that a state's values may also be influenced by the power at its disposal. Policy, in the sense of propositions describing a state's probable action in given circumstances, is a function of both its power and its values, of both the means at its disposal and the ends dictated by its values.

Since the pursuit of values is often associated with "idealism," some "realists" shrink from this conclusion and, to justify the assumption that states act to enhance their power, assert that power is the supreme value for which states strive. In other words, states utilize power to augment power—power is both means and end—but the jump from assuming that the pursuit of power is an inherent property of states to asserting that states pursue power as their supreme value changes the point of view from that of science to that of philosophy. Values can, it is true, be spoken of scientifically as facts manifested in particular cultures, but they are usually spoken of philosophically as subjective appraisals of what ought to be.

Thus when it is said that states pursue power as their supreme value, the philosophical question is at once raised: Ought power to be the supreme value of states? The "realist" answers affirmatively, asserting that states should pursue their national interests and the supreme national interest is the augmentation of the state's power position. They are, however, then asserting not a self-evident axiom but an ethical norm, and an ethical norm which is by no means uncontroversial. Can it be said that the Alexanders, Caesars, Napoleons, and Hitlers who appeared to make power their goal are better examples of statesmanship than the Washingtons, Jeffersons, Lincolns, and Wilsons who appeared to subordinate power to other values? It is admittedly difficult to assess the weight of power as end and power as means in the thinking or action of any political leader.

It is also difficult to assess the relative importance of the various elements of political power—armament, potential, morale, reputation—under given conditions of culture and technology. What contribution may a value system itself make to a state's power? May not a state which attributes high value to the ob-

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servance of promises, the exercise of power with moderation, the toleration of divergent values, and respect for differences of opinion be usually in a better position to achieve its policies than a state which has a reputation for repudiating promises, and for behaving with brutality, intolerance, and disrespect? The advantage of larger armies, navies, and air forces may be overweighed by superior capacity to gain allies. It is said, without complete accuracy, that Washington lost all his battles but the last, and that Napoleon won all of his but the last. Washington with the help of Franklin succeeded in getting France, the Netherlands, and Spain on his side and Prussia, Russia, and Sweden in benevolent neutrality before the Revolutionary War ended, but Napoleon found himself fighting alone against Europe at Leipzig and Waterloo. While exceptions can be found, it is roughly true that policies and values generally appraised as good win allies and wars, while those generally appraised as bad lose both. Observance of law is a value generally appraised as good and it may be wise policy. "Just as the national," wrote Grotius, "who violates the law of his country in order to obtain an immediate advantage breaks down that by which the advantages of himself and his posterity are for all future time assured, so the state which transgresses the laws of nature and of nations cuts away also the bulwarks which safeguard its own future peace."[14]

The lesson to be drawn is that in social and political affairs values cannot be eliminated from the discussion as they can in dealing with atoms and planets. Values, no less than arms, are among the "facts" which determine state behavior. All terms of politics—power, policy decision, action—involve both values and conditions, both human purposes and material instruments, both goals expressed by symbols and means manifested by procedures, weapons, and propagandas.

Finally, is it certain that political values should be appraised in relation to the state? Is man for the state or is the state for

[14] Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, Prolegomena, sec. 18, Carnegie ed., p. 16. Modern psychologists emphasize the value of law for self-control even more than for control of others (Ranyard West, *Conscience and Society*, New York, 1945, p. 166). Grotius hinted at the same thought. "Even if no advantage were to be contemplated from the keeping of the law, it would be a mark of wisdom, not of folly, to allow ourselves to be drawn toward that to which we feel that our nature leads" (*loc.cit.*).

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man? The less discouraged of our age may assume that today, as in 1776, 1688, 1215, and further back, men and women regard the opportunity to enjoy life and liberty and to pursue happiness as a primary value and that they consider it the function of the state and other institutions to forward that value. In a world which is likely to continue to shrink and to change at an accelerating rate under the influence of advancing science and technology, and in which war is likely to be more destructive and less localizable, these values can hardly develop unless the peoples of the world are so organized that nations and factions will be deterred from war. Such organization is hardly to be expected unless men are educated to world citizenship and opinion is cultivated to support universal institutions. Goals such as these are not achieved in a day or in a decade. The steps toward them must often be deflected by necessities which require that states be strong and opinion be behind them, but unless the goal is recognized it is not likely to be approached.

These conclusions in regard to long-run policy may be characterized as "idealism." Their opposite would counsel a continued education of people to worship the sovereignty of the nation-state, continued propaganda of opinion to strengthen those states and to weaken international institutions, and continuance of the arms race. The result to be expected is further bi-polarizing of the world in hostile alliances, increasing taxes, regimentation of persons, declining standards of living, less enjoyment of human rights, and eventually atomic war, after which the prospects of any large number of people enjoying life and liberty and pursuing happiness as they have been doing during the last few centuries would be slight indeed. If long-run policies with these objectives are called "realism," then realism seems a close neighbor of foolishness.

If the demand for "realism" in international politics means to deny that words are weapons, that values and ideas have influence, and that ideas give power, it can find little to sustain it in modern social thought. If it means that men should not reflect on the probable consequences of their actions but act on impulse and a blind urge for dominance, it is suicidal. If it means that

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men should calculate the probable consequences of alternative policies in the existing distribution of power, it is sensible, but such action could equally well be called "idealism." If it means that men should avoid absolutistic principles, should appreciate the relativity of all values to time and circumstance, it may be sound advice, but such pragmatism is no less "idealism" than it is "realism." "Idealists" and "realists" seem to agree that calculation of the power situation and of the disposition of states to enhance their power is important in policy-making. The issue is what other factors are important to have in mind in choosing among alternatives if long-run progress is not to be frustrated in meeting short-run exigencies. "Idealists" refuse to conclude that our civilization has made the fatal turn and is going the way of Egypt, Babylon, and Rome. They believe men, by taking thought, can contribute to the development of conditions in which "the dignity and worth of the human person," justice, and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.[15]

Machiavelli suggests that the fundamental norms for the behavior of individuals in a society and for statesmen in international relations are different.[16] They are, of course, different because the conditions and circumstances are different. In the same sense, the proper norms of behavior in China, in London, and in Timbuktu, in the age of the horse-borne archer, the tractor-borne gun, and the air-borne atomic bomb are different. The applicability of any norms can hardly be judged except in the light of the total situation, including the culture and the technology in which they are to be applied. The Machiavellian distinction could hardly have been made except against the background of a culture which assumed that there are absolute moral norms of human behavior to be observed in all cultures and in all situations. A philosophy suitable for our varied and changing world appreciates that justice may resemble long-run expediency if all aspects of the situation are considered. "Honesty," as Franklin

[15] United Nations Charter, Preamble.

[16] Morgenthau suggests that politics is necessarily evil and inconsistent with ethical norms (*Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, pp. 195ff.).

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said, "may be the best policy." Here "idealism" and "realism" meet.

The ambiguity in the terms "realism" and "idealism" makes them of doubtful service in the field of international relations. If they are used to indicate an antithesis more objective than that of pessimism and optimism or than that of approval and disapproval, it seems to me they can best distinguish short-run from long-run policies, national from human policies, and oppositional from cooperative policies. These distinctions are clearly relative. Thus "realism" demands that immediate necessities and short-run requirements be not neglected in working for long-run goals, and "idealism" demands that long-run goals be not neglected in meeting immediate necessities and short-run requirements. "Realism" also insists that even in the long run it is to be expected that the nation will continue to be the predominant political value of the citizens and, consequently, policy should be guided by the national interest, whether of stability or expansion, with only secondary concern for the individual or humanity. "Idealism," on the other hand, insists that in the long run man will persist but nations and institutions will rise and fall; consequently, dominant values are human, and long-run policy should be guided by them and seek to adjust national policy and develop international institutions to serve them in a changing world, whether those values are stability or progress. Finally, "realism" insists that opposition to any policy is to be expected, while "idealism" sees that most policies are shared by some others and cooperation is possible. They agree that the remedy for opposition is cooperation with others—"Fight 'em or join 'em," say the politicians—"Know your enemy," say the preachers. The fight may be most important in the short run, but the results of cooperation may be more enduring.

This distinction is supported by usage. The "real" is usually taken to mean the actual, the present, the known, or the expected, and the "ideal" is taken to mean the perfect, the remote, the conceived, or the desired. Short-run policies are more closely related to the actual, the present, the known, and the expected than are long-run policies and so lend themselves to more "real-

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istic" treatment. Furthermore, in our period of history the needs of each nation are more actual, present, known, and anticipated by its people than are the needs of other nations or of humanity, and defense from enemies is more pressing than cooperation with friends for distant goals. Consequently, it is "realistic" to give primary attention to national interests and foreign enemies.

On the other hand, long-run policies must be based upon future contingencies which are remote and merely conceived, and can only be justified by their perfection and desirability, at least until the social sciences make possible prediction and control over longer periods and of far more accuracy than they do today. Consideration of such policies must, therefore, be in large measure "idealistic." Furthermore, say the "idealists," in the rapidly changing world the character, relative power, and even existence of present nations cannot be predicted through long periods of time; therefore, long-run policy ought to be based on more "idealistic" factors, such as the goals of human progress, human potentialities, and human needs, hopes, and desires, which are in fact more stable over long periods of time. Here the "idealists" differ from the "realists," insisting that as consideration is given to an increasingly distant future, it is more "realistic" to be "idealistic." The "realists" may retort that it is idle to waste energy on policy aimed at such a long run that efforts to predict the conditions upon which it must be based are mere speculation. To this the "idealist" replies that short-run policies of today create the conditions of the future, so it is suicidal not to give such intelligent consideration as we can to the conditions which are possible and the goals which are desired in the long run. If this is not done, say the "idealists," policy becomes a drift toward dangerous rapids which may not be very far ahead in a rapidly changing world. In any case, they say, it is clear that the world has so shrunk and interdependencies are so pervasive that the horizon of policy-making must be lifted from the nation to the world, from immediate antagonisms to more permanent ends enlisting general cooperation.[17]

[17] See my articles, "International Law and the Balance of Power," *American Journal of International Law*, XXXVII (January 1943), pp. 97ff., reprinted in *Compass of the*

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I conclude that statesmen should guide their policies by a philosophy of "realistic idealism" or "idealistic realism." Realism will teach them that both power and values, both conditions and symbols, both passion and reason, both necessities and choices have influence in human affairs, and will urge them to appraise their relative influence in the changing situations with which they are faced. Idealism will suggest attention to the wisdom of Pascal, echoing Solon and Grotius: "Justice without force is impotent; force without justice is tyrannical. It is necessary therefore to unite justice and force and to make that which is just strong and that which is strong just."[18]

It is perhaps fair to say that most of those who, like Dr. Herz, have emphasized the distinction between "idealism" and "realism" in international relations, while usually at first indicating a preference for the latter, have emerged with conclusions not unlike those of Pascal.

World (H. W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, eds.), New York, 1944, pp. 53ff., and "Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization," *Yale Law Journal*, LV (August 1946), p. 871, which attempt to evaluate "realistic" balance of power policies and "idealistic" international organization policies.

[18] Pascal, *Pensées*; Plutarch, *Solon*, par. 15; Grotius, *op.cit.*, Proleg., sec. 19, p. 16.

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Research Note

NATIONAL POLICIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS

By LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN

SEVEN years have passed since the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco in the month of June 1945. In that short time, events have disproved some of the most important assumptions about the postwar world on which the 1945 decisions were based.

Efforts have been made, notably in the improvisations of the Korea police action, in the creation of the Interim Committee, and in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, to adapt the structure conceived at San Francisco so that it would more closely meet the needs of the world as it emerged from the crucible of World War II. In addition, limited membership organizations, such as NATO, have been developed to compensate for the failure of the 1945 assumptions to be realized. Whatever may be said about the UN's "success" or "failure" in adapting itself to reality, it is clear that with respect at least to the relations among the Great Powers the 1945 prognosis was not a valid one.

The forward-looking assumptions were not the only ones on which the Charter decisions were based. In addition to the assumptions about the future conditions in which the UN would have to operate, there were other hypotheses, drawn largely from past experience, about the kind of organization which was theoretically necessary to carry out the purposes for which the UN was to be set up. For example, it was assumed that the UN should be based on the principle of sovereign equality of its members. In formulating these assumptions, the Charter planners relied heavily on the lessons of history and particularly the experience of previous international organizations. These in turn were based on similar hypotheses as to what was needed. The League of Nations, for example, assumed that there should be universality of membership.

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Finally, the purposes for which the UN was established were in themselves assumptions. For example, it was assumed that the UN should have as purposes both the peaceful settlement of disputes and the suppression of acts of aggression. It was assumed that the UN should not have international government as its purpose as advocated by world federalists.

The operating experience of the UN thus far suggests that there is need for re-examining the basic assumptions on which the UN and, in fact, international organizations in general are based. For example, the UN's experience on the question of membership at least suggests the need of examining the significance of the assumption that membership should be universal. The UN's difficulty in negotiating a conclusion to the hostilities in Korea while at the same time participating, in most respects, as a co-belligerent in open warfare in Korea suggests a need to re-examine objectively the assumption that one organization can both suppress aggression by force and settle disputes peacefully.

With these considerations in mind, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has undertaken a long-range program of reconsidering the hypotheses on which the basic decisions about international organizations have been based. The aim is, over the course of years, to subject to the most searching inquiry all the assumptions, past, present, and even future, about the basic essentials for effective organization to meet international needs, including the purposes which they should be expected to fulfill.

As a step in this direction, the Endowment has instituted in selected countries a program of studies of different national policies and attitudes toward international organization in general and the United Nations in particular.

It is hoped that these studies will produce valuable insights into the varying national perspectives from which problems of international organization are viewed. Examination of national participation in the United Nations and of national attitudes toward it should reveal what different national communities demand of international organizations and what are the internal factors which influence their expectations and interests and differentiate them from each other.

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The decision to proceed in this way was influenced by several other considerations. The UN Charter provides in Article 109 that the question of holding a conference to review the Charter should appear on the agenda for the session of the General Assembly in 1955, if no such conference has been held by that time. The need, therefore, to consider Charter review provides a focus for beginning to reconsider the assumptions on which the UN is based.

Furthermore, it was recognized that the greatest need, in this connection, would be for study in other countries. Studies of the UN Charter and of UN operations, directed precisely at the possibility of Charter review in or after 1955, are now under way in this country. Comparable studies in other countries would be useful in themselves and would supplement studies in the United States that have an American orientation.

In addition, the prospect of Charter review provides a good opportunity to stimulate self-appraisal in participating countries.

In short, the program aims at: (1) adding to the sum of knowledge about differing national interests in the UN by a process of mutual exchange; (2) increasing understanding within the participating countries of what the UN has meant in operation and how it may best be used to accomplish national purposes; and (3) suggesting possible lines of change in the Charter and structure of the UN and in the techniques of participation by members.

The studies will be carried out in a number of different countries, selected in order to ensure that there is representative coverage. Negotiations have already been concluded or have reached an advanced stage in Canada, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India. It is hoped to expand the coverage in Europe, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and to include countries in the Pacific and in Latin America.

In each case, a local scholar or scholars of high standing will do the main work of research and writing. The research will follow an outline prepared by the Carnegie Endowment in order to ensure that all the studies cover approximately the same ground, although it is expected that different national positions

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and interests will be reflected in the emphases of the manuscripts. Study groups of informed people, drawn as widely as possible from government, the academic world, trade unions, business and professional associations, and the like, will be set up in each participating country to help guide the scholar or scholars or to react to the manuscript as it is prepared. In each country, the work will go forward under the auspices of a private organization, such as the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Egyptian Society of International Law. The studies in each country are jointly financed by the local cooperating organization and the Carnegie Endowment.

The project has as its target date the spring of 1954. The expectation is that the manuscripts which emerge will be published in a series, subject to review in each case by competent authorities on the country concerned. There will be a final synthesizing volume which will attempt to indicate the areas of consensus among the participating countries, the areas of disagreement, and the stated or implicit factors in each country which influence its attitudes and policies toward the UN.

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